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Abstract 
In the cities of the South, water services in neighbourhoods of the poor are often obtained 
through self-managed organizations. This thesis aims to analyse the way in which these 
communitarian organizations influence the pattern of urban water governance. I define water 
governance as comprising state and non-state actors, institutions, practices, visions and 
discourses whose interactions, clashes and collaboration determine how, where, why, and 
by whom water and sanitation services are distributed. My fieldwork was conducted in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, between September 2013 and September 2014. I carried out 44 
interviews with state officials at different levels, leaders of 21 water cooperatives, as well as 
in-depth case studies in two water cooperatives. This was accompanied by mapping 
exercises, which allowed me to better place cooperatives in the territory. 
Analysing the case of the water cooperatives of Cochabamba, I argue that water cooperatives 
partially resist the attempt of the state to exercise power over their material waterscape, while 
also presenting alternative visions of how water provision should be carried out, both as 
single entities and through networks. Those two elements are fundamental for the dialectic 
built between the cooperatives and the state, which present instances of both conflict and 
cooperation. I argue therefore that communitarian organizations are not just subjected to 
larger-scale processes and powerful actors but that they can exercise agency and influence 
patterns of water provision. 
To understand how cooperatives influence water governance, I firmly ground actors and 
institutions in a waterscape. Control over their waterscape is a key component of the 
cooperatives’ capability to influence governance at a higher scale. I argue that the 
relationship between a cooperative and its members is fundamental for the capability of a 
cooperative to control, modify and maintain its waterscape. Such a relationship is often based 
on the feeling of ownership of the members over the cooperatives, a feeling that was created 
through the history of the cooperatives.  
This thesis establishes the usefulness of analysing different scales and spaces to understand 
water governance in an urban setting. Only by analysing the different histories, forms of 
control, and visions of actors at different scales is it possible to understand how and why 
communitarian organizations shape urban water governance.   
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Introduction 
This thesis examines water governance in Cochabamba, Bolivia, by explicitly addressing 
those organisations that operate outside of direct state control. Water governance in this 
dissertation is understood as being a deeply political affair, in which different providers, 
visions, and systems of regulation coexist and, at times, clash. In the Cochabamba 
conurbation, both communitarian and state organizations provide the water and sanitation 
service and therefore contribute to shaping its water governance.  In such a situation, the 
state does not have complete control over the way governance is shaped, and independent 
providers also assume an important role.  This thesis, therefore, investigates the role of these 
organizations in water governance. 
Rationale 
Communitarian and small-scale organizations in the South of the World have a fundamental 
importance in providing water service in areas that have been neglected by the state, often 
due to disordered processes of urbanization. In the urban South, in fact, polarization in access 
to sanitation services worsened starting in the 1970s with the growth of slums (Gandy, 2004, 
p. 372), cutting part of the population, often the most vulnerable, from access to piped water. 
Alternative methods for water access have growth including water trucks, small-scale sellers 
of water, artisanal wells, and small-scale networks (Allen et al., 2006, p. 334). Hence, small-
scale, informal, communitarian providers are diffuse in the South of the World, as they are 
one of the ways in which the urban population accesses water services where formal 
provision is insufficient or absent (Allen et al., 2006, p. 334; Bakker, 2010, pp. 23–24). Such 
is the situation in the Cochabamba conurbation, posed in the Cochabamba valley, Bolivia. 
The inhabitants of the Cochabamba conurbation access water in different ways. Some 
receive water from a municipal company, others from communitarian providers, privately 
owned water trucks, natural water sources, or private wells. This dissertation focuses on 
communitarian water providers. Spronk, Crespo and Olivera (2012, pp.18-19) describe 
“communitarian systems in peri-urban areas” in South-America as systems built by the 
people residing in rapidly growing peri-urban areas as a response to the absence of the state. 
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Such systems are characterized by small scale and a sense of ownership over the system by 
its users.  Similarly, I use the term “communitarian” as it is usually conceived in Bolivia, to 
say water and (more rarely) sewage systems that are built1, managed and owned by rural 
communities and urban neighbourhoods to respond to their own water needs. While I 
acknowledge, therefore, the existence of debates over the notion of “community”, in this 
dissertation I use the term communitarian following local usage. 
In the seven municipalities that compose the  Cochabamba conurbation, more than 600 
communitarian organizations supply potable water to approximately 58% of the population, 
while the 4 municipal operators provide it to only 26% of the population (PMMC, 2013, p. 
55). These communitarian providers have been fundamental in offering the service in a 
sprawling conurbation where large peri-urban areas have never been reached by a municipal 
water entity. The Cochabamba heterogenous and continuously growing process of 
urbanization then offers a good case study to understand how different communitarian 
organizations interact and are influenced by the physical and social characteristics of the 
conurbation. This allows me to place the management of water by the cooperatives in a 
geographical and historical context, linking it with larger processes.  
However, the main aim of this dissertation is not to understand how these organizations 
provide the service but what is their role in the wider governance of the conurbation. 
Cochabamba is a particularly interesting case for looking at this issue because the 
heterogeneous Cochabamba conurbation allows analysing how communitarian 
organizations and the state influence the waterscape and each other in different spaces and 
scales. Furthermore, under the Morales government, the state has been expanding its power 
in the conurbation’s water sector through the construction of water infrastructures and the 
formalization of communitarian water providers. These changes – along with the ensuing 
debate over the shape water governance should assume in the future – offer points of tension 
and debate that underline the political nature of water governance. In this situation, it is then 
important to understand how and why communitarian providers exercise power and to 
examine their influence in the overall shape that water governance takes in the conurbation.  
                                                 
1 With this I do not mean that such organizations do not receive external support to build and improve their 
system. This is, in fact, often the case in Cochabamba.  
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To explore this subject, I chose to investigate the water cooperatives operating in the 
Cochabamba conurbation. Communitarian providers there assume different organizational 
forms. Some systems are managed through formally recognized neighbourhood councils or 
independent water committees, while a minority operates through a water cooperative (these 
are often better-established ones). For various reasons, water cooperatives represent a good 
case study to investigate water governance in the Cochabamba conurbation. They are 
generally old, thus providing historical perspective; they are scattered around the 
conurbation, therefore helping me to examine their relationship with different 
municipalities; and they are organized in a federation, therefore allowing me to investigate 
the role of networks.  
 
Research Questions  
To analyse the way in which cooperatives influence urban water governance in the 
conurbation, I pose three different questions.  
My first question is the following:  
• How do cooperatives protect and further their role as water providers? 
Addressing this question helps me understand how cooperatives exercise power over their 
territories and to identify the sources of such power. Furthermore, I can identify how 
cooperatives look at their role and see how this vision is developed. Investigating these issues 
is fundamental for my overarching research aim for two reasons. Firstly, I can analyse how 
cooperatives exercise water governance in limited spaces and at the neighbourhood level. 
While this power is not an active attempt to influence the conurbation water governance, it 
does influence overall governance, both by modifying the material landscape and by 
influencing and limiting the way in which the state and other actors see and act on it. 
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Secondly, by answering this question I can discern how and why cooperatives exercise 
power in the conurbation. 
My second research question focuses on the state: 
• How do state institutions affirm their role in the water sector? 
Understanding how the state sees its role in water governance, and specifically in bringing 
water service, clarifies why certain legislations and infrastructural works are prioritized and 
executed. Additionally, understanding how they see and represent their role also allows me 
to comprehend how the state relates to and represents water providers. Furthermore, I can 
understand the means through which the state exercises power in water governance. Finally, 
viewing how the state officials represent their roles allows me to investigate differences in 
visions and roles amongst state organizations, along with the possible repercussions these 
differences have on their relationship with communitarian providers. The state is therefore 
not considered as a unified actor, and posing this question allows me to underline differences 
between state organizations at different scales.  Overall, this research question allows me to 
explore how the state exercises governance in the conurbation — in which spaces, in which 
ways, and for which reasons.   
My third research question is as follows: 
• How do the state and cooperatives interact in the water sectors? 
This research question enabled me to explore how water cooperatives exercise influence on 
a higher scale than their area of service, either by limiting the influence of the state in certain 
territories, creating networks capable of influencing state policies in the conurbation, or 
proposing alternative models of governance. I furthermore explore how the state influences 
the cooperatives and in which ways they react to such influence. Overall, I can then 
understand how the state and the cooperatives influence and limit each other’s capability to 
control water governance in the conurbation.  
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Theoretical framework 
Water governance in the conurbation is the result of the interaction of different actors, at 
different scales and in different places. This set of factors has determined how water is 
managed and distributed, by whom and for what reasons.  Therefore, I need to understand 
the reasons why these actors behave in various ways, how they interact, and the 
consequences of these actions and interactions on the territory of the conurbation. To 
understand how communitarian water providers contribute to shaping water governance, I 
used a framework of analysis that enabled me to both explore the interaction between actors 
working at different geographical scales and the deep relationships that communitarian 
providers create with their territory. 
My framework of analysis, therefore, encompasses the dimensions of territory and scale. 
Territory is necessary to examine the strong connection between providers and their material 
landscape and how it was created, as well as the power exercised by the state through 
material modification of the territory. The concept of scale is necessary for understanding 
the interaction between different actors at different geographical and administrative levels. 
Furthermore, I needed to consider the role of networks to grasp the strategies through which 
the cooperatives interact with the state and control their water sources.  
 To allow for a more in-depth examination of the dimension of territory in relation to water 
governance, I decided to examine it using the two complementary concepts of waterscape 
and hydro-social territory. The concept of waterscape permits me to analyse how water 
systems and society co-create both each other and the material landscape; while with the 
concept of hydro-social territories, I can analyse how these waterscapes are conceived by 
different actors.  
In this dissertation, I then needed to combine these four frameworks of analysis: scale, 
network, waterscape and hydro-social territory. To analyse the various interactions between 
them, I adapted the ‘territory-place-scale-network’ (TPSN) framework of Jessop et al.  
(2008: 390), which argues that socio-spatial dimensions such as these are ‘closely 
intertwined’, both theoretically and empirically. The TPSN framework then facilitates the 
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analysis of ‘mutually constitutive, and spatially intertwined dimensions of socio-spatial 
relations’ (Jessop et al., 2008: 389). These authors themselves encourage the addition of 
different socio-spatial dimensions, as well as the possibility of using only a few of them. 
Therefore, I modified their framework to suit my research better.  To this end, I substitute in 
the TPSN framework, the concepts of territory and place with those of the waterscape and 
hydro-social territory. Waterscape is the result of the interactions between society, water and 
landscape, while hydro-social territory is used to signify the different visions and 
knowledges over the waterscape. Using these two concepts I introduce the mutual 
interactions between actors, natural resources, and the physical landscape in the analysis. 
With this modified framework, I then put different methods of analysing water governance 
into relationship. 
Methodology  
To carry out my research, I explored how various levels of the state influence water 
governance and control the waterscape, how cooperatives carry out governance in their 
waterscape, and how different levels of the state and the cooperatives interact. My research 
design, therefore, aimed to enable me to explore multiple scales and spaces in the 
conurbation. To this end, I used qualitative mixed methods to carry out a research that was 
multi-space and multi-scale in nature.  
Hence, I carried out in-depth case studies in two water cooperatives, and these included 
participant observation, interviews and document analysis. I interviewed in total 127 
respondents in the two cooperatives, including both water users and cooperatives directors 
and employees. This approach allowed me to examine the relationship of the cooperatives 
with their waterscape and with their members, along with how they conceive their role and 
interact with other territorial actors. To understand how the cooperatives are embedded in 
the conurbation’s waterscape, and how they view and act on it, I held in-depth interviews 
with representatives of the cooperatives active in the conurbation, carrying out interviews 
with representatives of 21 cooperatives. To clarify the role of networks, I also examined the 
Federation of Water Cooperatives of the Cochabamba Department (FECOAPAC). To 
comprehend the role of the state at different scales and in different spaces, I interviewed 44 
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representatives of the state at various levels, from municipal water providers to the Vice-
Ministry for Potable Water and Sanitation.  
Main findings 
Because cooperatives were created to remedy the absence of the state in providing this 
service, they needed to acquire material and discursive control over their waterscape. This 
control is exercised through its material construction and defence; for example, through 
wells construction and member participation in communitarian works. Furthermore, the 
cooperatives also exercise discursive control over the waterscape by creating an imagined 
hydro-social territory based on their history, which engenders feelings of ownership in the 
cooperative members. Both of these forms of control need the support of their members, 
who, therefore, have a central role in the cooperative’s ability to influence water governance.  
Under the Morales government, the view that the state is responsible for providing water 
services emerged strongly. However, this position at time conflicts with their 
acknowledgement of communitarian providers. State policies in Bolivia, and in Cochabamba 
in particular, aim to reinforce the material presence and control of the state in the water 
sector. Interviews with state officials highlighted that they see the waterscape of the 
conurbation as disordered, also due to a lack of official data, and most of their policies can 
be interpreted as an attempt to order and control it. One such policy is the registration of 
communitarian providers; another is the construction of large-scale water and sewage 
infrastructures that reinforce their material control.  
This strengthening of the role of the state has created tension with the cooperatives, 
especially at the municipal authority level.  It reflects a fundamental discussion that emerged 
in the conurbation regarding the scale at which water provision should be carried out. 
Representatives of municipal providers often defended the view that providing the service 
is their legitimate role. However, interviews with staff at different levels of the state revealed 
that their views on the role of communitarian providers are not homogeneous.  
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Cooperatives employed two main strategies to exercise power at the conurbation level. One 
was the establishment of relationships with different levels of the state through their umbrella 
organization (FECOAPAC). One of the main aims of this strategy was for the cooperatives 
to be considered as legitimate recipients of state resources. Another strategy was through the 
presentation and implementation of alternative, small-scale models for solving the water and 
sanitation issues of the conurbation.  
Contribution to knowledge  
This dissertation offers a contribution to the body of work analysing multiple actors in water 
governance. The influence of grassroots associations in urban governance has been 
considered in the literature (e.g., Appadurai 2001, p. 35), and the capability of rural 
indigenous organizations to influence water governance has also been explored, especially 
concerning the Andean region (Boelens et al., 2015; Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 487).  
Studies of ‘informal’ providers in urban areas and their interactions with formal ones have 
also been carried out  (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2014; Bakker, 2008; Cheng, 2014; Marston, 2014; 
McMillan et al., 2014; Schwartz et al., 2015). However, in-depth studies of how 
communitarian providers can influence and exercise power over urban water governance are 
rare.  
This dissertation contributes to this body of work by analysing ways in which communitarian 
organizations can exercise power over water governance in urban areas.  First, I explore the 
importance of the material and discursive control that the cooperatives exercise over the 
waterscape and conclude that the control that they exercise over their material waterscape is 
fundamental for their capability to exercise power in front of the state and other 
organizations. Second, I look at the basis of their control. I argue that the way in which the 
cooperative members see the waterscape (i.e., as a result of their history and of their 
sacrifices) is fundamental for the cooperatives’ ability to exercise power. Third, I argue that 
the development of a discourse over their ability to offer an alternative to large-scale 
providers is fundamental for formulating a contrast to state discourses.  
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To investigate these issues, I furthermore modified the TPSN framework to include the 
waterscape and hydro-social territories. This modification contributes to the set of 
frameworks of analyses in the context of urban water governance, especially where providers 
acting at different levels are present. This allows me to connect different imaginaries and 
conceptions of the waterscape (analysed through the hydro-social territories) with 
governance at a higher scale. For example, it allowed me to connect the feeling of ownership 
over the waterscape on the part of the members of the cooperatives with their cooperative 
discursive defence of an alternative model for water governance. This feeling of ownership 
has also led to their subsequent resistance to state policies, as well as clarifying their power 
to do so.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the literature on democratic water governance. It 
posits that democratic governance is based on the capability of the inhabitants to shape the 
city. This right is often exercised within small-scale territories, where communitarian 
organizations are capable of shaping their neighbourhoods. However, this dissertation 
emphasizes that the capability of the citizens to debate and contribute over the shape water 
provision should take at the conurbation level is severely curtailed. The capability of the 
cooperatives to shape networks and participate in influencing water governance at the 
conurbation level, can then be interpreted as contributing to the democratization of 
governance in the conurbation.  
Overview of chapters  
The first chapter establishes how water governance is defined in this dissertation and 
illustrates the theoretical framework I use to analyse Cochabamba water governance. After 
explaining why the concept of scale does not allow a detailed examination of the 
historical/geographical grounding of communitarian organizations, I then introduce the 
concept of waterscape and hydro-social territories. I argue for their usefulness in connecting 
discourses over water provision with its material base. I next connect the concept of scale 
with that of the waterscape, hydro-social territory and networks, by modifying the TPSN 
framework of Jessop et al. (2008). Lastly, I ground this dissertation in the wider literature 
on urban water governance, communitarian water provision, and democratic water 
governance.   
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The second chapter analyses the history of the Cochabamba conurbation. Focusing on the 
development of its waterscape enables me to underline how communitarian providers and 
state provision were co-produced in the valley. Understanding the history of the conurbation 
is fundamental to understanding how water rights, water provisions and state control were 
created there.  The transformation of land and water ownership in the valley through state 
legislation still contributes to today’s distribution of water rights. The disordered growth of 
the conurbation led to a reduced state control over peri-urban areas and to the formation of 
communitarian organizations. The state’s attempt to retake control of such areas through 
policies aimed at making them part of its apparatus is still the basis for the relationship 
between it and urban neighbourhoods. Finally, I examine how the policies of the Morales 
government shape water governance in the conurbation today.   
Chapter 3 explores the methodology I used during my fieldwork and how I analysed the data 
I obtained. This chapter explains the reasons for using a multi-scale, multi-space and mixed-
methods research design. Such designs included in-depth case studies of two cooperatives, 
interviews with representatives of cooperatives and interviews with state officials at different 
levels. I then describe some of the ethical issues I negotiated during my fieldwork and reflect 
on how my positionality may have affected data collection. I lastly describe how the data 
were analysed.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the cooperatives of the Cochabamba conurbation and on my two case 
studies. I examine why the cooperatives were established and how their history influences 
how they are embedded in the conurbation waterscape. I then analyse how the cooperatives 
established their control over their area of service and water sources and look at the different 
forms this control takes. I then focus on the relationship between the cooperatives and their 
members and discuss its importance for maintaining control over the waterscape.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the role of the state in urban water governance. I analyse how state 
officials see the conurbation, stressing that the lack of control over certain areas of the 
conurbation is correlated with their lack of knowledge of it. I explore how legislative and 
political changes, as well as infrastructural projects, influenced the waterscape of the 
conurbation. I pinpoint differences in how various levels of the state see the cooperatives.   
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Chapter 6 analyses the interaction between the state and the cooperatives. I focus here on the 
question of ‘scale’ and on how, both discursively and materially, the state is pushing for 
water governance to be carried out at the level of the municipality or of the conurbation. I 
then underline how the cooperatives resist this discourse or attempt to adapt to it (such as by 
forming networks to present their requests to different levels of the state or by creating 
alternatives to large-scale infrastructural projects).  
The conclusion analyses how the preceding chapters contribute to answering the research 
question, presents the key findings of this dissertation and underlines some limitations and 
possible areas for future research. I then focus on outlining how this dissertation 
contributes to knowledge both analytically and empirically.  
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1. Connecting urban water governance and communitarian 
organizations 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the theoretical framework through which I can answer 
my research question. To this end, this chapter is a theoretical point of view to the exploration 
of how water cooperatives affects the wider water governance of the conurbation.  
Furthermore, it expands on the existing literature on urban water governance, connecting it 
to my developments.  
In the first section of this chapter, I outline my definition of water governance. This 
definition presents governance as a deeply political process, influenced by different actors, 
acting at different scales and with different values and objectives.  
The second section outlines a framework which allows me to analyse these different facets 
of governance. I first look at the concept of scale that is often used to analyse the way in 
which place-based organizations relate to the state.  However, scale alone does not offer 
sufficient scope for the analysis of the historical-geographical grounding of communitarian 
organizations. To analyse how both cooperatives and the state control, build, and look at 
their territory, I then introduce the concept of waterscape and hydro-social territories. These 
concepts allow me to understand different facets of Cochabamba governance. However, I 
need to understand how they interact with each other.   
To elaborate a framework that allows me to analyse the interaction between different facets 
of governance, I adapt Jessop et al.'s (2008) TPSN (Territory-Place-Space-Network) 
framework. This framework  analyses the ‘mutually constitutive, and spatially intertwined 
dimensions of socio-spatial relations’ (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 389). However, in its original 
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form it does not include the material landscape. To this end, I include the concepts of hydro-
social territory and waterscape.  
The third section of the chapter grounds my research within the current debate on the role of 
communitarian organizations in water governance. Firstly, I place this thesis in the wider 
range of debates and policies concerning water provision through communitarian 
organizations in the Urban South. I focus on the debate about the capability of 
communitarian organizations to exercise agency and to influence water governance. I 
underline how my research contributes to this debate. Lastly, I consider how the participation 
of communitarian organizations in shaping their neighbourhoods and wider processes of 
governance, can be considered as a way in which marginal communities exercise their ‘right 
to the city’.  
1.1. Water Governance: a definition  
In this thesis, I define water governance as the result of the interactions between different 
actors, at different scale, with different values and political visions. These interactions 
determine how water is distributed, to whom, by whom and for what reasons. Water 
governance, therefore, ‘should not be understood as a monolithic or homogeneous set of 
policies and practices, as competing institutional arrangements and values may coexist or 
compete’ (Perreault, 2008, p. 839).  
This definition of governance draws on critical scholarship which argues that environmental 
governance should be looked at as a deeply political process shaped by different actors 
seeking to realize different political projects (Castro, 2007a, p. 102).  As a consequence, an 
analysis of governance should include: 
a range of formal and informal institutions, social groups, processes, interactions, and 
traditions, all of which influence how power is exercised, how public decisions are 
taken, how citizens become engaged or disaffected, and  who gains legitimacy and 
influence (Reed and Bruyneel, 2010, p. 647).  
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The notion of power, and in whose interest is exercised, is central to my analysis of water 
governance. Governance is shaped by ‘relationships of power, divergence and conflict’  
(Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 491). Governance, as a result,  ‘reflects and embodies 
dominant interests and positions’ (Budds and Hinojosa, 2012, p. 122), and continuously 
changes. As it can be more clearly seen in the South of the World, power is central to the 
analysis of the process of urbanization of water, as water is considered to be a conduit 
through which society and power relations are produced, shaped, and reproduced (Loftus, 
2009, p. 594). 
As a result of such power relations, an analysis of water governance should not only include 
the distributions and control of material resources, but also of values and worldviews. Power, 
therefore, should be analysed in all its facets: as material or discursive, economic, political, 
and cultural (Heynen et al., 2006, p. 12). Castro (2007a, p. 106), in fact, argues that:  
The core of governance has to do with determining what ends and values should be 
chosen and the means by which those ends and values should be pursued, i.e. the 
direction of the social unit, e.g. society, community or organization.  
While having material direct power over resources is important, the conception of how 
society should be organized must also be included in the analysis. I take into consideration 
both material and discursive aspects of power in the present work. This is because the clashes 
between the different ways in which communitarian organizations and the state see their 
respective roles and the conception they have of their territory are fundamental to understand 
their interactions. Furthermore, the way in which they perceive and think about water 
provision influences and is influenced by their power to materially modify the water 
infrastructure and distribution. How these two forms of power are conceptualized in this 
thesis is described in Section 1.2. 
How power is obtained and exercised in water governance should be considered looking at 
different scales. Water and power act at different, but complementary levels: from large scale 
infrastructures to more intimate spaces, such as the home (Loftus, 2009, p. 959). My work 
underlines the need to connect power created through relationships between members and 
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cooperatives to the cooperatives' power to exercise or resist control over the territory at 
different scales. 
Therefore, one needs to take into consideration all kinds of actors and institutions, as well as 
analysing the values and visions that support and motivate them. One must also take into 
account which actors are reinforced or weakened, not only materially, but also discursively, 
through specific policies. To analyse water governance in Cochabamba, I need to explore 
the differing visions that the cooperatives and the state have over their territory as well as 
how their policies materially influence it. Furthermore, cooperatives and the state operate at 
different scales. Therefore, one needs to analyse how scale influences their relative power to 
modify, materially and discursively, water governance.  How all these elements can be 
considered together is analysed in the next section.  
1.2. Space, scale, nature, and actors  
This section focuses on building an analytical framework to analyse how Cochabamba’s 
cooperatives influence water governance.  I, therefore, need to explore the different facets 
of water governance in Cochabamba and to explain how these different facets are correlated. 
To that end, I build a framework of analysis which enhances the TPSN (Territory, Place, 
Scale, Network) framework of Jessop et al. (2008).  
I first explore the concept of scale, underlining its useful aspects and its weaknesses.  Two 
strands of literature are particularly useful. The first concerns how the concept of scale is 
used to analyse the ways in which local organizations connect with actors at larger 
geographical scales. The second revolves around the politics of scale, that is, the way in 
which scale is established. The concept of scale, however, does not allow for sufficient 
attention to be paid to the relationship between communities and their territory, and to the 
material elements that influence water governance. To compensate for the limitations of the 
concept of scale, I introduce the concepts of waterscape and hydro-social territory, which 
offer the necessary tools to examine how society, power, institutions, and the material 
territory (e.g. water infrastructure, water sources) are co-produced, and to examine both the 
material and discursive effects of their interactions. 
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Lastly, I bring forth a framework of analysis that encompasses these concepts, namely an 
enhanced TPSN framework (Jessop et al. 2008), which posits that different socio-spatial 
dimensions (such as territory, place, scale, network and possibly others) are ‘closely 
intertwined’. To adapt this framework specifically to the analysis of water governance, I 
introduce the concept of hydro-social territory and waterscape and apply them in relation to 
the concepts of scale and network. 
1.2.1. Scale and politics of scale, a fundamental but limited concept 
As it has been stated, scale is fundamental to understanding water governance for several 
reasons. First, scale provides a framework to analyse the way in which social actors are able 
to operate at different levels (Budds and Hinojosa, 2012, p. 123). This is crucial to 
understand the way in which communitarian providers can influence governance at higher 
scales. Second, political ecology scholarship posits that scale is a contested socio-political 
construct (Norman et al., 2012, pp. 53–55)  that was developed to ‘justify certain 
perspectives, and/or reconfigure power and authority’ (Budds and Hinojosa, 2012, p. 123). 
In Cochabamba, analysing discourses concerning the scale at which certain services should 
be provided is fundamental to understanding the tensions between the state and 
communitarian providers. Understanding that scale is created, but that it has significant 
consequences for actors in the conurbation, offers scope to analyse such debates.  
The relationship between Cochabamba’s local cooperatives and the state involves 
interactions at very different scales. It is therefore important to analyse how the concept of 
scale has been used to explore how such interactions take place. The literature on scale has 
considered the way in which local organizations can exercise real influence beyond the very 
local scale.  The concept of jumping-scale was introduced to describe the ways in which 
local actors may bypass scalar hierarchies to form alliances with actors operating at a higher 
scales (such as international networks) (Marston, 2014, p. 74). However, the concept of 
jumping scale is contested as too restrictive and as sharply dividing the local from the global, 
while affording little capability for agency to local organizations (Marston, 2014, p. 74). 
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Marston (2014), in her analysis of Cochabamba water committees, suggests linking the 
theory of scale to informal urban theory. She focuses on Roy’s (2005, p. 154) work on urban 
informality, which argues that more attention needs to be paid to the way in which local 
actors strategically engage ‘with multiple sovereignties’ (that is, in this context: multiple 
authorities) at different scales.  Conceptualising scalar interactions as interactions with 
‘multiple sovereignties’ is a useful way of looking at how cooperatives interact with the 
state. In Cochabamba, cooperatives often interact with different agencies and state-
institutions based on what they hope to obtain and through the links that they have been able 
to establish. Depending on the issue at hand, the scale at which these actors operate is more 
or less significant (e.g. when looking for funding the scale at which the financing body 
operates is not particularly important).  
The interaction of cooperatives with state agencies and other organizations then takes place 
in multiple arenas (Budds and Hinojosa, 2012, p. 123), through interaction with different 
‘sovereigns’ (Marston, 2014),  at different scales and for different reasons. This way to look 
at how communitarian providers influence governance at higher scales, therefore, 
encourages an analysis of different reasons and strategies to understand why such influence 
might be necessary.  
So far, I have considered scale as the ‘arena’ in which cooperatives operate, but scale and 
more precisely the establishment of different scales, is also a political objective (Budds and 
Hinojosa, 2012, p. 123).  This conception of scale is important, in order to understand water 
governance in Cochabamba. Currently, the debate on how (and by whom) the water service 
should be provided is heavily influenced by ‘politics of scale’, namely disputes on the 
appropriate scale at which water and wastewater should be managed. While scale itself is a 
social construct built through scalar politics, it has an important impact on water governance 
and in the capability of communities to exercise agency. This point is underlined in the 
literature on scale, which stresses that ‘scale is both fluid and fixed’ (Born and Purcell, 2006, 
p. 197). This means that when a scale is defined it has a real influence on how power is 
distributed, but its definition is a result of political interactions. In Cochabamba, scale has a 
real impact on water users and communities, and assumptions over the appropriate scale of 
water governance have a direct consequence on how the cooperatives relate with the state.   
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Looking at scale as socially produced also uncovers the mechanisms of power that influence 
the choice of the scale at which water governance is supposed to take place.  The political 
meaning of this debate is often obscured by technocratic reasoning. Difficulties in contesting 
assumptions about the ‘proper’ scale of service provision and even in presenting it as a 
legitimate debate, is one of the themes of my research. This is common, as often debates 
about the scale of water governance lead to the reification of scale. Analysing how scale is 
politically constituted allows us to challenge it. Normal et al. (2012), emphasize the 
importance of linking the study of water governance with the politics of scale, thus paying 
more attention to how scale is created and changed based on power relationships and on who 
is included or excluded in these processes. In this way, the neutrality of scale is challenged, 
and what are presented as ‘neutral’ technical choices can often be subjected to political 
discussions. 
Scale is a fundamental concept in order to examine how water governance is structured and 
how actors’ interactions shape it.  However, scale presents some analytical weaknesses. One 
of the main problems posed, is that the concept of scale does not allow enough attention to 
the profound relations between actors and territory.  Scale is not sufficient to analyse the role 
of communitarian organizations in water governance, as their power is based on their relation 
to their territory, their users and their history (as it is examined in Chapter 4). In other words, 
it is impossible to look at the ‘scalar politics’ of communitarian organizations without taking 
into account the deep connections they have with their neighbourhoods, land, water 
resources, and the discourses they use to legitimize their role as providers. For this reason, 
the concept of scale should be enhanced through the addition of other socio-spatial 
dimensions. Two of the concepts that I argue should be used are those of hydro-social 
territory and waterscape, which I present in the following section.  
1.2.2. Hydro-social territories and waterscape 
The concept of hydro-social territory and of waterscape connect water, territory, actors and 
institutions. In this way, I tackle the limitations of the concept of scale explored in the 
preceding section. To answer my research question, in fact, I need to connect social 
processes and relations with their material base, that is, water infrastructures, water sources 
and, more generally, the landscape of the Cochabamba conurbation. It is not possible to 
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examine the cooperatives without looking at how they modify and reproduce their 
waterscape, and how their organizations are influenced by the material landscape. At the 
same time, it is not possible to look at state policies without looking at, for example, the 
material large-scale infrastructures that they are building, and at the material and discursive 
consequences that such building engenders.  
Both the concepts of waterscape and of hydro-social territory derive from the Political 
Ecology school of thought, which seeks to transcend the nature/culture binary (Heynen et 
al., 2006, p. 5), underlining the co-determination of environmental and social changes 
(Heynen et al., 2006, p. 11).  Following such reasoning, it is imperative to introduce territory, 
water, and infrastructures in my analysis, while at the same time underlining how these 
elements should not be analysed as a ‘neutral’ background to water governance. With such 
an addition, I am able to analyse the deep material and discursive relationships that 
communitarian organizations have with their territory.  
The political ecology school of thought has used various terms to explain the way in which 
water, society, and power interact with the material landscape, and the material and 
discursive effects that these interactions produce. To analyse water governance in 
Cochabamba, the concepts of waterscape and hydro-social territories are particularly useful.  
These two concepts provide a framework through which I examine both the combination of 
material territory, actors, and institutions (waterscape) that participate in water governance 
and the discourses and imaginaries (hydro-social territories) that influence the choices of 
certain governance configurations over others. These two concepts should ‘be viewed as 
complementary and even mutually reinforcing’ (Karpouzoglou and Vij, 2017, p. 2), even if 
they might, at times, overlap. To expand on those two concepts, the remainder of the sub-
section will more clearly explore how I define them and how I intend to use them to analyse 
Cochabamba’s water governance.  
The waterscape is the result of the ever-changing interactions between society and water, 
that take place at different scales, in different times, and are influenced by power. The 
waterscape allows for an analysis of the connection between water, power and governance 
(Norman et al., 2012, p. 55), and more specifically, of the way in which unequal power 
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relations influence (and are influenced by) the way water is distributed in different spaces 
and at different times (Karpouzoglou and Vij, 2017, p. 2).  
The flexibility of the concept of waterscape enables one to pay attention to ‘the geographical 
situatedness’ of socio-natural relations and give space for ‘detailed empirical observation’. 
As it is not linked to a specific scale of analysis, it can be used to study issues at any scale. 
In fact, it is possible to see a multiplicity of waterscapes within the city (Karpouzoglou and 
Vij, 2017, pp. 2–4). It therefore, enables the study of the interaction between self-managed, 
non-centralized water providers and municipal water providers working at different scales. 
Furthermore, the concept of waterscape makes the study of different meanings and 
institutions that shape water governance, water provision and social identities 
(Karpouzoglou and Vij, 2017, p. 3) possible. This flexibility is of particular importance in 
Bolivia where ‘water governance (…) is comprised of a patchwork of institutional 
arrangements, norms and traditional uses, legal grey areas and sector specific politics’ 
(Perreault, 2014, p. 242). 
One of the major themes of this dissertation is the importance of physical infrastructures, of 
the control of the landscape, and how these relate with the history and the institutions of 
water cooperatives. Therefore, in this dissertation, I use the concept of waterscape mainly to 
analyse the way in which the landscape and society (to say water sources, the land, 
infrastructures on one hand and actors and institutions on the other) co-create each other, 
paying attention to how relationships of power are inscribed in these relations and in the land 
itself, through laws, property, infrastructures, and the geographically unequal distribution of 
services and resources. 
However, the concept of waterscape is not the only one used to analyse the water-human-
landscape-power interactions. The second concept I use in this dissertation is that of hydro-
social territory. Hydro-social territory is defined as: 
the contested imaginary and socio-environmental materialization of a spatially bound 
multi-scalar network in which humans, waterflows, ecological relations, hydraulic 
infrastructure, financial means, legal-administrative arrangements and cultural 
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institutions and practices are interactively defined, aligned and mobilized through 
epistemological belief systems, political hierarchies and naturalizing discourses 
(Boelens et al., 2016, p. 3). 
The concept of hydro-social territory is of particular interest, because it enables one to see 
how water spaces are represented by different groups. This concept focuses on the co-
existence of overlapping imagined territories, sustained by different regimes, imaginaries, 
knowledges and technologies.  Certain hydro-social territories are dominant over others 
(Hommes et al., 2016, p. 18; Karpouzoglou and Vij, 2017, p. 2). The ‘dominant’ one is 
usually created and imagined by the state and is often connected with ideas of progress and 
modernity. This concept of hydro-social territory allows for an analysis of how the state aims 
to make local territories ‘comprehensible’ and discipline local communities, by selecting 
which territories and systems of knowledges are acceptable and which ones should be 
eliminated  (Boelens et al., 2016, p. 6; Hommes et al., 2016, p. 11; Hoogesteger et al., 2016, 
p. 94). Most policies currently pursued by the Bolivian state in the Cochabamba conurbation 
seem to share the aim of making the waterscape more ordered and controllable. An example 
of this, is the registration of communitarian providers (explored in Chapter 5). Therefore, 
how the state interprets the hydro-social territory has a strong impact on its relationship with 
communitarian providers. 
Furthermore, the concept of hydro-social territories can be used to analyse conflicts and/or 
coexistence between overlapping territories, ‘territories of territories’ built over the same 
material base but given different meanings by different actors and discourses (Boelens et al., 
2016; Hoogesteger et al., 2016, p. 5). In the present thesis, I use this concept mainly to 
understand how different actors ‘see’ the waterscape, and how such conceptions influence 
and are influenced by the material and institutional waterscape. The usage of this concept 
leads to an analysis of how communities and the state cooperate or clash, not only at the 
material but also at the discursive level. How the cooperatives see and represent themselves 
and their territory, and how they see the state, is connected to their history and their sense of 
ownership over the waterscape. This sense of ownership is the base of their capability to put 
forth their own imagined hydro-social territory, to say the way in which they imagine an 
ideal waterscape in the conurbation. Their ability to do so is one of the ways in which 
cooperatives influence water governance (as it is argued in Chapter 4). 
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1.2.3. Putting together hydro-social territories, waterscape, scale and 
network.  
In this section, I introduce a framework that puts the concept of waterscape, hydro-social 
territories, scale and networks in connection with each other. To do this, I extend the TPSN 
framework of Jessop et al. (2008), which brings four different socio-spatial dimensions 
(Territory, Place, Scale and Network) to the foreground. I adapt this framework to the 
analysis of water governance by substituting the dimensions of territory and place with 
waterscape and hydro-social territory. This allows me to connect the spatial analysis of the 
TPSN framework with the analysis of the co-creation between society and the physical 
landscape of political ecology. Finally, I describe how this framework can help me analyse 
different facets of the Cochabamba water governance. 
The concepts of waterscape, hydro-social territory and scale were examined in the preceding 
sections. Furthermore, I introduce the concept of network which represents a fundamental 
strategy through which communitarian organizations exercise power over the waterscape at 
different scales. For example, water cooperatives created a federation, which allows them to 
defend themselves more effectively when dealing with the state. The study of networks is 
therefore important to understand the way in which communitarian organizations influence 
governance. Networks (formal and informal) are used in two different ways. Firstly, they 
can be used by communitarian organizations to enhance their capacity to shape the discourse 
on water and governance arrangements, and, more generally, their capability to interact with 
the state and to defend their waterscape. Networks can then be used to propagate ideas over 
the hydro-social territory of communitarian organizations at different scales (Hoogesteger et 
al., 2016)  and give them a better capability to resist and present requests to the state. 
Secondly, informal networks that develop through the lived history of the cooperatives and 
their struggle to build their waterscape are fundamental to build a communal vision over the 
cooperatives, which, I argue, are the basis of their capability to control their waterscape. As 
Boelens et al. (Boelens et al., 2016, pp. 4–5) argue, mutual cooperation and mobilization for 
the defence of the territory form the basis of rural communities’ control over their water 
systems (Boelens et al., 2016, pp. 4–5). I argue that this observation is also valid for urban 
communities. 
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Even though all these concepts are useful on their own, one needs to understand how they 
relate to each other in order to analyse how water governance in Cochabamba is shaped.  
Each of these concepts allows for the study of the different ways in which actors can exercise 
power over the waterscape, but I also need to understand how these different ways of 
exercising power are correlated.  For example, I need to analyse how different groups 
conceive the waterscape, to say how they create different hydro-social territories. I also need, 
however, to analyse how these conceptions influence and are influenced by institutional and 
material changes in the waterscape.  
The necessity to connect different ‘socio-spatial dimensions’ is also underlined by Jessop et 
al (2008). They presented a framework which connects four different ‘dimensions’: 
Territory, Place, Scale and Network. Jessop et al. argue that these dimensions are 
theoretically and empirically ‘intertwined’, (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 390), ‘mutually 
constituted, and spatially interweaved’ (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 389). This framework is 
particularly useful for the examination of ‘material interactions among different structures 
and strategies that draw upon these principles of socio-spatial organization in differential, 
historically, and geographically specific ways’ (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 394). The TPSN 
framework ‘is particularly suitable to capture who gains and who loses, where and in what 
socio-spatial form of water governance’ (Beveridge et al., 2017, p. 28) and to pinpoint the 
‘built-in tension’ (Beveridge et al., 2017, p. 33) engendered by the challenge posed to the 
‘territorial competence of an urban municipal water utility (...) by a decentralized system 
approach’ (Beveridge et al., 2017, p. 30), a tension that is central to Cochabamba’s water 
governance. 
However, in order to analyse water governance, I argue that I need to enhance this 
framework, by adding the dimensions of waterscape and hydro-social territory to be able to 
ground my research in the material landscape without losing sight of social interactions. 
Jessop et al. (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 392) themselves suggest that the dimension of 
nature/environment could be added to the framework. However, the interplay between the 
available natural resources and social interactions (Heynen et al., 2006, p. 5) implies that 
one must look at cities as co-created by deeply political socio-natural processes (Gandy, 
2004, p. 364; Swyngedouw, 2006, p. 114). ‘Nature’ therefore, cannot be considered on its 
own, as it cannot be analysed without a social component, and the results of such socio-
natural processes should be analysed as a whole. The hydro-social territory and the 
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waterscape allows me to analyse different facets of the results of such socio-natural 
processes.  These two concepts therefore allow introducing material elements in my analysis, 
while putting them in relations with social and political processes.  
I also made the decision not to include in the framework the dimension of place and territory. 
These two concepts, in fact allows one to understand the way in which space is patterned, 
bordered, and given meaning. The concept of waterscape and hydro-social territory, 
however, also allows me to analyse how space is modified, shaped and conceived, but 
furthermore allows me to understand how such actions are connected with the physical 
landscape, and specifically with water. In this way, this analysis becomes more meaningful 
when speaking about the governance of water, as it allows to take into consideration both 
the material, social and spatial elements that contribute to create water governance. For 
example, the concept of territory allows the examination of what is considered as ‘inside or 
outside’ (Jessop et al., 2008). Using the concept of hydro-social territory, I can specifically 
analyse what spaces are considered (or imagined) as ‘belonging’ to a cooperative, and why, 
and how these conceptions are connected to physical elements such as water sources and 
water infrastructures.  
In the following table, I present my framework and how it allows to examine different facets 
of water governance. The interactions considered in the table help me answer my research 
questions, as it is explained further down. The table is a modification of the framework 
produced by Jessop et al. (2008).  As in the table presented in Jessop et al, (2008) paper, I 
present the dimensions of socio-spatial interactions as both a structuring principle, and as 
field of operation (Jessop et al., 2008, p. 393). A clear example of that distinction can be 
found by examining the concept of scale.  As it is mentioned in Section 1.2.1, scale can be 
considered as both the arena in which the cooperatives operate and as structuring principles 
through which different scales are defined (e.g. the territorial levels of the state, such as the 
municipality, region, and national state).   
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STRUCTURING 
PRINCIPLES 
FIELD OF OPERATIONS 
WATERSCAPE HYDRO-
SOCIAL 
TERRITORIES 
SCALE NETWORK 
WATERSCAPE Creation of 
waterscape(s) 
Influence of the 
existence of 
different 
waterscapes on 
the hydro-social 
territories (e.g. 
seeing the 
waterscape as 
disordered) 
Waterscape 
as 
constituted 
by 
interlocking 
waterscapes 
at different 
levels 
Necessity to 
establish 
networks to 
defend a 
waterscape 
HYDRO-
SOCIAL  
TERRITORIES 
Discourses 
connected with 
the construction 
of waterscapes 
(e.g. sense of 
ownership on the 
waterscape) 
Creation of 
hydro- social 
territories  
Connection 
between 
hydro-social 
territories 
and scale 
(e.g. at what 
scale 
governance 
should be 
carried out) 
How 
networks 
influence 
hydro-social 
territories  
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SCALE Building of 
waterscape at 
different scales 
(e.g. building 
large-scale 
infrastructures) 
How hydro-
social territories 
are structured at 
different scale 
Creation of 
different 
scales 
Networks 
structured at 
different 
scales 
NETWORK How networks 
influence the 
structure of the 
waterscape 
Networks created 
due to shared 
hydro-social 
territories 
How 
cooperatives 
connected to 
sovereignties 
at different 
scales  
Reasons for 
the creation 
of a network 
Table 1: Author's modification of Jessop et al. (2008) table. 
I use the various interactions between the dimensions of waterscape and hydro-social 
territory to explore how the state and the cooperatives protect and further their role as 
providers (my first and second research questions, as presented in the introduction to this 
thesis). For example, the common experiences that derive from the construction of the 
waterscape of cooperatives create a shared hydro-social territory. That is, the members of a 
cooperative participate through their work and monetary contributions to the construction of 
the water infrastructures. Such efforts create a communal sense of ownership over the 
cooperative, which leads to a shared view of the cooperative. The connection can be then 
extended further: the hydro-social territory reinforces the discursive control of the 
cooperatives over the waterscape and influences the material construction of the waterscape. 
That is, the shared view of the cooperative can influence the way in which their members 
are ready to support it by, for example, improving it materially.   
On the other hand, by analysing the role of the state, I can understand how the existence of 
differently positioned waterscapes in the conurbation is the reason why the hydro-social 
territory is conceived as disordered. This conception influences decisions which modify the 
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waterscape of the conurbation. To say: state officials often look at the waterscape as 
disordered due to the existence of communitarian providers over which they have little 
knowledge and control. This pushes forward certain policies aimed at controlling such 
organizations. Connecting the waterscape and the hydro-social territory, I can therefore 
understand both the reasons and the effects of state decisions, and how such decisions affect 
both the material waterscape and the way in which such waterscape is imagined. This allows 
me to understand, more specifically, how the existence of the cooperatives influence and is 
influenced by state policies.  
Looking at the relationship between waterscape and hydro-social territory allows me to 
analyse the way in which different actors, discourses, and ways of seeing the city interact 
with the material construction and reconstruction of water infrastructures, and the evolution 
of water institutions. It allows me to pinpoint tensions and to understand how different actors 
negotiate them. It therefore allows me to understand how narratives over the city, and its 
material transformation influence each other and contribute to create water governance.  
Examining the interaction between the dimension of scale and the dimensions of waterscape 
and hydro-social territories helps me analyse how the state and the cooperatives interrelate 
(my third sub-question).  Using this framework, I can analyse interlocking waterscapes 
posed at different scales and how discourses connected to the politics of scale are influenced 
by the way in which the waterscape is structured and imagined.  Equally, I am able to analyse 
how discourses on scale can influence state politics. For example, I can examine how the 
state presents large scale infrastructural works as the only possible solution to Cochabamba’s 
water difficulties, and what the consequences of these infrastructures are on the waterscape 
of the cooperative. 
The dimension of network, and its interactions with the other three dimensions allows me to 
analyse how cooperatives create networks to improve their control over the waterscape, to 
strengthen their hydro-social territories, and to build relationships with different levels of 
the state.  This analysis also helps me to answer my third sub-question. An example is the 
creation of a federation of cooperatives, which aims to reinforce the role of the cooperatives 
in the eyes of the state.  
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In sum, this framework allows for the study of the different material and discursive ways in 
which cooperatives exercise power. In this work, I define material power mainly as the 
capability to influence the waterscape, and discursive power as the capability to influence 
hydro-social territories. With this framework, I examine how different forms of power can 
be considered as co-produced. Looking at the dimensions of networks and scale, 
furthermore, I analyse how cooperatives can exercise material and discursive power at the 
scale of the conurbation. 
1.3. Water governance as a political and academic debate 
This section grounds my research within the current debate on the role of communitarian 
organizations in urban water governance, focusing on the South of the World. Such a 
perspective is important, as Bolivian state and international actors have influenced water 
governance by establishing an ‘optimal’ point of view, for example –  as will be discussed 
in Chapter 2 – during the Water War. Furthermore, the perspective of the different actors, 
such as the state, is influenced by international trends. Finally, I pinpoint my contribution to 
the literature within that context.  
In the first subsection, I introduce the international trends that have led to the present focus 
on multi-stakeholder governance and on small-scale providers. In the second subsection, I 
shift the focus to the debate on the capability of communitarian organizations to influence 
governance arrangements and underline my contribution to such debate.  Finally, in the third 
subsection, I introduce the debate on what can be defined as democratic water governance, 
presenting also my contribution to such discussion. This allows me to place the Cochabamba 
case in a historical context and to pinpoint how my framework adds to the current debate on 
the role of communitarian organizations in urban water governance. 
1.3.1. The debate in a historical context 
As mentioned previously, the view of different actors in Cochabamba were often influenced 
by international political and academic perspectives. Such points of view influence the 
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state’s understanding of what the optimal policy is for water provision. Additionally, 
international debates contributed to policy shifts, which for example, led to the Water War 
in Cochabamba, central to the historical view of several actors. 
In this section, I swiftly analyse international trends influencing water governance in the 
South of the World, which led to the current attention given to multi-stakeholder governance.  
Discourses on different models of governance are not simply theoretical debates, but are 
based on historical shifts (Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 476). This section analyses how 
certain discourses on governance are used and how they entered state policies. While certain 
models and discourses are dominant in different periods of times, they are not exactly or 
necessarily replicated in Cochabamba. For example, in Cochabamba, the discourse on the 
need for ‘universal’ municipal provision, after a period in which the privatization discourse 
was introduced and rejected, is often dominant amongst state actors. However, these 
discourses are coupled with recent discourses on multi-stakeholder governance, which varies 
at different levels of the state. 
The building of the first municipal water and sewage networks started in Europe and North 
America in the late 19th century to deal with environmental degradation and epidemics 
(Bakker, 2012, p. 618), and to preserve societal cohesion (Gandy, 2004). After World War 
I, water and sewage networks started to disappear underground in the North of the World, 
concealing the relationship of power that they embodied. In the North, receiving potable 
water in the house became a normalized, unquestioned experience (Kaika and Swyngedouw, 
2000, pp. 121-122). Around the 1970s, as aging infrastructures burdened state economies, 
calls for competition created privatization tendencies. Water (as other forms of natural 
resources) became a new frontier for investment of capital (Swyngedouw et al., 2002, pp. 
126-128). 
Water and sewage networks in the South of the World developed differently than the ones 
in the North, often due to disordered processes of urbanization. However, the model of water 
provision born in the North had strong influence on how networks in the South were seen, 
discussed and managed. These discourses had, and still have, a strong influence on the 
Cochabamba conurbation. Plans that were drawn up by the municipality of Cochabamba in 
the 1950s and 1970s were often influenced by northern examples and planning theories (see: 
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Goldstein, 2004). The ideal of a universal municipal provision is furthermore often dominant 
amongst the municipal officials I interviewed in Cochabamba.  
Universal access to water and sanitation delivered by a centralized company was,  until 
recently, considered the  model to which all cities in the South would eventually conform 
(Gandy, 2004, p. 368). However, since the 1970s the growth of slums and the decreasing 
presence of the state led instead to a growing polarization in access to services (Gandy, 2004, 
p. 372). Those that do not have access to the formal network resort to alternative and often 
informal ways to access water, such as water trucks, small scale networks and artisanal wells 
(Allen et al., 2006, p. 334). This is the situation in Cochabamba, where most of the 
inhabitants receive water from the communitarian water providers (see Chapter 2). 
In this context, private provision was presented as a way to bring water ‘to the poor’ (Castro, 
2007b), often as part of structural adjustments supported by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Between the 1990s and the early 2000s, the 
privatization of water services became a mainstream policy (Goldman, 2007, p. 788) based 
on the assumption that the public sector was a locus of corruption and rent-seeking behaviour 
(Fine and Hall, 2012, p. 51), and inherently inefficient (Swyngedouw, 2005a, pp. 82–83). 
There is no evidence, however, that private sector participation improves water access, a 
reality eventually acknowledged by the World Bank (Castro, 2007b, p. 760).  
These waves of privatization are important to understand the pushback against them. The 
Water War in Cochabamba is one of the most famous example of successful resistance 
against privatization of water. Discourses against water privatization were in evidence in the 
discourses of state officials, activists, and communitarian leaders I interviewed, some of 
which recalled actively participating in the protests. Cochabamba’s revolt against the 
privatization of its municipal system during the water war of 2000 had very local reasons 
(see Chapter 2), but it was also part of a larger movement. Privatisation was contested both 
locally and by a growing international water justice movement. A wave of high-profile 
privatization concession contract dissolutions followed the first era of privatization, often 
due to mass protests (Goldman, 2007, p. 788).  
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After a sharp rise of private sector participation in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the 
1990s (Bakker, 2013a, p. 254), social and financial problems then brought a ‘partial retreat’ 
of privatisation policies in many low-income countries (Bakker, 2010, p. 94). The retreat of 
international companies from direct management of water service should not be considered 
as a retreat of privatization tout court.  Bakker (Bakker, 2013a, p. 257) contends that ‘we are 
witnessing a refinement, rather than a retrenchment, of the neoliberal project’. Private 
participation takes different forms in different spaces.  Private companies started to cherry-
pick the most profitable cities, and population sectors (Bakker, 2013a, p. 257) 
(Swyngedouw, 2005a, p. 95). Companies also started to stipulate public-private 
partnerships, leaving the public sector in charge of long-term investment (Swyngedouw, 
2005a, p. 89). Tri-sector partnerships (involving the civil society) were also brought forward  
(McDonald and Ruiters, 2012, p. 5) (Loftus, 2009, p. 957), as part of these subtler forms of 
private capital participation. In Bolivia, ‘mixed’ (to say public-private) forms of water 
provisions are allowed by the legislation (see Section 2.5). I did not find concrete examples 
of public-private agreements in Bolivia. However, the Bolivian academic Carlos Crespo did 
express preoccupation over the fact that such form of private participation was allowed 
(Interview 25.02.2014). 
It was in this context that interest in communitarian providers, which had long existed, 
started to strengthen world-wide.  This interest involved both proponents of privatization 
and the anti-privatization front (Bakker, 2008, p. 236). Free-market leaning organizations, 
in fact, started to demonstrate keen interest in the ‘informal’ activities of ‘the poor’ 
(AlSayyad and Roy, 2003, p. 2). In this context, the recognition of communitarian providers 
appears to be an attempt to find ‘new private sector champions’ (Ahlers et al., 2014, p. 3).  
However, interest in communitarian organizations as ‘alternative to privatization’ 
(McDonald and Ruiters, 2012, p. 10) has also grown in the anti-privatization front. The water 
sector, in fact, became strongly ‘politicized’ by privatization attempts which created an 
‘effective and well-coordinated cluster of regional and international groups that have 
opposed water privatisation and which are now proposing alternatives’ (McDonald and 
Ruiters, 2012, p. 10). Latin American anti-privatisation activists look at ‘communitarian 
management’ as a valid alternative to both the private sector and traditional forms of state 
provision which are considered ‘bureaucratic and centralised’  (Spronk et al., 2012, p. 445). 
Activists in Cochabamba, such as Oscar Olivera (one of the leaders of the Water War), see 
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communitarian water providers as a cradle of democratic practices, whose influence goes 
beyond water provision (interview, 11.08.2014). Such stances are often accompanied by 
disillusionment over the role of the state.  Cochabamba activists often have links with 
international networks, which broadly share these views.    
The growing interest in communitarian providers has not assured their survival. Mainstream 
policy literature often sees informal utilities as temporary measures (as discussed in: Cheng, 
2014, p. 2), useful only until the realization of a universal centralised water provider (Kooy, 
2014). However, Bakker (2010, pp. 39–41) argues,  such a vision does not take into sufficient 
account the reality of these organizations, whose value to their members is not based simply 
on their ‘efficiency’ calculated through an economic model. Attempts to displace 
‘community knowledge of water supply with the teche of hydraulic engineering, accounting, 
and water economics’ are often resisted. In which ways new ‘multi-stakeholder’ governance 
agreements prepare or force communitarian organizations to assume institutional forms, 
decisional and ownership models that would make it easier for them to be subsumed to 
technocratic (and in certain cases profit-based) forms of governance, needs to be therefore 
questioned. Further, how communitarian organizations are able to resists such attempts 
should also be examined. 
This is a central debate in Cochabamba, where the growing institutionalization of 
communitarian water providers are seen with wariness by some water activists, as an attempt 
of the state to control and co-opt such providers. Furthermore, certain state authorities, 
particularly the municipal ones, see universal provision by a municipal (or conurbation-
wide) provider as the ideal arrangement, while at the same time political discussion over the 
reason for such a choice are often obfuscated beneath technical, economical, or legal 
reasoning.  
The case of Cochabamba can therefore be connected to wider changes in water governance 
in the South of the World. At the same time, however, context is fundamental to understand 
the relationship that develops between communitarian organization and the state is, as will 
be underlined in the next section. 
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1.3.2. Can communitarian organizations influence governance? 
Whether communitarian organizations can influence governance is central to the academic 
and political debate on them. One of the key contributions of this thesis is an analysis of how 
this can happen and where the cooperatives draw their power from. In this section, I present 
different arguments from the academic community on the communitarian organizations’ 
ability to exercise agency and I compare them with what emerged from my data. This makes 
clear what are the different perspectives on the subject and how this dissertation contributes 
to the debate. 
The growing attention towards communitarian water providers can be interpreted as a part 
of a shift to ‘multi-stakeholder’ governance, described in the previous sub-section, whose 
later manifestation includes an enhanced attention to ‘civil society’ participation. In this 
context, ‘governance’ is seen as an institutional model that determined how and by whom 
decisions are taken over a certain process and it does not coincide with the definition given 
in Section 1.1. Examining this model of multi-stakeholder governance and the role of 
communitarian organizations in them, the question emerges over the capability of 
communitarian organizations to exercise agency. Some authors argue that the state can 
exercise nearly complete control, while others argue that communitarian organizations are 
able to engender changes. This debate underlines the need to consider the specific context in 
which communitarian providers operate. I argue that communitarian providers in 
Cochabamba can exercise agency and I stress how my framework allows me to add new 
dimensions in understanding the role of communitarian providers in water governance.  
The ‘water crisis’ in cities of the Global South has led to calls for ‘good governance’ 
(Perreault, 2014, p. 236).  Governance, in this context, is often presented in public policy as 
an apolitical, neutral, and empowering tool that can be harnessed for the resolution of 
specific environmental issues (Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 477). Governance’s supposed 
neutrality, however, often results in the hiding of political and economic interests (Perreault, 
2014, p. 236), a phenomenon that  Li  (2007) describes as the ‘rendering technical’ of 
governance.  Castro argues that such kind of urban governance restricts the debate to ‘the 
technologies of management’, excluding ‘end and values’ from the discussion (Castro, 
2007a, p. 106). This vision of governance has resonance in Cochabamba, as certain facets of 
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governance (especially concerning the construction of large-scale infrastructures) are often 
presented in technical terms by the state, and therefore are difficult to criticise. However, the 
capability of the state to control the debate in Cochabamba is somehow limited, and the 
evidence of conflicting visions and values is often clear.   
Studies on the subject of ‘governance’, moreover, often focus on multi-stakeholder 
neoliberal2 governance, where state, the private sector, and ‘public society’ are called to 
participate. This discussion does not necessarily fully apply to Cochabamba (for debates 
over the supposed post-neoliberalism of the Bolivian state see: Macdonald and Ruckert, 
2009; Marston, 2015; Webber, 2011). Although in Cochabamba private actors are present 
(for example, those that sell water through water trucks, and building companies), they are 
not directly called to participate in formal mechanism of governance. The literature on 
neoliberal governance, however, offers insight to the way in which the state exercises power 
and to its relationships with communitarian organizations.  
Swyngedouw  (2005b, p. 1998) argues that pro-poor organizations should be wary of their 
involvement in multi-stakeholder governance, because they will not have any real agency in 
it. The state is often central to transfering competence to non-governmental actors, and to 
setting up the institutions in which actors are invited to participate. As a result, most of these 
institutions or networks will be controlled ‘directly or indirectly’ by the state (Swyngedouw, 
2005b, pp. 1997–2002). Therefore, Swyngedouw argues, while multi-stakeholder 
environmental governance is presented as democratic and empowering, in reality, it is often 
top-down, opaque, and easily manipulated by those in power (Swyngedouw, 2005b, p. 
1993). Seen in this perspective, community-participation in urban water governance then 
risks to become a way  to create consensus around authority’s objectives (Finewood and 
Holifield, 2015, p. 89), as well as way for the state (and private organizations) to abandon 
or underserve part of the population (Bakker, 2013a, p. 257).  
                                                 
2 While neoliberalism can take different forms (Finewood and Holifield, 2015), political ecology literature 
broadly defines neoliberal environmental governance as the “institutional realignment away from state-
centric (public-sphere) to market-based (private-sphere) forms of governance”, that subject the environment 
to a “neoliberal logic”, that favours “market based actors and practices”, and is characterized by 
privatizations, rescaling, and the multiplication of “stakeholders” involved in the management of nature. 
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However, relationships between formal utilities and community organizations are not always 
exploitative. The technical water committees in Venezuela are looked at as an example of 
state-community co-production of the service, that not only improves water provision and 
management but also fosters the capability of community members to realize wider changes 
and empowers the community (McMillan et al., 2014). This highlights the importance of 
context in understanding how empowering (or disempowering) the co-production of services 
can be (McMillan et al., 2014) and the importance of the political aims of those involved.  
This debate then raises a fundamental question: are communitarian organizations capable of 
participating in and modifying dominant governance regimes or are they inherently 
subjected to them? In my dissertation, I argue that communitarian organizations can exercise 
agency, to a limited extent. I also argue that there is a need to look at how state discourses 
influence the cooperatives. Part of the literature sees the participation of communitarian 
organizations to service provision as ‘self-disciplining’ governmentality.  
‘Governmentality’, a concept originally formulated by Foucault (1991), is often used in the 
literature on urban and environmental governance to explain the capability of the state to 
control its citizens outside a direct intervention. Governmentality  is defined as a technique 
of governance aimed at disciplining the population (Swyngedouw, 2005b, p. 2003), 
transforming citizens into ‘rational’ and ‘disciplined’ inhabitants of the city. 
Governmentality is then one way to understand how ‘the urban is produced as a governable 
space’ (Gabriel, 2014, p. 41). 
 Gabriel (2014, p. 41) puts this vision of governance into discussion as he argues that 
‘governance is too often theorized as a dominating force that inculcates an unwitting and 
ultimately powerless underclass into the service of purely elite interests,’ undermining the 
capability of different interests to be heard and served by governance regimes. Kooy and 
Bakker (2008), furthermore, criticise the interpretation of ‘governmentality’ as a totalizing 
system, especially when applied in a post-colonial context, where governmentality 
techniques are often ‘contradictory and contested’ and simultaneously characterized by 
oppression and resistance due in part to a very heterogeneous population.  I argue that this 
is the case in Cochabamba, where the power of the state to ‘govern’ is limited. Case studies 
on urban governance also contribute to this debate. Appadurai (2001, p. 35) suggests that 
resistance to neoliberal governance is possible with his analysis of how  grassroots 
associations can influence urban governance. He describes Mumbai slum-dwellers 
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organizations’ capability to produce knowledge about their own communities, and to bring 
forth proposals to improve their living conditions as ‘governmentality from below (…) 
governmentality turned against itself.’  
These debates underline that to examine water governance, it is then necessary to analyse 
both the discourses of various actors and the material consequences of such discourses. In 
other words, as argued in the precedent section, to understand who exercises power and in 
which way in water governance, it is necessary to look both at the influence of different 
actors on the waterscape and on the hydro-social territory, and to the way in which these two 
elements influence each other. 
The literature on informality also contributes to this debate. Studies on urban informality 
offer important insights to the contradictory issues of how communitarian organizations 
might be able to resist state power on the one hand, and how the state is able to extend its 
influence on organizations theoretically operating beyond its control, on the other. This 
discussion is fundamental to look at the influence of the state in Cochabamba for two 
reasons. It underlines how state absence in peri-urban, ‘informal’ or illegal neighbourhoods 
can be considered as an active political choice that influence the evolution of communitarian 
water providers. It furthermore underlines how the way in which the state defines certain 
areas and actors as formal or informal has a direct consequence on those excluded and can 
therefore be considered as a way to exercise power. Finally, it offers insight on the limits of 
such power.  
Critical literature looks at informality as produced by the state to exercise control over the 
population (Ahlers et al., 2014, pp. 4–5). AlSayyad and Roy (2003, p. 5) define urban 
informality as an ‘organizing urban logic’, that ‘determines the rules of the games’, and is 
based on the ‘constant negotiability of value and the unmapping of space’. Studies of 
informality underline the capability of the state to decide which kind of informality should 
be nurtured or suppressed  (Roy, 2005, pp. 155–156). However, in a similar manner to the 
discussion of governmentality, a point of debate is the measure in which the state is able 
control the production of informality. Ahlers et al. criticize Roy (2005) for giving 
‘hegemonic authority to the state, thereby reifying the state by making it reign supreme over 
urban space and practices’. This state-centred approach negates the agency of others 
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underlining that ‘the state facilitates or is complicit in processes of informality, but does not 
necessarily dominate the process’ (Ahlers et al., 2014, pp. 4–5). Looking at the case of 
Cochabamba, there are limitations in the capability of the state to control and sanction certain 
space and practices. However, as the literature suggests, the definition of certain practices 
and space as illegitimate does have concrete effects on them, for example by excluding them 
from state funding (see Chapter 5).  
Critical urban studies also underline the possibility for marginalized communities to contest 
urban governance. Perreault (2008, p. 839) argues that:  
If we are to understand the variegated nature of resource governance arrangements 
(…) greater attention must be paid to the role of civil society actors in responding to, 
contesting, and shaping particular institutional configurations. Geographical work on 
resource governance has tended to view state and capital as the privileged sites of 
governance, paying scant attention to the agency of social movements, resource 
users' groups, or other civil society organizations 
In analysing the capability of communitarian organizations for agency, it needs to be 
underlined that the capability of communitarian organizations to influence governance 
arrangements, should not only be analysed by looking at the involvement of communitarian 
organizations in ‘official’ governance mechanisms, or in direct interaction with the state, but 
also by looking at discourses and practices that take place outside the state remit. As it is 
illustrated in Section 1.1, governance is composed of contradictory practices, and 
contradictory discourses, which contribute to the production of a fragmented waterscape, 
and differing hydro-social territories. There is a place in water governance, therefore, for 
discourses from below to impose themselves, and for marginalized actors to be able to 
intervene in policy designs (Romano, 2016, p. 74). Resistance might take place at different 
scales, as some practices might have their roots in the everyday life and livelihood claims 
(Perreault, 2008). More attention should therefore, be paid to ‘the power of self-governance’ 
and to the ‘micro-politics of subject formations’ and to the ways in which they create 
knowledges about the city (Gabriel, 2014, pp. 41–42).  
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My thesis contributes to the debate on the agency of communitarian organizations by 
focusing specifically on their capability to shape water governance. The framework I outline 
in Section 1.2.3 allows me to link a conurbation-wide analysis of water governance to the 
analysis of the cooperatives control over the waterscape. Furthermore, I connect water 
governance with the way in which the cooperatives see and conceive their waterscape.  The 
present work adds to the literature by underlining the importance of looking at how control 
over water governance is influenced by the capability of different organizations to exercise 
control over the waterscape and hydro-social territories in different spaces and at different 
scales. 
1.3.3 Methods of democratic water governance 
A side effect of the capability of the cooperatives to exercise governance is that they provide 
a legitimate method to democratise water governance, the analysis of which is a key 
contribution of this thesis. This dissertation explores how such democratic elements of water 
governance manifest themselves in the reality of the cooperatives, as well as how this is 
viewed by the state. This section expands on the existing literature on the topic and clarifies 
my definition of democratic water governance. 
Problems of water governance usually result in an unequal distribution of water risks and 
benefits to those with least power (Joy et al., 2014, p. 964). Therefore, the need for 
democratic governance is stark. The last section underlined how the capability to participate 
in water governance goes beyond simply receiving and paying for a service, and it includes 
also the capability to shape the way in which governance is organized. Therefore, an analysis 
of a just and democratic water governance involves interconnected questions of distributive 
justice (who receives the benefits and who the disadvantages of water governance), and 
procedural justice (who participates in water governance, why and how) (Perreault, 2014). 
The concept of democratic water governance has been explored by both academic and social 
movements, through a series of different concepts, mainly the notions of water justice, the 
right to water, and the right to the city. While these concepts sometimes overlap, they have 
separate meanings. The right to water (and sanitation) mainly involves the right to access 
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(Bakker, 2013b). It has been codified in various state laws (e.g. Bolivia, South Africa) and 
has been recognized as a human right by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The 
right to water has been used by various social movements to claim the right to water access 
and to fight privatization. However, Bakker (2007) explains how the right to water does not 
necessarily protect against privatization, as it only focuses on the right to receive water and 
not on how it is provided. Furthermore, it is often interpreted as an individual right, and it is 
usually centred around the duty of the state to provide the service, therefore not necessarily 
supporting collective rights over water sources that are central to informal/communitarian 
water provision (Mehta et al., 2014). However, Perreault argues that: ‘we would do well to 
acknowledge the political power of the notion of rights, and the discursive and material 
potency of rights claims’ (2014, p. 240), as protests over the right to water can be the catalyst 
for movements on broader issues, such as water justice (Sultana and Loftus, 2015). 
On the other hand, environmental justice, and water justice specifically, have a broader 
focus. Environmental justice’s core concern is the distribution of environmental goods and 
ills (Schlosberg, 2004). However, there have been calls for environmental justice to go 
beyond a distributive concept of justice, to include ‘participation in the political processes 
which create and manage environmental policy’ (Schlosberg, 2004, p. 517). Water justice 
should then involve participation and recognition of communitarian actors as legitimate, and 
should be placed in a historical, social, cultural, and environmental setting (Joy et al., 2014, 
p. 964) (Zwarteveen and Boelens, 2014). Boelens et al. (2011) stress how water conflicts do 
not only involve the right to access, but also to ‘culturally organize and politically control 
water resources’, issues that engender conflicts that become even more complicated in 
multicultural societies. 
Democratic governance is then the right to participate in the construction of the governance 
arrangements themselves. The concept of democratic water governance (intended as a right 
to share and participate in the management of resources) can then be associated with the 
right to the city: 
Just as the right to the city, as a complex bundle of rights, is the right to inhabit the 
city – to the resources and services necessary for dignified life, and to appropriation 
of the means of production and social reproduction – so too the institutional 
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arrangements and spatial scales we employ for governing water must address 
questions of individual and collective fulfilment, democratization, material relations 
of production, and ecological sensitivity. (Perreault, 2014, p. 243) 
The right to the city is a concept that was first brought forward by Lefebvre (1967),but has 
been used in more recent times by academics (e.g. Harvey, 2008) and activists alike. The 
‘right to the city’ is intended as a collective right to claim ‘shaping power over the process 
of urbanization (...) in fundamental and radical ways’ (Harvey, 2008, p. 272). The right to 
the city is then a collective right, capable to reconfigure the city as a ‘site of struggle’ 
(Perreault, 2014, p. 241). It is not intended only as the right to the present city, but also as 
the right to a ‘future city’ and to a ‘better system in which the demands can be fully and 
entirely met’ (Marcuse, 2009, p. 193). This interpretation of the right to the city relies on the 
Lefebvrian conceptualization of the social production of urban space, formulating therefore 
the right to the city as a right to participate, appropriate and produce urban space   
(Shillington, 2013, p. 105).  Recent readings of the right to the city connect it with the 
political ecology interpretation of urban space, as created through the social-natural 
metabolic process (Shillington, 2013, p. 105). Therefore, the right to the city implies a ‘right 
to metabolism’ (Heynen et al., 2006, p. 12). The need for the democratization of the 
urbanization of nature has also been underlined by the Urban Political Ecology literature. 
Zimmer (2010, p. 349) argues that ‘a virulent question in Urban Political Ecology is (...) that 
of democratic participation in the production of governance of societal relationship with 
nature’. The democratization of the process of socio-ecological change is considered 
fundamental, if we are to obtain true urban ‘sustainability’ (Heynen et al., 2006, p. 13).  
Therefore we can interpret appeals to the right to water (in its widest sense) as an appeal for 
the right to participate and benefit from urban metabolism (Shillington, 2013, p. 106). 
Therefore, a just and democratic water governance, would include a right to water that is not 
only intended as the capability to access water, but also the capability to modify and 
participate in governance arrangements, and to directly shape the city and the waterscape, 
materially and also in an abstract way. It would also mean the acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of actors such as the cooperatives, and of their rights in shaping urban water 
governance. Connecting this section with the precedent one, a just governance should be the 
capability of citizens and communities to produce not only their waterscape, and their 
imagined territories, but also to contribute to define the dominant hydro-social territory. In 
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other words:  citizens should be able to participate on a debate on what should be the ideal 
configuration of water governance in the city, which actors should be in charge of it and 
through which mechanisms these decisions should be taken. However, as the right of the 
citizens can be restricted to that of receiving the service, how the water arrives (or does not 
arrive) to the tap is treated as a technical and economic issue, and the debate is often not 
even acknowledged as existing.  
In Cochabamba, cooperative members are effectively participating in producing their 
waterscape, and their imaginaries connected to their waterscape. However, the state also 
produces discourses over the role of the cooperatives and on its own role, often with 
contradictory effects. These visions create the conurbation’s water governance, but often 
without an open, political debate about it.  
Conclusion 
This chapter underlines the need to consider water governance as a deeply political, and 
conflictive process through which different visions and conceptions of the city, of the 
service, and of the physical waterscape are brought forward. To understand how the 
cooperatives influence governance, one needs to go beyond the official channels of state-
communitarian actors interactions, to look at informal interactions, and clashes, as well as 
how the presence of the cooperatives shape the waterscape, and the conception of it. 
There is therefore, a need to look at different actors, at different scales, and to connect these 
with their visions of and relationships with their territory and water sources. To this end, I 
use the TPSN framework, enriched with the concept of waterscape (at different scales) and 
of hydro-social territories. This framework allows for the consideration of how cooperatives 
see their waterscape. On the other hand, I can analyse the role of state authorities in 
modifying the waterscape through large-scale infrastructures and regulations, while also 
analysing how state politics is influenced by the assumption that water provision is better 
carried out at a conurbation level. My thesis contributes to the literature on water governance 
and the debate on democratic water governance by underlining the connection between 
55 
 
  
control over the small-scale waterscape and hydro-social territories and the wider 
governance arrangements of the conurbation.  
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2. Setting the scene: history and geography of a changing 
landscape 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the history of the Cochabamba conurbation, focusing 
on water and land use and management. The history of the conurbation allows me to 
understand how the Cochabamba waterscape was created, as well as the deeply historical 
processes that contributed to the creation of different imagined hydro-social territories that 
interact to create Cochabamba’s water governance. This chapter, then, places the water 
cooperatives in an historical, political and geographical context in order to highlight the 
interconnectedness of water and sanitation governance arrangements in the valleys, and the 
processes of co-production of both formal and informal water providers. These processes are 
both inherently local and linked with wider processes. Therefore, while my focus will remain 
in Cochabamba, it is necessary to examine the deep political changes that characterize the 
Bolivian political landscape, and the way in which these changes influenced, and were 
influenced by, the growing urbanizations of the Cochabamba Valley.  
The first section will briefly set the scene with an overview of the geographical and 
climatological conditions in Cochabamba and the current conditions of water service in the 
conurbation. The second section focuses on the Cochabamba foundation and swiftly growing 
urbanization process. I go through the foundation of the city, to then focus on how the 
division of the land and the assignment of water rights, as well as the disordered process of 
urbanization, created a segregated landscape that negated to a wide part of the population 
access to fundamental services. I underline how wider changes, such as the Law of Agrarian 
Reform, influenced, and still influence, water access in the conurbation. This section will 
then establish how water rights were distributed in the conurbation, and how issues that still 
characterize the conurbation, such as contrast between the city and the countryside for access 
to water, land speculations, and large-scale projects first emerged.  
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The third section examines the neoliberal reform of 1980s-1990s. I focus on the Law of 
Popular Participation, an example of how a neoliberal reform aimed to re-scale the political 
process had very ambiguous consequences. This section analyses the construction of urban 
neighbourhood and communities and how they related to the state. As most cooperatives 
were founded around this period, this section allows one to understand how the history of 
the cooperative is inserted in the history of the conurbation, as well as giving a background 
to the lived history of the cooperatives. Finally, I analyse how water contrasts intensified the 
strengthening of associations such as the Federation of Irrigators.  
The fourth section focuses on the popular revolts of the early 2000s.  I focus on the Water 
War and its causes. I underline how national, international, and local factors contributed to 
its inception, therefore emphasizing the importance of different scale of analysis when 
analysing water governance in Cochabamba.  
The last section focuses on the changes that took place under the government of Evo 
Morales. I stress the discussion on the presumed post-neoliberalism of his government, and 
the tensions and contradictions that characterized it. I then focus on the water legislation and 
on the effort of the government to order the water sector, while underlining the tensions 
created by a policy that aims both at strengthening the state role in the water sector and 
officially acknowledges communitarian water management. Such policies constitute the 
background of the current relationship between the communitarian water providers and the 
state in Cochabamba. 
 
2.1. An overview of the Cochabamba waterscape 
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Figure 1: Cochabamba Conurbation. Source: PMMC Diagnostico, 2013. In red the areas where the conurbation has 
grown outside the allowed altitude for construction. 
The shape that the waterscape took in the years, as conurbation growth, agricultural lands, 
and the physical waterscape were co-created, is of fundamental importance to understand 
water governance as a whole, as well as the placement and difficulties of communitarian 
providers within the conurbation. Physical, social, economic and political elements all 
contributed to shape the current waterscape. The unregulated growth of the conurbation is 
determining environmental degradation as well as an absence of fundamental services in 
marginal neighbourhoods. Water scarcity and the growth of urban population increased 
tensions between rural and urban users. The physical shape of the waterscape, and the 
differences in the availability of water sources in the conurbation, influenced the socio-
economic characteristics of different neighbourhoods. The difficulties to find water in the 
south of the conurbation, and the relative ease with which water sources can be accessed in 
the north, influenced the construction of more affluent neighbourhood in the latter areas.  At 
the same time, the continuous growth of the conurbation pushed poorer neighbourhoods in 
even more marginal areas. All these elements contributed to create a fragmental waterscape 
in which a variety of self-constructed water providers emerged, whose history and 
characteristics can be understood only when placed in the wider waterscape of the 
conurbation. 
59 
 
  
Cochabamba develops in the Cochabamba valley at an average altitude of 2500m, cradled 
in the slopes of the mountain range Tunari in the north and the San Pedro Mountain in the 
east.  It is the centre of a continuous conurbation that stretches over the Cochabamba and the 
Sacaba Valley, part of the River Rocha watershed (Ledo, 2013, p. 14). The conurbation (now 
officially organized in a Metropolitan Region3) includes the municipalities of Cochabamba, 
Sacaba, Quillacollo, Colcapirhua, Tiquipaya, Sipe Sipe end Vinto. In 2012, it hosted 
1,141,094 inhabitants4, a steep growth from the 880,927 of 2001 (INE, 2014).  
Cochabamba has a semi-desert climate, with around 70 days of precipitation per year (Ledo, 
2013, p. 15) , concentrated in the summer months (November to March). Rain water is 
collected in the Tunari range recharging the valley water sources  (Hines Thompson, 2015, 
p. 13). Water deposits in chains of lagoons built in the mountain stretch from the Incaic 
period to the 19th century. Such mountain lakes are now used both for agriculture and for 
urban purposes and are at times an object of tension between different right-holders.  
Between 2800 m and 2580 m of altitude, water penetrates the soil recharging the aquifers, 
and some re-emerge around 2580-2560 m of altitude  forming ‘water eyes’ (Crespo Flores 
et al., 2004, p. 35). Water sources are therefore mainly placed in the northern part of the 
conurbation and are especially abundant on the Tunari slopes, but are difficult to find (and 
of bad quality) in the arid Southern Zone of Cochabamba, where wells often provide saline 
water (Walnycki, 2013, p. 140), and where the municipal network is limited.  It is an 
everyday occurrence in the affluent Norther Zone to see water tanks filling up in backyard 
wells, to be sold to unserved areas. 
                                                 
3 The Metropolitan Region is not necessarily a synonymous with the Cochabamba Conurbation, as is includes 
both rural and Urban Areas (Ley n 533, 2014, art 4a) 
4 Projected at 1,227.,00 in 2015  http://webine.ine.gob.bo/ine/tags-prensa/kanata  
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Figure 2: Water tanks collecting water in the North Zone 
Cochabamba is nevertheless a productive agricultural area. For more than three millennia 
farmers channelled and controlled water sources (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 14), building 
intricate irrigation systems (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 5). Those that control and maintain 
water systems for irrigations are called regantes (irrigators) and they are organized in a 
myriad of separate systems in the valley. Since the 1990s, these organizations were federated 
at a departmental level to defend their water sources and the customary rights that regulate 
water access (generically defined as usos y costumbres).  
The long history of water management in the valley created intricate networks of providers 
and rights. Water sources and irrigation systems are regulated in diverse ways shaped over 
different historical periods.  This resulted in complex systems of very local rights that varies 
with the water sources, but also with the time of the year (especially during the rain seasons, 
when water is abundant). Water can be obtained through wells (used by most communitarian 
systems for potable water), rivers, systems of channels that canalise mountain waters, water 
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from the mountain lakes, natural springs, or underground filtrations (Crespo Flores et al., 
2004, pp. 19–20). While water scarcity and periodical droughts always influenced the valley, 
conflicts over water control became more intense in the late 19th century as the city started 
to consume growing amounts of water (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 1). Conflicts between 
rural and urban uses of water characterize the valley, as the conurbation keeps expanding in 
rural areas, and need for water is growing. Conflicts and negotiations with rural providers 
also involve some cooperatives (see Chapter 4), especially those that could not find sufficient 
water sources in their area of service.  
The conurbation grew quickly and disorderly in the last 50 years. Such growth created a 
fragmented waterscape and left vast areas outside the reach of municipal services. At the 
same time, the lack of fundamental services and city planning caused an environmental 
degradation that put water sources at risk. The conurbation went through a process of 
horizontal, low density growth, and occupies nine times the territory that it did fifty years 
ago. In 2012 the yearly consumption of land was of  400 hectares, a growth that is 
increasingly waterproofing the recharge area of the aquifer (Ledo, 2013, pp. 14–17). 
Traditional agricultural activities are declining, as the best agricultural land, in the north of 
the city, is consumed to build both gated communities and precarious settlements (Ledo, 
2013, p. 20). The conurbation is now rife with environmental problems, in part due to 
untreated waste water. The river Rocha, that flows through the conurbation, is now little 
more than an open-air sewage, especially in the dry season, as the only working large-scale 
waste water treatment plant, Albarrancho, routinely receives more water than it can treat.  
The conurbation unplanned growth resulted in scarce covering of municipal water providers. 
The largest provider of the conurbation is SEMAPA, a Cochabamba municipality’s 
decentralized institution. Two other municipalities have decentralized providers: Sacaba 
(EMAPAS) and Quillacollo (EMAPAQ).  The Units for Basic Sanitation that operates in the 
other municipalities mostly provide sewage service. None of these organizations are 
currently able to provide water (or sanitation) to the whole of the municipal region. 
SEMAPA serves around 50% of the Cochabamba population (Ledo, 2013, p. 25). 
Those not connected to municipal networks, access water in a variety of ways. Some 
neighbourhoods self-organized in order to build their own water and sanitation systems. The 
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Cochabamba Metropolitan Masterplan (PMMC, 2013: p. 8-10) estimates that there are 
between 600 and 700 communitarian water providers in the conurbations. These 
organizations are governed under different systems, with varying levels of formal 
recognition, and supply water (more rarely sanitation) to users with varying levels of quality 
and organization (Zegada et al., 2015, p. 22). 
Independent water systems in the conurbation are managed within three main 
organizational structures: OTBs, water committees (or water associations), and water 
cooperatives (Lavrilleux & Compère, 2006: 16).  OTBs (grassroot territorial organizations) 
are the official representatives of territorial communities in front of the state. In urban 
areas, they mainly take the form of officially recognized neighbourhood councils which are 
in charge of various activities and organizations. Some OTBs directly manage an 
autonomous water system. In other cases, independent water systems are managed through 
a water committee or a cooperative. The territory of such organizations and that of the 
OTBs often, but not always, overlap. The cooperatives Quintanilla, for example, bring the 
service to multiple OTBs.  
Cooperatives are not the most common form of communitarian water provider in the 
conurbation and are in fact a minority. Cooperatives present some differences from other 
communitarian organizations in the conurbation. They undergo a stricter control by the 
state, as they have to follow the guideline posed in the General Law of Cooperatives5. 
Furthermore, members of a cooperative officially acquire a share in the cooperative at the 
moment in which they obtain a water connection.  
Water cooperatives often operate in older, well established neighbourhoods, with good 
access to water sources. A survey of the conurbation communitarian providers confirm that 
cooperatives are more likely to be placed in urbanized areas  (Lavrilleux & Compère, 
2006, p. 21), to be better organized, to bring a better quality service (Lavrilleux & 
                                                 
5 A new general law of cooperatives was approved during my field work. 
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Compère, 2006, p. 52) and to serve an higher number of families (Lavrilleux & Compère, 
2006, p. 52) than other communitarian providers. 
Water cooperatives are, however, not fundamentally different from other communitarian 
organizations. In fact, most cooperatives were first established as water committees, or as a 
water system administered by an OTB, and were afterwards officially registered as a 
cooperative.  Differences between the cooperatives and other organizations are therefore 
due to the fact that only the most stable providers decide to register as cooperatives (the 
reasons for this are explored in more details in Chapter 4).  
A summary of the way in which water is provided in the conurbation is provided in Figure 
3. As indicated in the figure, some communitarian water providers are federated through 
different associations, such as the ASICASUDD-EPSAS (Association of Communitarian 
Water Providers of the South, of the Department and of Providers of Water and Sanitation) 
and FECOAPAC (the Federation of Water Cooperatives of the Cochabamba Department).   
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Figure 3: scheme of water providers in the conurbation. I elaborated this scheme through data collected during my 
fieldwork.  
 Those that do not have access to piped water, usually resort to privately run water trucks 
that provide expensive water of unreliable quality. Water trucks users in Cochabamba 
consume 4 time less water than those with a public connection (Ledo, 2013, p. 98) and pay 
10 times more for water unit (Ledo, 2013, p. 76). Access to water varies strongly in different 
areas of the city, as newer and poorer neighbourhoods are forced into areas with worse access 
to natural sources and where the municipal network does not arrive (Walnycki, 2013). 
Degraded environmental conditions in general and scarce access to potable water and 
sanitation are therefore linked to social and economic, but also geographical, marginality.  
In the impoverished southern periphery6, 92% of the population suffers from some form of 
deficit in water or sewage access (Ledo, 2013, p. 62), as a scarce infrastructural investment 
                                                 
6 The Southern part of the South Zone, excluding the oldest area near the city centre, where prices of the land 
can be quite high. Variability in conditions in the South Zone, and in peri-urban areas in general, are high.   
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and lack of resources, is compounded by overexploited, saline, aquifers (Ledo, 2013, p. 77) 
and high water contamination worsened by the presence of the municipal landfill of Kara 
Kara, and SEMAPA wastewater treatment plants (Alba Rancho) (Ledo, 2013, p. 107). Lack 
of water brings ‘illnesses of poverty’ such as diarrhoea, which represent a major cause of 
children mortality (Ledo, 2013: p.72) and lead to 35 years of difference in life expectancies 
between the south and the residential north of the city (Ledo, 2013: p.18), exemplifying that 
‘access to nature in the city can and is indeed often is a matter of life and death’ 
(Swyngedouw, 2006, p. 105). 
As Walnycki (2013, p. 137) argues, the problems of water provision in Cochabamba are 
neither generalized, nor recent, nor ‘natural’. They are instead determined by economic and 
social factors, and political choices. To understand this uneven and fragmented landscape of 
water provision, it is therefore necessary to understand the long history of water governance 
in the Cochabamba Valleys and to analyse the way in which the conurbation evolved.    
 
2.2. Building a fragmented waterscape: haciendas, rural reforms, 
and the expansion of the city.  
This section examines how the Cochabamba waterscape was created and evolved before the 
neoliberal reforms of the 1980s - 1990s. This section underlines that the existence of 
contrasting imagined hydro-social territories, which still strongly influences the relationship 
between communitarian organizations and the state, has for a long time characterized the 
Cochabamba valley. State imaginaries are often based on ideas of progress and modernity 
and aims to make local territories ‘comprehensible’. The state imagined hydro-social 
territories are usually the ‘dominant’ one (Boelens et al., 2016, p. 6; Hommes et al., 2016, p. 
11; Hoogesteger et al., 2016, p. 94). In the Cochabamba valley as well as the rest of Bolivia, 
however, the state never obtained a complete control over the territory, neither in the city or 
in rural areas, and traditional systems of rights never disappeared. Attempts of the state to 
control and order the waterscape, through systems of rules and regulations or technological 
solutions aimed to bypass communities control, were never fully successful. The attempt of 
the state to assume control over an unruly waterscape is still present now, through the 
registration of water rights and providers (explored in Section 2.5). This section then 
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explores the elements that led to the present fragmented waterscape and underlines the 
continuous attempt of the state to control it. 
The fact that the state never fully controlled the waterscape does not mean that the 
interventions of the state had no consequences: ideas of formality and informality led to the 
exclusions of parts of the city from public services, while ‘acceptable’ forms of informality 
were used to further the expansions of the municipal systems. Land reforms of 1952 were 
also fundamental for the redistribution of water rights. However, state imaginaries as well 
as its physical control over the territory, were always contested and challenged by both rural 
and urban actors, resulting in a fragmented waterscape.  
The effects of this history are the basis on which water provision is built today. The slow 
acquisition of water sources from the part of Cochabamba municipal providers is still felt 
now, as other municipalities are asking for the returns of some water sources now placed in 
their areas, on the assumption that water from the MISICUNI dam would be enough for the 
city needs.  The tension between rural and urban water users are still present, as discussions 
over the need to re-distribute water sources traditionally reserved for irrigations emerge. 
Communitarian providers themselves are included in this discussion, as some clash with 
rural communities, while others were able to reach agreements with irrigators to access their 
water sources. Cochabamba’s water governance is then the results of the accumulation of 
water rights, imaginaries, histories, and infrastructures, and can really be understood only by 
taking into consideration its history.  
Water had always been a stone of contention in the valley and attempts from the part of 
powerful elites to control this resource, instances of commercialization of water, and 
communitarian resistance to appropriation processes went on well ahead of the Water War 
of 2000. Cochabamba was founded in 1571 when Captain Geronimo Osorio was granted the 
right to establish the city of Villa Oropeza, later named Cochabamba (Guzman, 1972 in: 
Goldstein, 2004, p. 57).  From the 17th to the 19th century the Cochabamba valleys were the 
breadbasket of Bolivia, providing food for the altiplano (high Andean plateau) mining 
regions through a system of haciendas (feudal landholdings) owned by city-dwelling elites 
and farmed by indigenous sharecroppers (Rivera, 1992 in: Goldstein, 2004, p. 57).  Water 
control had a central role in the breaking up of the few indigenous communities left in the 
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valley.  In 1874, the Ley de Exvinculación (Disentailment Law) imposed a process of land-
privatization (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, pp. 39–41). In the altiplano (Andean plateau) 
communities violently resisted the break-up of community land but in Cochabamba this 
process was ‘swift, peaceful, and complete’ (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 22; Alejo et al., 
1995, p. 54). Land grabs (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, p. 40) and inequalities within 
Cochabamba communities partially explain their fragility, but it was the appropriation of 
water by community elites and hacienda-owners, and the 1870s catastrophic drought, that 
weakened any potential opposition (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 11).  The 1906 Water Law7, 
furthermore, theoretically recognized water as a public good but largely favoured large land 
owners, and connected land ownership to water ownership (Walnycki, 2013, p. 84), 
The new law, however, did not manage to dislodge the traditional water management in the 
valley, as system of irrigations managed through customary mita (water-turns) systems, 
continued to be de facto respected (Hines Thompson, 2015: 14). This did not impede the 
trading and renting of water. While free-trade regulations had in fact ruined many hacienda-
owners, forcing them to sell part of their land, they often conserved mountain sources and 
water turns, while few families were able to secure extensive water rights (Hines Thompson, 
2015: 11-24).  An emerging class of small land-owners, which received community land or 
bought it from haciendas, was then often forced to purchase water turns (Hines Thompson, 
2015: 14). 
Water problems and differentiation of service were likewise already present in the city. 
Already in the 19th century, the municipal water system had difficulties to keep up with the 
growth of the city. Differentiation in service aggravated and contrast between rural and urban 
users started to emerge. Water infrastructures, consisting of a system of public taps, were 
already generally overtaxed at this point, but the South Zone, where most new migrants 
settled, was particularly underserved (Hines Thompson, 2015: p.25). At the beginning of the 
20th century well-served residential suburbs grew North of the centre on the slopes of the 
Tunari range (where water sources are readily available) (Goldstein, 2003: p.63). The 
situation worsened after the 1932-1935 Cacho war, when veterans arrived in the city 
precipitating a housing crisis. The problem of land-trafficking emerged, as immigrants were 
                                                 
7 The law is still valid, even if it has been modified in contradictory ways throughout the twentieth century 
(Beltrán, 2004, p. 15), as a new water law has been long in the work, but never approved 
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sold lots in the middle of rural areas, with the promise that (non-existent) services would 
follow (Goldstein, 2003: p.61-64).  Water access in different areas of the city then varied 
dramatically: ‘the longer established, whiter, wealthier, and closer to the cordillera a 
neighbourhood was, the better its water access. The Zona Sur [South Zone] lost out on all 
fronts’ (Hines Thompson, 2015: p.57).   
The need of the city to acquire new sources emerged starkly, leading with it tensions with 
rural water owners. The growing city did manage to expand its water frontiers, however rural 
water owners were still stably in control of the territory and were in practice able to establish 
which sources would be ceded to the city (Hines, 2015: 37-39). 
Water and land ownership drastically changed after the 1952 revolution led by the MNR, 
The Rural Reform redistributed haciendas lands to their workers, creating new rural 
communities (Walnycki, 2013, p. 87) organized into rural unions (Alejo et al., 1995, p. 55). 
This reform was part of the MNR vision for a ‘modern’, national state, part of an attempt to 
transform ‘indians’ into ‘peasants’, a proletarian class ready to be integrated into the new 
national identity (Regalsky and Breña, 2010, p. 39;  Centellas, 2013, p. 92; Albro, 2010, p. 
74). While the creation of rural unions reinforced the link between communities and the 
state, they were not substituted by ‘modern’ individual connections (Walnycki, 2013b, p. 
87), and it did not mean that the state acquired a firm control over rural territory. Likewise, 
the state had little power over water sources. While the rural reform did declare water sources 
property of the state, it gave them in common use to those receiving redistributed land and 
recognized the mita system. (Hines Thompson, 2015: 96-113). These policies then 
contributed to the Bolivian state institutional and legal pluralism, still apparent in 
Cochabamba water management (Walnycki, 2013, pp. 87–88).  
These reforms had a profound effect on Cochabamba’s water management and community 
organization. Water sources in Cochabamba were mostly redistributed to ex-hacienda-
workers and small land-owners (Hines Thompson, 2015: 96-113), a re-distribution that is 
the basis of much of the current mita systems in the valley (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, pp. 
44–45), while rural unions are the base of rural organizations existing in Cochabamba today 
and influenced the organizational forms of peri-urban water providers (Walnycki, 2013b, p. 
87).  
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In the ex-rural District 2 of Sacaba, where I carried out case studies on two water 
cooperatives, the effects of the rural reforms are still clear, and well-remembered by the 
oldest inhabitants. Water sources placed in the mountain range were fundamental for water 
provision in the district. The way in which rights to these water sources were distributed can 
only be understood by putting it in a historical context.  Rights to water sources in the 
mountain range are currently divided between the last descendent from an old family of land-
owners, an association of irrigators, water cooperatives, and mountain-based rural 
communities. These rights are controlled through a series of private agreements, customary 
laws, and state laws. Historical changes in water rights, therefore, still strongly affect water 
distribution in the conurbation today.  
The reforms also affected the city landscape. After the Urban and Agrarian Reforms, (1953 
and 1956), the city underwent another migratory wave, as a new Municipal Regulatory Plan 
of 1961 tried in vain to control city growth (Chritèle and Delgado, 2007, pp. 117–119). The 
development of the outskirts of the city entrenched water segregation, as the municipality 
was unable to extend its water network (Hines Thompson, 2015: p.90). The municipality 
attempted again to obtain more water, but now whole communities protected their sources, 
making that difficult. The municipality was able to gain access to part of the Wara Wara and 
San Juan lakes water (Hines Thompson, 2015: 106). These were also the years when the 
Misicuni project (consisting of damning three rivers north of Cochabamba and channelling 
water to the city through an underground channel) (Walnycki, 2013, p.137) was first 
proposed as a solution to the city continuing water scarcity (Hines Thompson, 2015, p.122-
127), underlining the start of the desire of the city to skip the messy pattern of ownership in 
the valley through technological solutions. The choices taken in this period still influence 
water management in Cochabamba today. The Misicuni dam is finally concluded (even if 
not fully operational) and posed to become the major water source of the conurbation.  Due 
to the arrival of this water, the municipality of Sacaba, as well as the organization of 
irrigators of the District 2 of Sacaba, are asking for the restitution of the Wara Wara lake. 
Lack of water also contributed to develop and strengthen neighbourhoods’ organizations 
(Hines Thompson, 2015: pp. 113-119) that grew in peri-urban areas. Their members brought 
with them their experiences from miners and rural organizations, as the absence of the state 
forced them to organize to access essential services (Walnycki, 2013, p. 89). In the North 
Zone, neighbourhoods organized to exchange local water sources for access to the municipal 
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network (Hines, 2015: 113-119) increasing a trend started in the 1940s, in a state-supported 
‘informal process of urbanization’ (Hines, 2015: 80). Where water was available, the first 
independent water providers were built. In the arid Southern Zone, inhabitants developed 
strong neighbourhood organizations to direct their requests to the municipality (Hines, 2015: 
113-119) offering contribution in terms of money and infrastructures (Hines, 2015: 35).  
Geographical settings, national politics, neighbourhood organizations, informal and formal 
rules all contributed to the construction of a fragmented waterscape, where the water service 
was co-produced by communitarian organizations and the state in a blurring of the concept 
of formality and informality. Evidence that both northern and southern neighbourhoods 
effectively contributed to the building of what is now the SEMAPA system underlines how 
the separation between the methods of state organizations and of communities are not clearly 
separate, emphasizing that informality is a fluid concept, and that both formal and informal 
behaviours can often be identified in the same organization (Ahlers et al., 2014). In the 
conurbation, municipal providers are strengthening a discourse that presents them as the 
‘legitimate’ providers, a position that is strengthened by the fact that they characterise 
themselves as ‘public’ and communitarian organizations as ‘private’. Looking at the history 
of Cochabamba water governance, however, we can see that the division between public and 
communitarian organizations is not always simple.  
Meanwhile the political situation had again changed, as Bolivia was subjected to military 
dictatorships from 1964 to 1982 (Cielo, 2010, pp. 25–26). The military sought to weaken the 
Workers Unions and to ally with the peasant, guaranteeing the rural reforms. While the state 
regained partial control of the territory, it was essentially unable to control unionized rural 
areas (Regalsky and Breña, 2010, pp. 39–40). The state, likewise, never gained complete 
control on urban territories, as Cochabamba continued its unruly growth.  Illegal occupation 
of rural land worsened in the 1960s and 1970s, as rising prices encouraged rural landowners 
to sell their plots (Goldstein, 2004, p. 72). The growth of Cochabamba did not stop at the 
municipality borders. The construction of connection roads stimulated the east-west growth 
of the conurbation in the 1970s (Municipality of Sacaba, 2007, pp. 3–8), where most of the 
water cooperatives are now located.  By the late 1970s, the municipality had lost control of 
the situation and started to implement exclusionary policies, declaring new settlements 
illegal with the consequences that it often had no control or authority over new 
neighbourhoods (Goldstein, 2004, pp. 77–79). 
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The lack of an effective control over the territory by the state was also in evidence when 
looking at water management. Attempts to impose control over the territory through a 
‘modernization’ and simplification of the waterscape (with the support of international 
financial bodies and the foreign cooperation) largely failed. In the early 1960s, as a drought 
and protests about water scarcity enveloped Cochabamba, the government obtained foreign 
aid from the Federal Republic of Germany and the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) 
and new water plans were supported by the dictatorship of General Banzer.  However, both 
rural and urban inhabitants did not passively accept centralist plans (Hines Thompson, 2015, 
pp. 129–130). Founded in 1973 to satisfy the BID loan requirements, SEMAPA tried to raise 
prices while menacing water cuts, and ‘abolishing’ independent systems, effectively a 
preview of what a private company would attempt in 2000. However, it had no real capacity 
to do either and the resistance from the citizenship to the steep water hikes plummeted rates 
of payment (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp. 164-165). 
Clashes also took place with rural communities, as German engineers advised the 
municipality to drill artesian wells in the rural areas of Vinto, a solution that they assumed 
would not require negotiations with multiple users (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp. 124-127). 
Vinto farmers indicated (correctly) that deep wells would influence their own shallow wells, 
a claim refuted by state engineers. The project was nevertheless carried out by the 
government in a period of emergency drought. While farmers eventually ceded, in exchange 
for new wells, this conflict strengthened rural organizations, and engendered a stronger sense 
of ownership over water sources (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp. 169-175).  
These conflicts underline once again how different levels of the state, not always acting in 
unison, intervened and influenced water management in Cochabamba, as well as 
emphasizing the capability of rural and urban organizations to maintain a certain degree of 
control of the territory. Furthermore, it was the same attempt of the state to control the 
territory, that strengthened the community’s capacity for organization. The neo-liberal 
reforms of the state that culminated with an attempt to privatize water, would again bring 
unexpected consequences on rural and urban organizations. As the 1952 state was not able 
to control farmers through the construction of the unions, so the attempt to decentralize the 
state would results in fortifying both rural and urban organizations.  
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2.3. The neo-liberal years 
 
This section looks at neo-liberal reforms in Bolivia in the 1980s and 1990s, focusing on the 
consequences they had on communitarian organizations, and municipal governments, 
specifically in the Cochabamba conurbation. The neo-liberal years lead to a re-organization 
of the Bolivian economy that led to mass migration from rural and miners’ villages to urban 
areas. The migrants brought with them their forms of organization, which influenced the 
organization of urban neighbourhoods. The de-centralization policies of 1990s were 
intended to reinforce state authority, but they had very ambiguous consequences, as they 
strengthened the communitarian and neighbourhoods’ organization that would become 
central in the contestation of neoliberalism, at the same time as the state was partially able 
to co-opt them. In Cochabamba the reforms brought a wave of neighbourhoods’ legalization 
but did not improve water access. Tensions over water rose again between the state and rural 
users, as the state attempted to tame the waterscape, and assert control over water. These 
clashes led to the strengthening of the irrigators, as they protected their water access on the 
base of customary water rights.  
Democracy returned in Bolivia in 1982. The country was in a deep economic crisis, 
tormented by a hyperinflation that reached 25,000% by 1985. The MNR party applied, 
guided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a package of structural adjustments that 
dramatically shrunk the state (Good, 2006, pp. 178–184). The national tin mines, in crisis 
after the collapse of international prices, were sold off.  Between 1986 and 1992 around 
30.000 miners lost their jobs, deeply diminishing the power of the COB (Bolivian Central 
Union) (Gill, 1997, pp. 294–295), as well as  thousands of state and private sectors workers, 
unable to compete with cheap imports (Good, 2006, pp. 178–184). Entire miner’s 
communities were ‘relocated’. The majority moved to cities such as Cochabamba or El Alto 
(La Paz growing satellite city), others to the Chapare coca-growing regions, or abroad. Some 
of the older workers had acquired urban plots through miner cooperatives, but many had 
difficulty accessing housing and were forced into informal jobs, forcing strongly collectivist 
workers into individualistic survival strategies (Gill, 1997). The situation in the countryside 
73 
 
  
worsened: military interventions to suppress coca-production intensified in the low-land, 
while highland agriculture suffered due to land fragmentation (Healey, 2009, p. 84).  
The reforms weakened state control. Since the 1970s, the state progressively lost control of 
agrarian communities, and privatization policies led communities to assert ‘their rights to 
the autonomous management of resources’, leading to ‘local ungovernability’ (Regalsky and 
Breña 2010, pp. 41-42). The situation became increasingly chaotic also in the cities as the 
1980s drought triggered rural migration (CEDIB-Equipo Problemática Urbana, 2011, pp. 
18–19) and migrants arrived from mining communities (Ledo, 2002 in Durán, 2007, p. 106). 
In Cochabamba, while the 1981 Regulatory Plan allowed the progressive incorporation of 
some new areas in the urban limits (Chritèle and Delgado, 2007, pp. 117–119), parts of the 
fast-growing peripheries were declared ‘red zones’, excluded from any future regularizations 
(Goldstein, 2004, pp. 76–78). At a national level, settlements in excluded areas kept growing 
well into the 1990s (Cielo, 2010, p. 68). 
This policy of exclusions allowed land-trafficking to grow, but also encouraged the internal 
organization of neighbourhoods (Walnycki, 2013, p. 275) as new-comers brought their 
organizational experience to the city. Many of the water cooperatives in Cochabamba were 
founded in this period, and some carry the name of the mining community of their founders. 
Miners’ organizational capabilities, political militancy and reputation as fighters are well 
known in Bolivia (Cielo, 2010; Walnycki, 2013; Gill, 1997). These were also highlighted by 
some of my interviewees, who identified their capability for organization in their experience 
as miners.  
This does not mean that indigenous and miners’ organizational structures were simply 
replicated in cities, as peri-urban communities organization and identity are shaped by both 
the previous experiences of the settlers and by the struggles that neighbours led together 
(Cielo, 2010, p. 79). Walnycki argues that, while miner communities and neighbourhoods 
with a strong rural presence often have strong organization and a shared identity, most 
neighbourhoods have neither, and their inhabitants might also simply aim at becoming ‘like 
the centre’ instead than focusing on auto-organizations (Walnycki, 2013, pp. 223–225; 
Walnycki, 2013b, p. 241).  However, peri-urban water providers do often reference to 
‘indigenous and mining discourses to develop a sense of community’  (Walnycki, 2013, p. 
74 
 
  
81), often based on an idealized notion of miners and rural communities (Walnycki, 2013, 
p. 172). Cooperatives (as they are explored in Chapter 4) often reference to their history to 
justify their control over the territory, emphasizing that the way in which these communities 
were formed strongly influences the waterscape and water governance in the conurbation.  
In the 1990s, another wave of privatization was pushed forward by the Sánchez De Lozada 
government. The law of capitalizations effectively privatised fundamental state-owned 
industries (oil and gas, telecommunications, airlines, electricity, and railroads), while 
retaining 50% of each in state possession. Many state-employees were fired, while the cost 
of fundamental services such as electricity and water rose. State revenues fell, in part due to 
a cut in royalties and taxes for oil exploitation (which represented 48% of state revenues) 
(Kohl, 2002, pp. 456–460).  
The reforms were accompanied by an effort to create a more inclusive national citizenship 
with the aim of restoring the legitimacy of the state, damaged by the ‘excesses’ of 
neoliberalism (Cielo, 2010, p. 68; Medeiros, 2001, p. 402). These reforms represented the 
convergence of the government neoliberalist and indigenist tendencies (Medeiros, 2001, p. 
411) but also an example of a second wave of reforms in Latin America, with 
decentralization as key (CEDIB, Equipo Problemàtica Urbana, 2011, p. 12). The new 
constitution declared Bolivia a ‘pluri-cultural, multi-ethnic’ nation, and gave new political 
and cultural rights to indigenous peoples, including recognizing traditional community 
authorities (Perreault, 2005, p. 272; Albro, 2010, p. 75). However, these new rights were 
limited by neoliberal reforms that ‘tended to undercut livelihood options’ (Perreault, 2005, 
p. 272). 
The LPP (Law of Popular Participation, 1994) is a major example of tension during the 
reforms and it had the most contradictory consequences. It created 311 new municipalities: 
which were assigned 20% of the state budget, (Kohl, 2002, pp. 457–462), and the 
responsibility to deliver basic services such as schools, roads, and irrigation systems (Kohl, 
2002, p. 464). Crucially, it gave to communitarian organizations the possibility to receive 
legal personhoods as OTB (Grassroots Territorial Organization), (CEDIB-Equipo 
Problemática Urbana, 2011, pp. 6–7). OTBs became the official representative of each 
territory to the state, in charge of negotiating with the municipality which projects were 
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needed to improve their neighbourhoods (Kohl, 2002, pp. 457–462). It also mandated the 
creation of municipal oversight committees formed by OTB members (Kohl, 2002, pp. 457–
462). 
Decentralization policies were seen as a way to strengthen democracy but choices on offer 
were limited to the neoliberal model: while municipalities were given new competencies, 
the management of some services, such as water and solid waste were passed to private 
businesses or municipal autonomous entities. The role of ‘neoliberal’ municipalities was 
limited to ‘application of pro-poor programs’, ‘maintenance and the construction of 
infrastructures’ (CEDIB, Equipo Problemàtica Urbana, 2011, pp. 20–22). Municipalities, 
moreover, had limited control over their territory, as they were excluded from participating 
in the governance of ‘oil and gas, mineral, and hydraulic resources’ while they were, 
contradictorily, put in charge of sustainable development (Kohl, 2002, p. 465).  
The law also had contradictory effects on communitarian associations. It recognized a 
variety of associations from neighbourhood committees to indigenous ayllus (Albro, 2010, 
p. 75) and aimed at articulating their ‘ethnic democracy’ to the ‘European’ democracy of the 
Bolivian state (Alejo et al., 1995, p. 158). This model allowed participation within restricted 
margins (Medeiros, 2001, p. 401), limiting the communities’ capability to intervene in large-
scale policies, and, in general, recasting political issues ‘in terms of purely technical 
problems calling for technical solutions’ (Medeiros, 2001, p. 403). It therefore focused the 
attention of popular organizations on local issues, and imposed the OTB as the only actors 
to negotiate at municipality level, (CEDIB, Equipo Problemàtica Urbana, 2011, p. 12) 
fuelling possible contrasts with other territorial organizations. Furthermore, it risked 
favouring only local elites, used to deal with state authorities (Alejo et al., 1995, pp. 160–
163). While decentralization policies theoretically intended to give more autonomy to 
communities, and to respond to the historical and growing tensions between the central state 
and regional governments (Kohl, 2002, p. 458), they, in fact, expanded the reach of state 
authority (Kohl, 2002, p. 467), as also intended by  Sanchez De Lozada, (Perreault, 2005, p. 
272). 
However, reforms did not have univocal effects, and decentralization created new spaces of 
political organizations and social mobilizations (Perreault, 2005, p. 279). Perrault argues that 
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‘TBOs [OTBs] and oversight committees in many cases do enhance local participation and 
provide a valuable base for political organizing,’ and that the LLP is one of the causes for 
the high number of indigenous candidates elected in the 2002 elections (Perreault, 2005, p. 
273). Moreover, state restructuring ‘served to territorialize opposition to privatization and 
neoliberal economic policies and, in some areas, reinforce regional social movements’ 
(Kohl, 2002, p. 449). The reforms, moreover, recognized the validity of customary laws that 
were used to substantiate local and territorial requests and protests (Albro, 2010, p. 85).  
The LLP had profound consequences in the Cochabamba valley. It enlarged the jurisdiction 
of the municipality over rural areas (Perreault, 2005, p. 273) so that neighbourhoods seated 
in on rural land came to be part of the municipality, at the same time as the municipality 
acquired competencies over land use and ordering (Chritèle and Delgado, 2007, p.120) 
bringing massive regulation. However, the LLP policies did not provide a legal alternative 
to the informal land-market (Chritèle and Delgado, 2007, pp. 5–10) so that speculation and 
prices rose. Clientelist relationship between communities and departmental authorities 
strengthened, as neighbourhoods without legal land titles were recognized as OTBs, 
underlining the nebulous delimitation between formality and informality and the role of the 
state in co-creating ‘illegal’ settlements (Cielo, 2010, p. 123) 
The law also modified the relationship between communitarian organization and the state. 
Neighbourhood councils had existed since the 1930s in Cochabamba, and by the 1940s they 
were organized in a federation (FEJUVE),  which had a fundamental role in mediating with 
the authorities regarding the need of the neighbourhoods (Mejía Coca et al., 2009, pp. 155–
158). The LLP officially recognized these organizations, however the competition for 
projects generated rivalries between organizations and facilitated the creation of clientelist 
networks (Mejía Coca et al., 2009, p.163). While the political situation deeply changed, 
clientelist structure are still well-established. Some of my respondents, in fact, reported that 
projects depended from political support to the party in power. The OTBs are still today a 
fundamental actor in peri-urban areas, and one of the main form of contact between urban 
communities and the state. LLP funding has also been used to carry out infrastructural works 
for autonomous water providers. However, the presence of the OTB, and the use of LLP 
funding, is also used to strengthen the control of the state over water system placed outside 
their areas (see Chapter 4). The foundation of the OTBs still has a strong influence in water 
governance in peri-urban areas. 
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The LLP did not improve the municipal capability to provide services to the peripheral 
population (Chritéle & Delgado, 2007, p.10), as SEMAPA continued to be underfunded, 
(less of 1% of public spending) and to privilege the city centre (Walnycki, 2013, p.148). 
While the LPP aimed to strengthened local water governance it was in fact rife with 
inconsistencies: it gave more funding to the municipality, but most was earmarked for 
projects implementation, leaving little for maintenance and monitoring water quality 
(Perreault, 2005, p. 273).  
The 1990s were a period of intense struggle over water in Cochabamba; as attempts to order 
and tame the waterscape largely failed, the influence of international organization rose. 
SEMAPA, government and international organizations largely failed to transform urban 
users into obedient costumers (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp. 193-200). Price hikes, justified 
to obtain loans, to extend the service and to avoid privatizations were delayed multiple times 
by users (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp. 204-215). The same institutions attempted to tame the 
unruly countryside, launching a series of studies aimed at making the valley waterscape 
knowable and to ‘rationalize it.’ However, conflict intensified between the municipality and 
rural and provincial users that opposed the projects of SEMAPA to drill new wells in the 
Vinto/Sipe-Sipe area (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp.193-200).  Even when SEMAPA managed 
to build some wells in the El Paso area, it did not manage to impose the principle of state 
ownership on water resources (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp. 200). Far from disciplining the 
countryside, the conflict led to the foundation of FEDECOR (Cochabamba Irrigators’ 
federations) in 1997, aimed at defending their historic rights to water (Hines Thompson, 
2015, p. 201) (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, pp. 57–60). 
At the core, the conflict concerned who had the right to water. The state responded to the 
claim of the irrigators by referencing the constitution that held the state as the owner of water 
sources. However, there were contradictions within different laws (Hines Thompson, 2015, 
p. 201). Customary rights, the core of the irrigators’ water rights, were acknowledged by the 
Constitutions, the INRA Law and the LLP (Perreault, 2008, p. 840). However, most usufruct 
claims by communitarian organizations over irrigation systems and sources were not legally 
recognized, thus creating uncertainty. Moreover, decentralization policies created confusion 
over who was supposed to mediate conflicts, as regional governments were weakened and 
the municipality had often neither the jurisdiction nor the expertise to mediate resource 
disputes (Perreault, 2005, pp. 275–277), a confusion that is well in evidence today, as 
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different levels of the government, including some newly created organizations, are 
uncertain over who is in charge of solving the numerous inter-communities (and inter-
municipalities) conflicts that characterize the conurbation.  
Irrigators made defence of customary rights (usos y costumbres) central to their fight.  The 
concept of usos y costumbres goes back to Spanish law but it resurfaced in the ‘political and 
legal discourse’ in the 1990s. The concept itself is not void of contradictions. Customary 
rights are changeable and place-specific, which lead to inherent difficulties in granting legal 
protections while allowing flexibility (Perreault, 2005, p. 276). Furthermore, such claims 
risk to advantage only a relatively privileged part of the rural populations, those with access 
to fertile land served by irrigation systems (Walnycki, 2013, pp. 145–146).  The FEDECOR 
emphasized that  these rules come from their forefathers in a bid to reinforce the legitimacy 
of their access to water (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, p. 49). The concept is often used in 
essentialized manners, claimed as ‘ancient costumes’ (even if many irrigation systems date 
from the 1953 rural reform). However, the effective historical authenticity of these rights is 
not as important as their use as an instrument not only to revendicate rights but also to create 
a local identity and to emphasize political autonomy (Perreault, 2008, p. 841). Furthermore, 
participation to the maintenance, construction, and defence of these systems is also 
fundamental to water access  (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, p. 44).  
The neo-liberal years then had contradictory but lasting effects on water governance in the 
conurbation. The effects of such policies are still visible today, as the OTB remains one of 
the main forms of contact between peri-urban communities and the state, while the irrigators 
maintain an influence over water sources and water policy in the conurbation.  
As the state attempted to control the waterscape, groups that would oppose water 
privatization were strengthened. The irrigators would become central actors in the 
Cochabamba Water War, while neighbourhoods organizations claimed a central role in both 
the Water War and in the upraising of El Alto, during the Gas War.  
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2.4. The era of rebellions 
A new period of revolt and resistance characterized the early 2000s, of which the most 
significant examples are: the ‘Water War’ of Cochabamba against the new Potable Water 
Law and the privatization of SEMAPA, and the ‘Gas War’, a protest opposing the export of 
natural gas through a Chilean port. These resistance movements were connected to the 
question of who, how, and at what scale, can access and control resources; but also to the 
question of day-to-day life, inequality and democracy (Perreault, 2006, pp. 153–158). As 
such, they should be analysed at different levels. The Water War will be analysed in more 
detail, focusing especially on the local and regional context, and its effect on Cochabamba 
water governance. However, the analysis of the national and international levels is also 
necessary, as the discussion of scale remains fundamental to an understanding of 
Cochabamba water governance. 
Both Water and the Gas Wars were, in part, consequences of international trends that led to 
the rescaling and re-institutionalization of resources governance (Perreault, 2006, p. 152). 
The privatization of SEMAPA was the consequence of a World Bank policy (Crespo Flores, 
2000, p. 60): the privatization of water providers was included in the Bolivian debt relief 
conditions (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 15) and it led also to the privatization of La Paz/El 
Alto municipal provider, given in concession to the  French transnational Suez (Perreault, 
2006, p. 160). Bolivian protests can also be analysed as part of an international pushback, as 
the Water War can be considered part of the global ‘new social movements’ that started to 
organize against neoliberal globalization in the early 2000s (Crespo Flores, 2000, p. 59).  
The national context is also of primary importance. Neoliberal reforms represent a 
continuation of colonial and neo-colonial projects that for centuries robbed the country of its 
natural resources. The protests were based on the tradition of revolts of workers and 
indigenous people (Perreault, 2006, p. 168) . The protests, furthermore, put into doubt the 
political and economic model of the Bolivian state, that aimed to depoliticise communitarian 
and workers organizations, making political parties the only legitimate link between 
government and population (Crespo Flores, 2000, p. 59).  Therefore, the Water War can be 
read as a crisis of the methods of governmentality used by the Bolivian state (Crespo Flores, 
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2000, pp. 65-66), compounded by the fact that central state never had complete control over 
natural resources (Perreault, 2006, p.152). 
Local components are fundamental, especially those connected with the livelihood of 
Cochabamba rural and peri-urban sector. One of the key issues that emerged from the Water 
War, in fact, concerned the defence of customary rights that were and still are ‘inherently 
local’ (Perreault, 2006, p.159).  Another fundamental element is the growing importance of 
neighbourhood’s associations. The sense of community created by neighbourhood 
associations through the construction of their own networks was a fundamental element in 
the Water War (Walnycki, 2013). In El Alto, ‘neighbourhood micro-governments,’ had a 
fundamental role in organizing the resistance (Mamani Ramìrez, 2005, pp. 7–12). Therefore, 
the Water War in Cochabamba, can be considered as the results of policies and influences at 
varied scales, but also the results of a long local history of clashes over water and 
communitarian resistance against dispossession of natural resources.  
Tensions over water in Cochabamba started to intensify in 1996 when the Mayor announced 
a World Bank loan dependent on the privatizations of SEMAPA. As a prelude for the 
concession bid, the government transformed SEMAPA in a conurbation-wide organization 
(Ledo, 2013, p.73) with the prefect as president (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 213). Urban 
popular groups opposed the move, fearing water hikes, while officials and organizations of 
the conurbation smaller municipalities saw it as a menace to their systems. The supreme 
court reinstalled the mayor as the president of SEMAPA (Hines Thompson, 2015, pp. 221-
222) and the government made some concessions to the population, promising to involve 
local authorities, limit prices hikes and add the Misicuni projects to future concession (Hines, 
2015, pp. 222-223).  
The request for the inclusion of the Misicuni underlines tensions between the region and the 
government. Misicuni had been at the centre of local debates and electoral promises for 50 
years and it represents not only the solution for Cochabamba water problems but is also a 
symbol of departmental development and autonomy (Laurie and Marvin, 1999, pp. 1405–
1404). This first inkling of the ‘Water War’ therefore underlined tensions concerning the 
level at which water management should be carried out, questions that are still at the centre 
of Cochabamba water governance arrangements.  
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In 1998, a public call for concession was won by Agua de Tunari, the only organization 
present. It was an international consortium led by Bechtel, an US engineering firm (Shultz 
and Draper, 2008, pp. 15–16) legally based in the Cayman Islands (Crespo Flores, 2000, 
p.60). Closed-door negotiations with representatives from the municipal, regional and 
central state, produced a 40 years concession, very favourable to the private tender, and 
mostly undisclosed to the public. It guaranteed a 16% yearly profit, and exclusive monopoly 
over water sources. Investment for Misicuni was not guaranteed (Shultz and Draper, 2008, 
p. 16; Torrico et al., 2013, p. 45). Five weeks after the contract was signed the Banzer 
government passed the Law 2029 on Potable Water (Crespo Flores, 2000, pp. 60-61). The 
law legitimized the contract (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 45) as it decreed that the activities of 
autonomous water providers (even private wells) were illegal in a concession area (Torrico 
et al., 2013, p. 36). 
Local authorities did not initially resist privatization: the mayor was linked by an inter-
party’s pact with the government, and many neighbourhood councils were linked to the 
mayor’s party (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 33). The FEJUVE itself had become rife with 
clientelism after the decentralization reforms (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 63). Due to a lack of 
formal leadership, the protests coalesced around informal representatives. The creation of 
the Coordinadora, an organization created outside formal structure of political actions 
(Torrico et al., 2013, p. 47) can be seen as a consequence of the perceived ‘failure of local 
institutions to look out for public interests’ (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 17). 
The Water War was unique in that the population in general participated (Torrico et al., 
2013, p. 36). The new law and the contract affected different sectors of the population in the 
whole conurbation (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 45). The urban population were affected by the 
rise of tariffs, while peri-urban organizations and irrigators risked losing their systems and 
wells (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 45) (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, p. 86).  The FEDECOR was a 
central actor. Organizing a first meeting with Oscar Olivera, leader of the union of factory 
workers, and with organizations of environmental activists, it gave the impulse for the 
formation of the Coordinadora (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 17). Urban actors came from 
different sectors of the population. Professionals gave technical and legal support to the 
Coordinadora, (Torrico et al., 2013, pp. 58-59). Neighbourhood organizations and water 
providers of peri-urban areas (especially the South Zone, not politically controlled by the 
mayor), were fundamental in transmitting information and became a place of debate. Most 
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of their neighbourhoods were not served by SEMAPA. Apart from the risk of expropriation 
(Torrico et al., 2013, pp. 61-64) their protest also symbolized the request for fair access to 
water resources (Crespo Flores, 2000, p. 65). Forms of protest reflected this diversity, 
ranging from road blocks and marches, to symbolic burning of water bills, and legal 
challenges. The protesters also used new technologies bringing their fight on a global stage 
(Crespo Flores, 2000, p. 64). 
In January 2000, a few weeks after the start of the concession, water bills increased by 51% 
on average. Open assemblies and road blocks were organized by the Coordinadora to ask 
for the derogation of the law, and the annulment of the contract (Torrico et al., 2013, pp. 47–
48) (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 19). Citizens started to refuse to pay water bills (Shultz and 
Draper, 2008, p. 20). In February, after failed negotiation, another mobilization started. The 
new government, headed by Banzer, Bolivia former dictator, transferred 1000 police officers 
from outside the province with the results of increasing support to the protests (Shultz and 
Draper, 2008, p. 21). The situation degenerated into a city-wide conflict, supported by the 
union of coca growers (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 21).  New negotiation brought the 
promise of a six months roll-back of bill rises (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 21), a promise 
soon renegaded (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 51).  
The protesters were able to obtain a copy of the contract with the water company, that was 
examined with help of professionals, and deemed unacceptable (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 
22). To legitimise the decision to fight until the annulment of the contract, an informal 
referendum was organized. More than 50 000 people participated, with 90% voting for the 
contract annulment and the modification of the law 2029. In April, an indeterminate strike 
and road blocks left Cochabamba completely paralyzed (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 53). The 
governor asked the government to cancel the contract and resigned publicly declaring that 
he feared a ‘bloodbath’ (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 24). In April 8th, the government 
declared the state of siege (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 53) and suspended constitutional rights 
(Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 25). The leaders of the Coordinadora that had not been arrested 
went into hiding (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 25).  As soldiers entered the city, the protests 
restarted. The army used real bullets, which resulted in the death of a 17-year-old boy, Hugo 
Daza (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 25). On the April 10th, the officials of Agua del Tunari 
fled the country (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 26).  
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The government broke the contract with Agua del Tunari (Torrico et al., 2013, p. 54) and in 
April a new Potable Water Law (law 2066) was approved.  It acknowledged customary water 
rights, guaranteed public consultation, and limited the power of the Superintendent for water 
to potable water and sewage (Perreault, 2005, p. 275). The Coordinadora took (temporarily) 
charge of the company (Crespo Flores, 2000, p. 62).  
After the Water War, the unrest in the country did not stop, and it intensified in 2003. This 
period of turbulences reached its peak in September-October 2003, leading to the ‘Gas War’. 
On September 20th, the army arrived to the villages of Warisata/Sorata to disassemble a road-
block that had stranded various tourists. Five people were killed among whom a small child 
(Shultz and Draper, 2008, pp. 83–84) (Mamani Ramìrez, 2005, p. 50). This massacre created 
a sentiment of ‘belonging to the same social identity’ in the city and in rural areas, as 
different social forces started to coalesce in the city of El Alto (Mamani Ramìrez, 2005, p. 
50).  The tensions came to a head when the Lozada Government agreed a low selling point 
for gas exported to the US through a Chilean port, incensing the historical hostility against 
a country that in 1879 had seized the Bolivian coastline (Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 91). 
The protesters asked for the nationalization and the industrialization of Bolivian gas and oil 
(Shultz and Draper, 2008, p. 90), the central points of the ‘October Agenda’. Citizens 
blockaded El Alto, leaving La Paz nearly isolated. On October 11th, Sanchez de Lozada 
declared the state of emergency and sent in the army. More than 60 people died during the 
September and October protests and hundreds were wounded. As the protests spread and the 
number of deaths rose, even the middle classes and part of the elite started to demand the 
resignation of the president. On October 2003, Lozada resigned and fled the country for the 
US, and vice-president Carlo Mesa was sworn into office (Shultz and Draper, 2008, pp. 92–
94).  
After the departure of Lozada, a limited Gas and Oil law was passed while social movements 
protested in favour of the nationalization of the oil and gas industry (Shultz and Draper, 
2008, pp. 97–98). Protest in Al Alto also brought to the cancellation of the private water 
concession (Perreault 2006: p.160). Mesa resigned in June 2005, as protests restarted in the 
whole country (Shultz and Draper, 2008, pp. 97–98).  In December 2005, new elections were 
called. For the first time in 20 years, a candidate had an absolute majority, and Evo Morales 
of the MAS, leader of the union of Coca growers and Bolivia first indigenous president, was 
elected with 53.7% of the national vote (Healey, 2009, p. 85).   
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2.5. Conflicts and contradictions of a ‘post-neoliberalist’ Bolivia 
The election of Evo Morales represented the  end of a ‘peculiar form of Andean apartheid’ 
(Kohl and Bresnahan, 2010, p. 6), and the start of what the Bolivian government calls the 
‘process of change’ (proceso de cambio) a ‘multidimensional project’ (Kohl and Bresnahan, 
2010, p. 8) based on a ‘re-foundation’ of the state, necessary to heal the de facto exclusion 
of the indigenous population from full citizenship  (Dunkerley, 2007, p. 150). To strengthen 
this process, a new constitutional assembly was called (Zegada et al., 2011, p. 49). 
These political changes encountered a fierce opposition by regional elites in the oriental low-
lands (where most the of the hydro-carbon fields were located) as they campaigned for 
regional autonomy (Zegada et al., 2011, p. 46), managing to obtain a referendum on the 
issue. Gustafson argues that ‘the departmental autonomy project is at base an anti-democratic 
defence of race and class privilege’ (Gustafson, 2009, p. 1011). 
In 2006, both the elections for the constitutional assembly and the referendum for regional 
autonomy were called. The MAS party obtained 50,7% in the election, and on a national 
level the ‘no’ won on the referendum (Zegada et al., 2011, pp. 47–48). Due to the unrest that 
surrounded drafting the constitutions, the government moved the assembly to Oruro, and 
quickly approved the constitution, in a move that have been criticized as authoritarian, even 
if the constitution was afterwards approved via a referendum (Walnycki, 2013, pp. 108–
109). 
The constitution acknowledges Bolivia as a pluri-national state (Gustafson, 2009, p. 1004)  
and contained  ‘new possibilities for indigenous authonomy,’ a ‘deep recognitions of 
indigenous rights and culture,’ ‘new channels for democratic participation’ and partial 
concession to regional autonomy (Cunha Filho, 2016, p. 235). However, this position was 
accompanied by a ‘strong stance on sovereign control over oil, and especially natural gas’ 
(Gustafson, 2009, p. 988) creating tensions between strengthening the central state and 
indigenous populations control over their territory (Kohl and Bresnahan, 2010, p. 6) 
underlining the difficulty to articulate  ‘indigenous rights with a resurgent nationalist agenda’ 
(Gustafson 2009, p.1001). These tensions, united with a continuous reliance on extractives 
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industries and scarce attentions to their environmental consequences (Kohl and Bresnahan, 
2010, p. 19), put in doubt the supposedly ‘post-neoliberalism’ of the Bolivian government, 
as it contrasted two of the main ‘pillars’ of Evo Morales government post-neoliberal 
governance: ‘nature’ and ‘community’ (Marston, 2012, p. ii). This contrast also emerged 
during my field work, materializing in the tension between the state’s acknowledgement of 
communitarian providers and the strengthening of the role of the state in water provision.  
Evo Morales’ image abroad is that of a defender of environmental and indigenous rights 
(Walnycki, 2013, p. 105). He also has a solid internal popularity. After the approval of the 
constitution Morales was re-elected two times, the last in 2014 with a 61% majority 
(Webber, 2016, p. 1856). His government  reached considerable achievements, characterized 
by a strong economic growth and social mobility (Cunha Filho, 2016, p. 235), underlined by 
a grown presence of indigenous people in state institutions (Kohl and Bresnahan 2010, p.18) 
Poverty and extreme poverty decreased respectively from 62,4% to 36,3% and from 37,1% 
to 18.7% between 2002 and 2011. This was accompanied by large-scale infrastructural 
programs, social programs based on cash transfer, rising incomes, and the decline of 
illiteracy (Webber, 2016, p. 1857) (Cunha Filho, 2016, p.236) 
While some criticisms and frustration addressed at the government might be due to the high 
hopes that were placed on it, tensions are indubitably present (Cunha Filho, 2016: p.236). 
Morales was elected on the promise of the nationalization of gas, the rebuilding the National 
Oil and Gas Company (YPFB, ‘capitalised’ in the 1980s) (Shultz and Draper, 2008, pp. 83–
84) and to renegotiate gas contracts (Shultz and Draper, 2008, pp. 99–100) (Healey, 2009, 
p. 85). A real nationalization never took place but higher taxes and royalties brought a strong 
increase in state revenues (Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011, p. 138). The 
government aimed to increase the role of the state  (Kohl and Bresnahan, 2010, p. 17) and 
to diversify the economy through industrialization. However, the latter proved significantly 
difficult (Kohl and Bresnahan, 2010, p.17). Mining activities are therefore central to finance 
social projects, whose ‘visibility’ and a ‘reach’ make them fundamental for the government 
(Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington 2011, pp.138-139).  
These tensions are made starkly visible by indigenous population protests over resources 
extraction and infrastructure developments in their territory (e.g. the TIPNIS resistance see: 
86 
 
  
Laing, 2015). While the Bolivian constitution acknowledges the rights of indigenous people 
on their territory (Gustafson, 2009, p. 988), ‘non-renewable resources remain under control 
of the state’ (Gustafson, 2009, p.1006). The Bolivian state embraced the argument that ‘the 
subsoil belongs to the nation, and that it should be extracted so that its benefits can be 
shared.’ However, benefits and damage are unevenly distributed, as places where ‘value is 
extracted’ face the brunt of environmental degrade and destruction of livelihood sources 
(Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington, 2011, p.143).  
The general tensions between state centralization, and the reinforcement of community 
organization can be observed in the water sector, on which transformation aimed at 
(re)nationalising and centralising state control over water provision, reforming legislation 
and regulation, and institutional development and reform.’ A Ministry for Water was created, 
which was a longstanding request from popular movements. Central agencies dedicated to 
the regulation of the water sector (the AAPS), to the support and development of capabilities 
for water providers (SENASBA) and for the execution of water-related projects (EMAGUA) 
were built. The constitution also pays attention to water issues. The right to water is 
enshrined in the constitution, as is the rejection of privatization (even if ‘mixed’ providers 
are allowed). The constitution declares the responsibility of the state in providing the service, 
but also recognizes communitarian providers, customary rights, and social participation in 
the management of water (Walnycki, 2013, pp. 121-123).  
The affirmation of the centrality of the state in bringing the water service, and the 
simultaneous acknowledgement of communitarian water providers is an ambiguity central 
to Cochabamba water governance current tensions. Clarification into respective roles could 
be brought by a comprehensive Water Law, that has, however, long been under discussion 
with no approval in sight. A real change in the overall vision of water provision has not 
appeared: SEMAPA (and other municipal providers) continues to aim to a model of 
universal provision (Walnycki, 2013, p. 134). While the state now officially recognizes (and 
seeks to register through the AAPS) communitarian water providers, there are not enough 
resources to really improve their capabilities and level or service (Walnycki, 2013, p. 99).  
The Cochabamba waterscape is still fragmented, and many water activists and community 
leaders fear that the state aims to encroach, and eventually dissolve, their providers 
(Walnycki, 2013, pp. 132–133). The regulation of these organizations, moreover, is taking 
place at the central state level, in a process of centralization, mirroring the attempt of the 
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state to retake control of natural resource governance. In conclusion, while state authorities 
do not actively exclude peri-urban providers, they do not actively support their existence 
either, as they are simply allowed to operate in areas that the state cannot yet reach (Marston, 
2012, p. 58). The Water War then put an end to privatization attempts, but it did not bring a 
long-term change in water governance, especially in peri-urban Cochabamba, neither did it 
solve the tension concerning water governance in the valley, nor end the menace on 
independent water providers. In fact, problems connected to the scale of water governance, 
and to who is a legitimate provider are very much alive (Walnycki, 2013: 168). 
After the Water War, the radical requests of the Coordinadora for a socially-controlled 
utility were eventually moderated in the concession for socially elected representatives in 
the Boards of Directors. However the low participation of the population (Kooy and Bakker, 
2008, pp. 238–239) led to a stop of these elections by 2011 (Marston, 2012, pp. 121–122). 
Furthermore, the movement that led the water war also started to fragment and weaken. 
Irrigators and peri-urban potable water providers went separate ways. There is also a widely 
held opinion between water activists and academics that the heads of some water 
organizations have been co-opted by the state (Walnycki, 2013, p. 101).  
Furthermore, infrastructural works in Cochabamba have followed the national trend towards 
visible infrastructures works with an ‘immediate political payoffs’ (Webber, 2016, p. 1866). 
Large scale projects have been pushed as the solutions to the conurbation water and 
sanitation issues.  The Misicuni project seems to finally approach completion. Water from 
the Misicuni dam should provide potable water and water for irrigation to the Cochabamba 
valley, and the whole Water and Sanitation Masterplan for the Conurbation hinges on it. 
However, it still presents technical and administrative problems (Crespo Flores, 2016).  
Additionally, during my fieldwork, it was still not clear how the water would be distributed 
to the various municipalities, and by which organizations, nor the answer seems to be near 
now (Crespo Flores, 2016).   
Putting forward a project that had been shut down by the Water War and precedent protests, 
the idea of a metropolitan (i.e. conurbation wide) water provider has been floated again, but 
it is not clear who this provider will be, or what should be its function. In April 2017, the 
Ministry for the Environment and Water and the departmental government announced the 
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need to strengthen a ‘metropolitan water institution,’ that would administer and distribute 
the water coming from Misicuni to the various municipalities. However, the very existence 
of such an organization was contested by the manager of SEMAPA. The president 
SEMAPA’s board, furthermore, announced the intention to transform SEMAPA in a 
metropolitan provider, seeing in the actions of the regional government an attempt to 
monopolize and profit from Misicuni (Los Tiempos, 2017a). At the same time, both 
Quillacollo and Sacaba are strengthening their own water providers. While spatial borders 
between the municipalities are nearly imperceptible, little coordination seems to exist 
between them (Ledo, 2013, p. 20). 
The Water War and the government’s reforms had then produced long-term but 
contradictory consequences in Cochabamba. The federation of irrigators, FEDECOR, was 
particularly strengthened by the Water War. It contributed to create the first National 
Organization of Irrigators in 2003 (Perreault, 2005, p. 277) and was able to ‘influence water 
politics and legislation, most notably the River Law of 2004, that protected their water rights’ 
(Walnycki, 2013, p. 143), acting through networked alliances (Perreault, 2008).   In 2003, 
communitarian water providers of the South Zone founded the umbrella organization 
ASICASUDD (now ASICASUDD-EPSA), that protects potable water providers interests, 
and pushes for a co-management model, where communities and the state would collaborate 
to bring the water service (Walnycki, 2013, p. 171). The water cooperatives, some of which 
had a very active role during the water war, also organized to found FECOAPAC8 in 2003.  
The National Federation of Water Cooperatives (based in the Santa Cruz de la Sierra, where 
water cooperatives dominate water provision) was founded in 2009 with the collaboration 
of both Cochabamba and Santa Cruz de la Sierra water cooperative federations and was 
officially recognized9 in 2012. Furthermore, many of the cooperatives that exist in 
Cochabamba decided to officially register around the time of the water war in an attempt to 
protect their water system (this will be discussed more in depth in Chapter 4). On a whole, 
the water war had the consequence of organizing and bringing to the foreground water 
organizations that operate in the conurbation, while also strongly politicizing water 
discourses in the valley.  
                                                 
8 Interview first president FECOAPAC, 17/06/2014 
9 Interview President FENCOPAS, 07/02/2014 
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Therefore, the current situation concerning water governance in the Cochabamba valley is 
quite contradictory, as communitarian organizations have been reinforced by their 
officialization and by the creations of networks. These networks are necessary for their 
capability to influence governance (see Chapter 6). However, the state influence in the water 
governance has also been strengthened, as the state focus its attentions on the construction 
of large scale infrastructures that will reinforce its control over the waterscape (see Chapter 
6).  
Furthermore, Campanini (2015)  argues that due to the process of urbanization, and the 
pressure to enlarge the legal borders of the urban areas (especially in water rich areas), led 
to a decline of agriculture in the valley weakening the irrigators organization. Furthermore, 
various activists and academics in Cochabamba shared the view that some heads of the water 
movement have been co-opted by the state. 
Meanwhile, the conurbation keeps growing in an unplanned way. Conflicts over the land are 
growing between agriculturist communities and new irregular neighbourhoods in peri-urban 
areas, where communities do not have any more complete social control over their 
communal lands (Opinión, 2012). As land speculation pushes prices higher (Ledo, 2013, pp. 
20-22), new settlements grow in areas that were previously avoided, due to elevation, lack 
of water sources and contaminations. This led the ‘peripherizations of the most extreme 
poverty’ in neighbourhoods that are often not recognized by the state (Walnycki, 2013, 
pp.161-162), but have the lowest land prices (Ledo, 2013, pp.20-21).  
Conflicts are getting worse as water sources become overexploited (Walnycki, 2013), and 
were made even more generalized after I left the field, due to the drought that recently hit 
Cochabamba. In the middle of this crisis, water waste is rife in valley, as the main methods 
of irrigation in Cochabamba is still flooding, and SEMAPA currently loses 50% of its water 
(Crespo Flores, 2016). 
 
90 
 
  
Conclusion 
The Cochabamba conurbation waterscape has long been fragmented, not only at a territorial 
level, but also in relation to the rights under which water is accessed and distributed, and the 
organizations that participated in its construction. Looking at the conurbation history, we 
can see that the current irrigations and potable water systems in the Cochabamba valley are 
based on an accumulation of different rights and systems (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, pp. 44–
45).  
The role of the state has for a long time not been dominant in this waterscape. State 
institutions, here often territorialized by municipal authorities, have inserted themselves in a 
pre-existing landscape, and have long been forced to negotiate with rural and ‘informal’ 
actors to access water-sources, and to take its place within the valley territory. This chimes 
with general difficulty of the Bolivian state in controlling and exercising its authority on the 
national territory.  
The municipalities, and the municipal water systems, have often attempted to create a 
‘modern’ and ‘formal’ landscape and waterscape, but have in fact used informal means of 
expansions. In the last year, the state discourse has changed, although the actions of the 
government seem to continue the long-term effort of the state to control and ‘order’ the 
waterscape of the Cochabamba valley, to make it legible and knowable to a modern state 
bureaucracy. These efforts are the centre of the tensions emerging between the state and 
communitarian providers, which will be analysed in more details in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Furthermore, this chapter emphasizes the importance of very local organizations and systems 
of rights to understand the Cochabamba waterscape. The history of struggles and relations 
that shaped the way in which Cochabamba peri-urban inhabitants conceive and created their 
waterscape will be analysed in more details in Chapter 4.  
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3. Methodology 
 
Introduction 
This chapter critically analyses the way in which I conducted my research. I explore how I 
started my fieldwork and formed relationships with my informants. I discuss the methods 
used with different kind of actors and their relevance to my research question. Additionally, 
I explain how I answered some ethical problems and the way in which the collected data 
were analysed.  
The objective of this thesis is to understand how cooperatives influence water governance in 
the conurbation through an analysis of the waterscape on different scales and different 
spaces. I argue that the basis of the cooperatives’ power comes from their connections to 
their territory. Furthermore, the points of view of the state, the cooperatives and other actors 
contribute to shaping the waterscape on different scales. It is important to frame such 
perspectives as part of the methodology of this thesis. For these reasons, my methodology 
strategy was two-fold. On one side, I interviewed state officials and cooperative 
representatives to understand how they view and act on the waterscape. On the other side, I 
deepened my understanding of how the cooperatives build and conceive the waterscape by 
performing two in-depth qualitative case studies. Mapping exercises were also undertaken 
on different scales and across different spaces, as they allowed me to better examine the 
relationship between cooperatives and the wider waterscape, as well as their interaction with 
other actors. 
Data analysis also reflected the complexity of this multi-sited and multi-scalar research. 
Interviews with state officials and cooperatives, as well as interviews related to the two case 
studies, were first analysed separately. This allowed me to explore how my respondents saw 
their cooperative and governmental organizations, the respective roles of their organizations 
and their relationships. It allowed me to analyse the reasons for the differences and 
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similarities between the two case studies. Afterwards, I focused on certain infrastructural 
projects in the conurbation, which are expected to modify the material waterscape. 
Analysing how the state and communitarian organizations viewed and participated in these 
projects offers a clear example of how cooperatives can contribute to water governance. This 
method of analysis allowed me to better understand how scale, waterscape, power and ideal 
hydro-social territories shape water governance in the conurbation. 
 
3.1. The necessity of multi-scalar, mixed methods research 
The aim of this thesis is to understand how cooperatives influence water governance. The 
reasons for the choice to examine Cochabamba water cooperatives is detailed in Section 1.3. 
This section discusses the necessity for a multi-scalar investigation (Chowdhury et al., 2011) 
and offers an overview of my mixed methods qualitative approach. My previous knowledge 
of the situation in Cochabamba (see Section 3.2), together with a review of the literature on 
the Cochabamba situation (e.g. Bakker, 2007; Bustamante, 2004; Crespo Flores, 2000; 
Crespo Flores et al., 2004; Shultz and Draper, 2008) informed my research design. The 
research design includes in-depth case studies of two different cooperatives and multi-scalar 
interviews with the state, cooperative respondents, and expert respondents. 
Investigating water governance in the conurbation requires an in-depth understanding of the 
cooperatives both as a whole and as single entities. I was particularly interested in examining 
how cooperatives are embedded in the wider waterscape. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
conurbation’s development was disorderly, which determined a high variability in water 
access and organization in the outskirts of the city (Zegada et al., 2015, p. 5), where state 
provision is often absent. Therefore, it was important to have an overview of the role that 
the cooperatives assume in the conurbation. To this end, I interviewed the representatives of 
most water cooperatives active in the Cochabamba conurbation, both before and during my 
case study. This helped me to select the two case studies. At the same time, themes emerging 
from my case studies helped me to refine my questions for the representatives of the 
conurbation cooperatives, and vice-versa. To answer these questions, I also carried out a 
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round of re-interviews.  In this way, I was able to understand the differences and similarities 
in their approaches towards the state. I was also able to understand how they influence and 
are influenced by the wider waterscape of the conurbation. The use of open-ended interviews 
allowed me to address specific issues, while allowing for the expressions of differences in 
experiences, unique difficulties and relationships with the waterscape, as well as the 
emergence of new themes. 
After 7 months from the beginning of my research, I selected two case studies (the method 
of selection is detailed in Section 1.5) to explore the various facets of a cooperative life 
(Somekh and Lewin, 2004, p. 33), such as the motivation behind the cooperatives’ 
behaviour, the formal and informal interactions between actors, and cooperatives’ 
organizational, material and economic characteristics (Bryman, 2008, p. 62; Hakim, 2000, 
p. 63). The horizontal power structures of the cooperatives, namely the importance of 
democratic members participation, means that the analysis of the cooperative’s decision-
making process must include the understanding of the visions and the interactions of the 
members with the cooperative. Furthermore, participant observation allowed me to 
contextualize data collected in other ways (Kawulich, 2005), including a ‘geographical’ 
context, as I could observe and analyse the ‘material’ waterscape of the cooperative and the 
way it influenced my respondents. Therefore, the mixture of interviews, participant 
observation and document analysis that characterize a case study were best suited to 
understand how the cooperatives see themselves and the state, and their relationship with a 
specific local waterscape. As explained later, these elements are key to the relationship of 
the cooperatives with the state and the way in which the cooperatives shape the waterscape. 
Interviews with state officials were necessary to understand how the state influences water 
governance and the cooperatives. The state is a central actor shaping the waterscape, and it 
is crucial to highlight that this is through both its action and its inactions. I used open-ended 
in-depth interviews to allow for detailed discussions on the context in which the cooperatives 
operated allowing me to obtain preliminary information on a situation on which I initially 
had a limited knowledge (Goldstein, 2002, p. 699). Interviews carried out late in my 
fieldwork also allowed me to ask specific questions and to obtain information that were not 
available elsewhere. Open ended interviews also allowed the expression of beliefs and 
visions. I conducted interviews at different levels of the state, as each level has different 
functions and may have different visions, underlining therefore importance of scalar 
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analysis. As a result, state organizations at different levels influence water governance 
differently and need to be analysed as a whole to understand how water governance is created 
in the conurbation. 
Another dimension of this research is the analysis of how different cooperatives collaborate 
in the conurbation. In Cochabamba, such collaboration happens mainly through an umbrella 
organization, the Federation of Water Cooperatives of the Cochabamba Department 
(FECOAPAC). Such organizations are important mediators between communitarian 
organizations and the state (e.g., in Cochabamba the Federations of Irrigators and 
ASICASUDD-EPSA; for an international example see Appadurai, 2001). They are also a 
way through which the communitarian organizations are able to exercise power. As I 
demonstrate in the following chapters, FECOAPAC plays a crucial role in propagating the 
cooperatives’ alternative vision of how the waterscape should appear. Therefore, 
FECOAPAC became a fundamental site of study. This organization was examined through 
open-ended interviews with its leaders, as well as participant observation in some of the 
cooperative leaders’ meetings and activities. 
3.2. Entering the field 
This section describes what I did when I first arrived in Cochabamba and how I first was 
able to create connections with certain organizations. Before leaving for Cochabamba, I re-
established a connection with the Italian NGO Ce.V.I., with whom I was in contact due to 
my master’s thesis project in 2009. The NGO updated me on the situation in Cochabamba 
and informed me about the nuances of water cooperatives. They had such information 
because they were collaborating with one cooperative to build a wastewater treatment plant 
(WWTP). My contact with Ce.V.I. was a useful point of entry for my research and allowed 
me to make contact with other key stakeholders/organisations in the wider waterscape. Upon 
arriving in Cochabamba, the head of the cooperative collaborating with Ce.V.I. put me in 
contact with FECOAPAC. 
After discussions with the leader of FECOAPAC, observing a couple FECOAPAC meetings 
and conducting exploratory interviews with the heads of a few cooperatives, I confirmed that 
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the cooperatives were an interesting case study. Some key characteristics determined this 
decision. First, the cooperatives are placed throughout the conurbation, allowing me to better 
understand their interaction with the overall waterscape in the conurbation. Second, a 
majority were well-established institutions with a long history, thus allowing me to have a 
better historical perspective. However, a few were in marginal areas with problematic water 
access, thus allowing me to understand the different strategies that they employed to shape 
their waterscape and their relationship with the state. Further details are given in Section 3.3. 
3.3. Water cooperatives and FECOAPAC 
This section justifies choosing water cooperatives as a case study and analyses their 
relevance to the research question. Furthermore, the section explores and justifies the themes 
investigated in the interviews conducted with the cooperatives and FECOAPAC and 
describes ulterior research methods utilized. A few details on the interview process are also 
given to analyse their influence on the data obtained.  
Cooperatives are a minority amongst the communitarian water providers in the conurbation. 
There are approximately 30 cooperatives out of the 600 communitarian water providers 
overall. Water cooperatives tend to be larger and to give better service than other 
communitarian organizations in the conurbation (Lavrilleux and Compere, 2006, p. 21). 
However, water cooperatives are not qualitatively different from other communitarian 
organizations. They are officially registered as cooperatives, but their internal organization 
and the participation of their members is similar to that in other communitarian 
organizations. Differences are due to the fact that those communitarian organizations that 
decide to register as cooperatives are mostly well-established ones (as discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4).  
One key facet that justifies my selection of water cooperatives as a subject of study is that 
they are spread throughout the conurbation’s waterscape. Consequently, I could, through an 
analysis of cooperatives in different municipalities, understand which elements of the 
cooperatives’ interaction with the state are particular to their municipalities and which 
elements have wider causes. Furthermore, the distribution of the aquifers in the conurbation 
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means that water quality and availability vary significantly. As a result, I could study the 
influence that the distribution of water sources in the waterscape has on the cooperatives, as 
well as how the power of the cooperatives influences their capability to access water. The 
need to access water sources is a key driver of the way in which the cooperatives interact 
with other state and non-state actors. 
I carried out interviews with 21 of the 25 cooperatives I was able to pinpoint in the 
conurbation. Cooperatives are also key to understanding the dynamics of the Cochabamba 
waterscape for four key reasons.  Firstly, most of them are well-established and relatively 
longstanding (founded approximately 20 to 30 years ago) so offer a window into wider 
patterns of urban development over time such as informality, auto-construction of 
neighbourhood organizations and the physical evolution of the waterscape. Secondly, they 
invite an analysis of the consequences of different state water policies through time. Thirdly, 
cooperatives are not uniform, and some are more fragile organizations, located in more 
marginal, poor areas. Understanding how this fragility changes their relationship with the 
state is important. Finally, the variability between cooperatives offers understanding of how 
class, access to water and the age of the neighbourhood influences and is influenced by the 
continuous development of the waterscape. 
My research question requires me to undertake a detailed analysis of how the cooperatives 
influence and are influenced by the waterscape on different scales. I completed open-ended 
interviews with representatives of the cooperatives and FECOAPAC. FECOAPAC is an 
umbrella organization with a central role in representing the cooperatives to the state, and 
therefore, a fundamental facet of the way in which the cooperatives influence water 
governance. As a result, the FECOAPAC relationship with the water cooperatives and with 
the state is of significance in this study. The constitution of networks is a fundamental way 
in which communitarian organizations relate with the state in Bolivia. The analysis of 
FECOAPAC allows me to understand how this network is used specifically by 
communitarian organizations to exercise power in the waterscape. 
My interviews, although open ended, investigated four broad themes. Firstly, I probed the 
cooperatives material waterscape, as well as their formal organization. This allowed me to 
collect empirical data, perform comparisons and extract an overall view of the cooperatives. 
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The second theme concerned the way in which the cooperatives obtained their resources: 
access to water sources, infrastructures or organizational capabilities. Such themes explored 
the history of the cooperatives, which are the basis of their discourse regarding themselves 
and their place in the conurbation. Oral histories are regarded as instances of storytelling 
(Skinner, 2014, p. 14). This made them appropriate for the goal of this thesis as I aimed to 
understand what these ‘stories’ meant for the interviewees and the way in which these 
histories influenced their relationship with the cooperatives. History also provides a link 
between the local cooperatives’ history and the history of the conurbation. The third theme 
regarded the cooperatives’ relationship with their members and water users. This 
relationship is the basis of the cooperatives’ capability to control their territory and to 
exercise power at different levels. The fourth focus of the analysis is the relationship between 
the cooperatives and the state. Questions on this subject allowed me to analyse both how the 
current relationship is interpreted and how representatives of the cooperatives think that 
relationship should be. 
I conducted multiple interviews with the leaders of FECOAPAC, as well as various informal 
chats in their office. This allowed me to understand how FECOAPAC reacted to issues that 
arose at that time (Lecompte, 2002, p. 286). These issues concerned clashes between the 
state and the cooperatives and wider issues arising in the conurbation waterscape or state 
water-related policies. I also observed various public meetings between the cooperatives and 
FECOAPAC. The observation of these meetings added to my understanding of the 
relationships between FECOAPAC and the cooperatives and various tensions that arose. 
Additionally, I learned how cooperatives participated in FECOAPAC decisions. 
Furthermore, state policies and the relationship between the cooperatives and the state were 
often discussed in these meetings, allowing me to understand how these issues were 
addressed, interpreted and conceived by the cooperatives. Finally, I spent time in the 
FECOAPAC office. As a result, I was also able to observe informal interactions between 
cooperative representatives and FECOAPAC officials and to understand the main issues the 
cooperatives brought to the FECOAPAC’s attention. In addition, FECOAPAC had a variety 
of official documents on the cooperatives, which added to my factual knowledge base. 
The analysis of FECOAPAC offers detailed information on a fundamental institution, used 
by the cooperatives to interact with the state. Therefore, questions posed in the interviews 
were focused on how the relationship with the state occurred, how the state reacted to the 
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federation’s requests and what their main requests were. I also analysed how the relationship 
between FECOAPAC and the cooperatives evolved, as certain tensions were present. 
Consequently, FECOAPAC is not the only avenue through which the cooperatives influence 
water governance, nor can it be expected to faithfully represent the different visions of all 
cooperatives towards the state. 
Performing these various methods of analysis had its challenges. Foremost, FECOAPAC 
was crucial to my capability to contact the cooperatives, as no official listing of these 
organizations are present nor are their contact details available. The president of 
FECOAPAC agreed to put me into contact with their members and grant me access to the 
documents in their possession. In exchange, I was asked to prepare a database containing 
information on the cooperatives, as FECOAPAC itself did not have these data in a 
systemized form. These difficulties and exchanges underline the importance of information 
in the conurbation. 
I considered the ethical implications of collecting data for FECOAPAC (further details are 
in Section 3.6). I decided to prepare two separate interview guides aimed at presidents of 
cooperatives: one was a questionnaire to collect the data I needed to complete the database 
(but that also gave me a factual base of information); the other was compiled for my own 
research. The data requested by FECOAPAC were mostly factual, such as data concerning 
water sources, infrastructure, prices and projects, as well as bureaucratic data (translation of 
the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1).  
Writing an effective interview guide for my dissertation required me to collect some 
information. In the first months after contacting FECOAPAC, I was invited to observe 
various workshops, given by a Bolivian NGO with 10 water cooperatives. Observing these 
workshops and listening to the discussions that ensued helped me understand some of the 
cooperatives’ concerns and the background in which they operate. This first exploratory 
study allowed me to better create an appropriate interview guide (Monti et al., 2014, p. 138). 
I tested the interview guide with the president of the cooperative Quintanilla, whom I met at 
a workshop, and I sought the opinion of the president of FECOAPAC (a translation of the 
final interview guide can be found in Appendix 2). 
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In November, I started my first round of interviews with the cooperatives. I used a list of 
phone numbers that FECOAPAC provided me to ask potential informants for an interview. 
One of the main difficulties, once I managed to secure an appointment, was finding the 
cooperatives’ offices. In many cases, I could not find their locations beforehand as I did not 
have a precise map, and in some cases, the streets had no official names. While this was a 
problem in practical terms, it also allowed me to observe the ways in which distance from 
the city centre and scarcity of public transportation are often linked closely to poverty and 
marginality, as well as to scarce water access. 
Furthermore, I started to understand how the city was often unmapped and unknowable. 
These themes emerged from the literature and from interviews with state officials, and I 
could observe what this meant in practical terms, both regarding the difficulties of the 
inhabitants and the difficulties of the state in understanding the conurbation. This also led 
me to start mapping the water providers, which was difficult because official maps were 
often incomplete. 
Generally, interviewees were open and friendly, but a couple were slightly suspicious, 
especially concerning the FECOAPAC survey. Cooperatives have to pay a fee to 
FECOAPAC that depends on their number of members. The president of one cooperative 
told me that the reason that FECOAPAC had sent me with the survey was to check up on 
their number of members. He had no problems, however, giving me an interview, as he 
perceived me as non-involved. He thought that FECOAPAC was using me without me 
realizing it and even agreed to answer the FECOAPAC's questionnaire. 
While I did not think that FECOAPAC was using me to ‘spy’ on the cooperatives, this 
exchange underlined a tension between a few cooperatives and FECOAPAC, which I 
observed on further occasions. To avoid any ambiguities, therefore, I always kept the 
questionnaire and the interview guide separate, and I always made it clear what information 
would be passed on to FECOAPAC and what would be used exclusively for my PhD 
research. I also made it clear to the head of FECOAPAC that I would not give him full 
transcriptions of the interviews, only the completed database. 
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In total, I was able to interview representatives of 21 of the 25 cooperatives registered in the 
FECAOAPAC database as acting in the conurbation, as well as two cooperatives that operate 
in more distant municipalities (a complete list of interviews can be found in the Appendix 
6). As new themes emerged during my research, I also performed a round of re-interviews 
in eight cooperatives towards the end of my research. The interviews usually lasted from a 
minimum of 30 minutes to nearly 2 hours. Overall, the interviewees had a high level of 
knowledge about their cooperatives or were able to obtain specific information from other 
people. 
While my research question focuses on water governance on the urban scale, such 
governance is also influenced by actors at the central state level and, more generally, by 
national trends, policies and issues. Therefore, I conducted one interview (and one re-
interview) with the president of the National Federation of Water Cooperatives (of which 
the FECOAPAC is a member), an organization based in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, where the 
largest water cooperatives of the country are based. I also interviewed the representatives of 
three cooperatives acting in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, as well as two representatives of water 
cooperatives operating in La Paz. This was useful to understand how the Federation of 
Cooperatives acts on a national scale and how certain issues affect the cooperatives 
throughout the national territory. Furthermore, I was also able to observe how the 
relationship between state and cooperatives are radically different in Santa Cruz de la Sierra 
from the one between the state and cooperatives in Cochabamba. This offered insight into 
the ways in which power relations influence the relationship between state and cooperatives 
which is spatially variable within and across the conurbation (see Chapters 5 and 6) 
3.4. Interviews with state officials 
This section explores how interviews with state officials were carried out and how they relate 
to my research question. The state is a fundamental actor in urban water governance. 
Therefore, an analysis of the role, policies and visions of state officials is necessary to 
understand how the state affects the waterscape. In my analysis, I focused on five themes 
necessary to answer my research question. These themes are the main ways in which the 
state affects the waterscape. 
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First, I explored how the state materially modifies the waterscape in the conurbation through 
large-scale infrastructural works. Such works assume a central importance in water 
governance in the conurbation, as they strengthen the role of the state and often push water 
governance to a higher geographical scale. An example of such a project is the Misicuni dam 
(explored in Chapter 6). Such projects have an important influence on the relationship 
between the state and the cooperatives. 
Second, the state influences the waterscape through the direct provision of water and 
sanitation services. Within the context of the state organization, direct provision of the 
service is the municipalities’ responsibility. In the conurbation, tensions between the 
municipal water providers and water cooperatives became a key element of my analysis. 
This element allowed me to understand how municipalities and cooperatives often compete 
over the control of the territory. As mentioned and further explored in later chapters, control 
over the territory is a key element through which the cooperatives exert power. Furthermore, 
the contrast between the concept of universal municipal provisions and communitarian 
provisions represents one of the main clashes between state and communitarian organization 
discourses on the way in which water governance should be organized. I have, therefore, 
studied the discourses provided by the municipalities, both on their services and the services 
of the cooperatives, as well as their material consequences. 
Legislation and regulation of the water and sanitation sector are a third important focus of 
the analysis. Regulations are one of the ways in which the state influences water governance. 
In Cochabamba, one of the most important regulations concerns the formalization of water 
providers, which was occurring at the time of my research. Analysis of this process and of 
the difficulties it encountered allowed me to understand how such regulations expand state 
control and their knowledge of communitarian organizations and how communitarian 
organizations react to such attempts of control. 
Fourth, I analysed the way in which the state distributes resources (i.e. funding) for water 
and sanitation projects. The analysis of this topic is important for three reasons. First, the 
distribution of resources concretely underlines the state’s priorities (Monti et al., 2014, p. 
138). Second, the rights of the cooperatives to receive state support is a fundamental point 
of contention in Cochabamba, as most municipal officials declared that the cooperatives are 
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not legitimate recipients of state funding. Third, this topic allowed me to pinpoint the 
existence of different discourses towards the cooperatives at different levels of the state. 
Such discourses could be used by the communitarian organization network to influence 
water governance in the conurbation. 
The fifth topic focuses more abstractly on how the state sees, conceives and imagines the 
waterscape. An indication of these conceptions and discourses emerged throughout all 
precedent topics; however, I also treat these conception and discourses as a separate topic of 
analysis. To this end, I asked state officials about their perception of the respective roles of 
the state and communitarian organizations in providing the water service. Such perceptions 
have material repercussions on the relationship between cooperatives and the state and on 
how the state influences water governance. 
I used these in-depth interviews to adapt to the high variability of roles and expertise of my 
respondents. I also added probing questions tailored to the expertise of my interviewees 
(Dexter, 2006, p. 17). These interviews were conducted with officials working at all levels 
of the state. This variation was necessary to obtain a complete view of how different levels 
of state influence water governance in the conurbation. In addition, different state actors may 
have different policies and visions regarding water governance. 
A figure illustrating the various levels of the state involvelvement in water and sanitation 
provision is synthesized in Figure 3. Interviews were carried out with representatives of most 
of these institutions (a list of the interviews can be found in Appendix 9). 
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Figure 4: Scheme of state organisations related to the water sector. I developed this scheme from an analysis of the data 
gained during interviews, consultations of state documents and official websites (http://www.mmaya.gob.bo ; 
https://www.fps.gob.bo/ ). 
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At the end of my research, I had completed interviews with 44 state officials, at the 
municipal, departmental and national state level. Since my main aim is to understand the 
role of communitarian providers in water governance, issues that arose from my research 
with the cooperatives were used to formulate new questions, which were asked to state 
officials. I, therefore, re-interviewed 10 of these officials towards the end of my fieldwork. 
Interviews with state officials were thus used continuously during the research to create a 
context allowing me to guide my research (Denitch, 1972, pp. 766–767; Goldstein, 2002, p. 
699) to understand their views and opinions and to understand specific issues on which they 
were experts (Mikecz, 2012). At times, I was given suggestions about whom I should 
interview (snowball sampling). Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours, 
depending on the topic and the time my interviewees had. 
Apart from state representatives, I performed a series of interviews with representatives of 
NGOs, consultants and academics. The themes of these interviews were similar to those 
explored with state officials. In-depth interviews enabled me to ask probing questions related 
to the interviewees’ areas of expertise. I completed 18 interviews with such respondents. 
 
3.5. Selecting the case studies and exploring their waterscape 
The reason I chose an in-depth case study, using a mixed methods qualitative design, is 
explained in Section 3.1. In this section, I explain why I selected two specific cooperatives 
placed in the same district. I explore how their characteristics allowed me to answer my 
research question. This section, furthermore, explains my decision to undertake a wider 
analysis of the district’s waterscape, as well as why this analysis contributed to answering 
my research question and how I carried out my research. Finally, such information is 
important to assert the quality of the data collected and the data’s implications on my 
research. 
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A multi-sited case study coupled with a scalar research design allows for fruitful 
comparisons (Chowdhury et al., 2011). I chose to examine two cooperatives due to time 
constraints. Choosing more case studies would have negatively influenced the quality of the 
data obtained. The decision to analyse two cooperatives placed in the same district was made 
for various reasons. First, this choice allows a more in-depth understanding of the wider 
waterscape in which these cooperatives were placed, as case studies should be generally be 
placed in a wider context (David and Sutton, 2011, pp. 166–167). This includes the 
understanding of other communitarian and non-communitarian actors, the influence of state 
organizations and the material waterscape, such as water sources and infrastructures. 
Furthermore, I could better study the effect of the policies of the cooperatives’ municipality. 
Such in-depth study would have been difficult to replicate in more than two different areas. 
Furthermore, I carried out my research in the two cooperatives in the same period. As their 
offices were a short bus ride away from each other that allowed me to spend time each day 
in both cooperatives. However, there were not only practical reasons for this choice. The 
fact that both cooperatives are placed in the same landscape and are related to the same 
municipality also allows me to compare them. I was able to understand what issues were due 
to the cooperatives’ characteristics and which were more generalized issues present in the 
region.  
I decided to perform my case studies in two cooperatives that had different characteristics: 
San Pedro Magisterio and Quintanilla. These characteristics, described below, have 
important consequences on how the cooperatives control their waterscape and relate to the 
state. Furthermore, these characteristics are widespread in the conurbation cooperatives, thus 
allowing me to establish a correlation. I verified those characteristics, as well as how 
widespread they were, using the interviews I completed with cooperative leaders. 
It is generally difficult to generalize the results obtained through case studies (Bryman, 2008, 
p. 57). However, the usage of a multi-scalar research method enables me to analyse how 
some themes and issues emerging from the case studies are reflected in the wider 
conurbation. It was possible for me to investigate issues emerging from the case studies in 
the wider conurbation and vice-versa. For example, I used some themes emerging from my 
case studies to introduce new questions in the interview guide for cooperative leaders in the 
wider conurbation and for state officials. 
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The Cooperative of Water and Sewage San Pedro Magisterio Ltda. had characteristics with 
important consequences on the way in which its members control their waterscape, exercise 
power and develop their relationship with the state.  These characteristics are widespread in 
Cochabamba cooperatives. Most cooperatives in the conurbation, in fact, are small, self-
contained, located in well-established neighbourhoods and receive water from wells placed 
in their own territory. This is also the case for San Pedro Magisterio. 
The relationship with their members is key to how cooperatives exercise power. As explored 
in Chapter 4, small, established cooperatives located in well-established neighbourhoods see 
a decrease in the involvement of their members over time. This has consequences for their 
relationship with the state and control of the waterscape, as is explored in Chapter 4. 
Moreover, obtaining water from water sources placed in their territory has important 
consequences on the cooperatives’ relationship with their neighbouring actors. While those 
with water sources outside their territory have a stronger need to exercise power outside that 
territory, San Pedro is less vulnerable to external forces. Both characteristics are important 
for the cooperatives to exercise power in the local waterscape and in their relationship with 
the state. 
Furthermore, the project for an independent wastewater treatment plant was being 
implemented at the time of my research. This plant represented an alternative model to the 
large-scale solutions for water pollution presented by the municipality. This represents an 
example of how cooperatives can present a different model of water governance, as well as 
how they can resist the power of the state. 
In contrast to San Pedro, the Cooperative of Water and Sanitation Quintanilla Ltda. is a large 
water cooperative (the largest in the conurbation), with most of its water sources placed 
outside its area of service. There are fewer cooperatives that obtain water in this way, but 
this fundamental difference from San Pedro allowed me to examine different ways in which 
cooperatives interact with their waterscape and external actors. To control its water sources, 
Quintanilla needs to create a network of agreements with different actors. These networks 
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are a fundamental strategy for the relationship between communitarian organizations and the 
state. 
The need to access and maintain infrastructures and water sources placed outside of their 
territory would require more active member participation. However, Quintanilla’s large size 
and fast growth means that its link to its members, especially newer ones, is often weak. This 
allowed me to more deeply examine the importance and nature of member participation for 
the capability of the cooperatives to build, maintain and modify their physical waterscape 
and to engage with the state as well as the consequences of a decrease in participation. 
To understand the operation of these cooperatives and their interaction with the municipality, 
it was necessary to put them in the context of the District 2 waterscape. This allowed me to 
better understand the relationship between the cooperatives, state and non-state actors in a 
local way. The district presents a network of water rights and organizations due to its ex-
rural history. This district has long received water from mountain sources managed by the 
irrigators’ organizations. Some of these sources are now used by the cooperatives because 
of several agreements with different actors that developed over time. This allowed me to 
place the development of the cooperatives in the history of the district, of the conurbation 
and of the Bolivian state, as national, local and regional changes affected the district 
waterscape. 
Furthermore, the district hosted a high number of independent water providers. The district 
presented the higher concentration of water cooperatives in the conurbation (seven 
cooperatives), but it also hosts water committees, gated communities with independent water 
systems and systems administered by the OTBs (Grassroots Territorial Organizations). 
While this thesis focuses on the cooperatives, the study of this district allowed me to engage 
with different providers, enabling me to grasp the variability in water provision in the 
conurbation. Furthermore, there was a growing influence of the municipal water service in 
the district. This service’s expansion in the district allowed me to analyse the tensions 
produced by the state’s growing control over the waterscape, as well as how its relationship 
with the cooperatives evolved and how municipal politics influenced this expansion. 
Furthermore, at the time of my research, the municipality planned to build a large-scale 
wastewater treatment plant to serve the district. This plan created tensions and conflicts that 
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can be better understood if placed in a district-wide context. These tensions were 
fundamental to my understanding of the way in which the municipalities are expanding their 
control over the conurbation waterscape and of the discourses employed to justify such 
expansion. Therefore, I was able to observe how communitarian organizations perceived and 
responded to pressure to connect their sewage system to the municipal plant. 
3.5.1. Mapping District 2 
My analysis of District 2 was based on a mixed methods approach. The district is now a 
largely urban district, however information over it were still not complete. Centrally the 
municipality did not have a clear idea about the position and conditions of the networks 
operating in the district, except for what regarded the networks managed by the municipal 
provider. For this reason, the district waterscape was only partially mapped. My first step 
was, therefore, the attempt to map water providers in the district, to obtain a complete view 
of its fractured, but still interlaced, waterscape. 
To this end, I obtained a detailed map of District 2, hired a taxi and set out to explore the 
district. For three days, I stopped at every water tower and asked people who was the water 
provider in their territory. The cooperatives were the easiest to locate since they had offices 
and employees (and I had already interviewed some of them). Other providers were more 
difficult to find and often required consulting private citizens. During these first trips, I 
collected basic information on every water provider I could locate. Furthermore, I asked the 
respondents to colour their area of service in the map, both because I was setting out to create 
a map of the water provision in the district and to understand what water providers were 
missing. Because of the information collected, I managed to obtain an outline of the water 
providers located in the sector. One of the maps that resulted from this research is displayed 
below. 
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Figure 5 Water provider of District 2 Sacaba (partial). Base map: Planning Unit of the municipality of Sacaba. I draw the 
areas of services of the District water providers using data coming from interviews. 
After this first exploratory foray into the district, I performed in-depth interviews with 
representatives of various water providers in the district. At the end of my field work, I had 
completed in-depth interviews with representatives of 13 water providers (excluding the 
representatives of the seven cooperatives I had already interviewed) and had obtained basic 
information on five more providers. I also conducted interviews with representatives of other 
state and non-state actors of District 2. This allowed me to gain a more complete 
understanding of how these actors interacted, collaborated and clashed to shape the district’s 
waterscape. Therefore, I interviewed the deputy mayor of District 2 (twice, as the post-holder 
changed three times while I was there), the president of the Association of OTBs of District 
2 and the head of the Association of Irrigators. I was also able to observe two assemblies of 
the Association of OTBs of District 2. These interviews and observations were particularly 
useful in helping me understand how municipal funding was distributed in the district, as 
well as the relationship water providers maintained with the municipality and with the OTBs. 
I also gained a general idea of the power relations within the districts and of the actors 
involved in certain issues. 
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3.6. The two case studies 
The necessity for an in-depth case study and the selection of the two case studies were 
analysed in the previous sections. This section explains what methods were used to collect 
data in my two case studies, what kind of data these methods allowed me to collect, and what 
challenges I faced in the two cooperatives. The aim of this section and the two following 
sub-sections is to establish the quality of the data collected, as well as explain how the data 
allows me to answer my research question. 
In both cooperatives, I performed in-depth interviews with the employees and members of 
the cooperatives’ boards of directors, as well as with other notable representatives of the 
cooperatives and representatives of the OTBs. Such interviews touched on various themes, 
which were fundamental for my research, and allowed ample space for new themes and 
issues to emerge. The themes discussed were broadly the same ones discussed with the head 
of cooperatives in the conurbations (described in Section 3.3): the history of the 
cooperatives; their infrastructural, organizational and economic activities; their relationship 
with their members; and their relationship with external actors. However, such themes were 
developed more deeply and connected with the context of the case study. Most of the 
interviews were usually quite long, ranging from one to two hours. Some of these interviews 
were repeated multiple times and in informal occasions, sometimes taking the form of more 
unstructured interviews or conversations, which are appropriate in the context of participant 
observation (Greene, 2012, p. 211). 
I also performed a series of interviews with water users. My interview guide aimed to 
understand how the cooperatives evolved and how the users saw and interpreted the 
cooperative history. I also analysed the water users’ level of satisfaction with the service and 
with the water prices. I additionally explored the way in which they related to and 
participated in the cooperative and the way in which they wished to participate (or not to 
participate). A translation of the interview guide is included in Appendix 4. These interviews 
allowed me to explore the relationship between the members and the cooperatives and the 
reason for the shape this relationship took. Such interviews were more variable in their 
length. Some interviewees had scarce knowledge of the cooperatives or were in a hurry, so 
those interviews were quite short (around 15 minutes). However, some interviews, especially 
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those conducted with older users, took a longer time (between 30 minutes and 2 hours). This 
might be a consequence of the free time available to retired interviewees, but it also seemed 
to be a sign of their more intense relationship with and knowledge of the cooperatives. 
I completed 53 interviews for the case study of San Pedro Magisterio. Eleven were with 
members of the board of directors and employees, one with a member and one with an ex-
member of the board of directors of the OTB, 42 with water users, and four with inhabitants 
of areas near borders of the cooperatives, which had not received the service (for reasons 
explored in Section 3.6.1). 
In the case study of Quintanilla, I performed 69 interviews: nine with members and ex-
members of the board of directors, four with employees, 48 with water users, one with a 
non-user (that was requesting the water service), and seven with representatives of OTBs 
and gated communities receiving the service from the cooperative (counting only those not 
also part of the cooperative’s board of directors)10. 
In both cooperatives, I also completed participant observations which took different forms 
during my field work (explored in Section 3.6.1 and 3.6.2). These observations gave me a 
general idea of the cooperatives’ day-to-day activities. Also, the information I received 
informally during my stay in the cooperatives helped me to write relevant and appropriate 
interview guides. In addition, the experience of sharing moments in the life of the 
cooperatives helped me to contextualize the data I received through interviews and to 
compare what I was told with what I observed. During these instances of participant 
observation, I took some photos and kept field diaries. 
I also observed some notable events in the life of the cooperatives and of the district. I 
observed two general assemblies of the cooperative Quintanilla11. I also observed the various 
festive activities, with which the cooperative members were involved. Such celebrations 
                                                 
10 Five of these are also the heads of independent water providers, which receive only the sewage service for 
the cooperatives and which were therefore also counted in the list of water providers interviewed. In this 
case, I would interview them both as water providers and to understand their relationship with the 
cooperative.  
11I was not able to observe any general assembly of the cooperative San Pedro, as only one took place during 
my research and, at the time, I was out of the country. 
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allowed me to better understand the material and symbolic place that the cooperatives 
occupied in the district. 
In the cooperative San Pedro Magisterio, I observed various meetings, internal and external, 
concerning the project for the construction of a wastewater treatment plant to be completed 
in the cooperative. I also participated in celebrations connected to the start of the plant 
construction. During these events, I was able to observe the relationship between state 
officials and the cooperative members, as well as between cooperative members. 
My research followed similar (but not identical) lines in both cooperatives. My experience 
in working with them, however, was different. Therefore, I will give separate detailed 
accounts of what occurred in the two cooperatives. 
3.6.1. San Pedro Magisterio 
This section presents relevant information about the methods used to collect data in the case 
study of San Pedro. My case study in the cooperative San Pedro took place between May 
and August 2014. Towards the end of April, I met with the president of the cooperative to 
ask his permission to conduct my research. He was quite open to the idea. In exchange for 
his collaboration, he asked me to write a report on the users’ perception of the cooperative 
so that they could address the most important issues. I finished the report and sent it by email 
a few months after the end of my field work. The ethical issues entailed are discussed in 
Section 3.7. 
At the start of my field work, the president invited me to a board of directors meeting to 
introduce me to the other members. They were quite welcoming, and I could immediately 
arrange a time and place to interview most of them. Most were older people (over 60 years 
old) and had been founding members of the cooperative. They were, therefore, quite 
knowledgeable and keen to speak about the history of the neighbourhood and of the 
cooperative. 
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In May, I started to frequent the cooperative office multiple times per week. I was given full 
access to internal documents and was openly told about all the news (and gossip). I spent 
time in the cooperative’s front office and chatted with the employees. This allowed me to 
understand the day-to-day work of the cooperative, to discuss occurrences and to sound out 
some of my interpretations. I also explored the neighbourhood, walking and talking with the 
plumber. This allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the cooperatives’ material 
waterscape, as well as to how the neighbourhood had evolved and was currently changing. 
Such understanding of the evolution of the material waterscape is crucial to understanding 
the relationship between the cooperative and the territory and their potential problems, as is 
further analysed in Chapter 4 and 6. During our walks, the plumber also introduced me to 
various cooperative members, asking whether they would like to be interviewed. I believe 
that the fact that I was with the plumber, who was well-known and generally well-liked in 
the neighbourhood, put most people at ease. 
Water users were generally open to speak about the cooperative. I usually waited in the front 
office and asked the users, who would come in to pay their water bills, for an interview. A 
significant number were retired and had time to chat and much to tell about the history of 
the cooperative and of the neighbourhood. Some of the younger inhabitants were quite busy 
and had no time for long interviews. I tried, however, to differentiate the interviews as much 
as possible in terms of where the water users lived in the cooperative’s territory, whether 
they were new or old users and whether they were members or only users, as it soon emerged 
that these elements influenced their relationship with the cooperative (as discussed in 
Chapter 4). 
To better understand the relationship between the cooperative and its territory, I also 
examined its relationship with the OTB. This research led me to uncover tensions within the 
OTB. I also determined how these tensions were connected with the inclusion and exclusion 
of parts of the neighbourhood from the water system. The examination of these tensions and 
exclusions allowed me to understand how the strong connection of the cooperative with one 
waterscape both strengthened the cooperative’s connection to its members but also led to 
exclusionary effects. To say: the cooperative did not provide water to those that saw as not 
belonging to its community. A discourse given by the state is that this exclusion is a sign of 
the cooperative’s weakness and inefficiency, thus causing consequences regarding its 
relationship towards the state. To analyse these issues, I interviewed those involved in the 
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tensions concerning the OTB. To more deeply examine the consequences of exclusion of 
parts of the neighbourhood from the water service, I interviewed some of their inhabitants, 
including some who received the water service from the municipal provider. Further details 
are given in Chapter 4. 
As mentioned, the fact that the cooperative had a project to build an independent wastewater 
treatment plan was one of the reasons I selected it as a case study. I followed the project 
quite closely, for reasons detailed in Section 3.5. I observed internal meetings, press 
conferences and celebrations. I also included questions on the construction of the plant in 
my interviews with water users and cooperative representatives. 
I collected various documents held by the cooperative, which allowed me to support and 
complement the data collected through observations and interviews. In particular, I was able 
to access the libros de actas of the cooperative: hand-written books where a cooperative 
transcribes what happened during meetings of the board of directors and general assemblies. 
These documents were of extreme importance to me as I could not observe either assemblies 
or the directors’ meetings directly. I was also provided financial and technical data. 
3.6.2. Quintanilla 
I conducted my research with the cooperative Quintanilla in the same period as the one in 
San Pedro: from May to August 2014. I interviewed members of the board of directors, 
employees and water users. I also observed public events and accompanied an employee on 
his round to take readings of water metres. Additionally, I went with some members of the 
board to observe the reparation work of a broken pipe in the mountain and was shown part 
of the infrastructure that brings water from the mountain range. 
Overall, performing my research in Quintanilla presented more challenges than in San Pedro. 
It took me much more time to gain the trust of the cooperative representatives, and I was 
never given the same access to documents that I had in San Pedro. However, I was able to 
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surpass these difficulties primarily through my attempts to reciprocate the cooperative’s 
help. 
Before beginning my research, the president asked what the cooperative would gain from 
my research, and I proposed a report. He said that he would like to have a report prepared 
for the members, such that they would understand the difficulties of managing the 
cooperative. When I was in the middle of my fieldwork, however, I was told by a member 
of an NGO that had contacts with the cooperative that some members of the cooperative 
seemed unhappy with me. I assumed this opinion was influenced by them normally hosting 
foreign volunteers focused on financing small projects. I could see how the presence of a 
person who spent her time only asking questions could clash with their expectations. I 
decided, therefore, to start writing the report immediately and to work on it in the 
cooperative’s office (also because that made it easier to ask for confirmation on the data I 
had or ask for the information I lacked). At the same time, I performed small tasks for the 
president of the cooperative. I took photos on public occasions and gave them to the 
cooperative. I also procured some information and pamphlets on how cooperatives could 
register in the water authority. In this way, I was tested for reliability and found an informal 
role in the cooperative (Bryman, 2008, p. 439). This seemed to help establish a better 
working relationship, and at the end of my research, the president of the cooperative and 
other members had become quite friendly and open. 
My difficulties in the cooperative were also the result of a general atmosphere of tension, 
clashes and accusations that characterized elections in the cooperative, as well as the 
frequent accusations of corruption that had marred the cooperative’s history. During my 
research, the current president was preparing a case against the previous president for 
mismanagement of funding and an audit was underway to evaluate the formal management 
of the cooperative. Probably due to this atmosphere, document consultation was, in general, 
less open than San Pedro. I was told that members that wanted to consult documents had to 
submit a written request to the cooperative and were not allowed to make copies. At the end 
of my research, however, I managed to obtain sufficient documentation to support and 
complete data collected through observations and interviews. 
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Understanding the relationship between the cooperative and its territory also presented 
challenges. The cooperative did not have a strong relationship with a specific territorial 
community and its relationship with the waterscape was often mediated through other 
territorial organizations, such as OTBs and gated communities. Such relationships are 
important to shape the cooperative’s control over the waterscape. While the connection in 
San Pedro to one territorial community was clear, this connection was lost in Quintanilla. 
The cooperative control of its area of service was likewise weaker and most of its energy 
was focused on the control of its water sources. 
To understand the connection between the cooperative, its waterscape and its users, I decided 
to investigate the relationship between cooperatives and OTBs. To explore this relationship, 
I interviewed representatives of six of the nine OTBs that form the area of service of the 
cooperative, as well as representatives of some of the gated neighbourhoods that received 
water and/or sewage from the cooperative. 
Another issue I explored was related to the difficulties of the cooperative in expanding their 
area of service to new users and the consequences of such difficulties. Due to the size of the 
cooperative (and the fact that the maps were not as precise as the one in San Pedro), I could 
not systematically research those households that had been excluded from receiving water. 
Therefore, I researched the way in which the cooperatives decided to give the service to new 
users and asked users about the difficulties they encountered in receiving the service. 
Additionally, I interviewed a member of an OTB board of directors and a member of a gated 
community, who had asked to be connected to the water service from the cooperative but 
ultimately could not receive it. 
 
3.7. Ethics and my position as a researcher 
This section reflects on ethical issues I encountered in the field, and how my positionality 
influenced the data to which I had access. I decided at the beginning of my research (and 
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with the support of my first supervisor) that trying to make people sign consent forms in a 
Bolivian context might have been difficult and raise suspicion and mistrust. In such context, 
oral consent is generally considered appropriate (ASA; Association of Social 
Anthropologist, 2011, p. 2). I, therefore, prepared statements in Spanish which I distributed 
to my participants but that did not require a signature. In some cases, the document was 
extremely useful in putting people at ease, but in others, my participants just glanced at it. 
Therefore, I would sum up my research orally and ask if I could record and use their names 
and/or the name of their organization. Most of my respondents answered that there was no 
problem; only one respondent asked for his cooperative to not be named. This cooperative 
is present in the map of all cooperatives and on my list of interviewees, but all other 
information specific to it has been anonymized. Some of the people I interviewed, on the 
other hand, made a point to tell me that they wanted to be transparent as they had nothing to 
hide. Others told me that they would prefer to be identified only by their titles (e.g., the 
‘president of the cooperative X’). I decided to refer to all cooperative respondents by their 
titles and not by their names. Water issues in Cochabamba are highly politicized, and I prefer 
to err on the side of caution. 
Some of the officials I interviewed in state agencies likewise preferred to be quoted only as 
officers of a determinate agency. The same was true of some experts I interviewed, 
especially those that held a critical stance toward the state. Therefore, I have not used 
people’s actual names in this dissertation, but I use their role, and the level of detail I give 
depends on the consent I received from the specific person. The only exceptions are 
academics and some activists, in which case I believe revealing their names would lend more 
weight and context to their statements, but I have only included names if I was given explicit 
permission to use them. 
With regards to water users, their interviews are anonymized, even if some told me there 
was no need and I could use their names if I wished to. However, I decided there were enough 
tensions in the neighbourhoods that I investigated to justify the anonymization of all 
interviews. This was particularly true in the case of small neighbourhoods, such as San 
Pedro, where most interviewees were well-known by the other inhabitants and members of 
the cooperative. In these cases, it is the researcher’s duty to anticipate possible harms that 
might arise from their research (ASA, 2011, p. 4). 
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During my research, I was also aware of the necessity to give back to my participants. 
Foreign researchers are sometimes seen as ‘taking something’ from their participants and 
giving nothing in return. This was a concern for me also because I thought I could not fulfil 
the expectations of some of my participants. More than once interviewees asked if I knew 
some NGOs that would be interested in doing a project with them. This is a common 
experience for researchers in Bolivia (see: Walnycki, 2013), which does not have an easy 
solution. I did small favours when possible. However, I endeavoured to make it clear that I 
was not personally involved with any NGOs or other funding bodies. 
As explained, I compiled reports for two cooperatives and built a database for FECOAPAC. 
However, I was aware of tensions between the cooperatives and FECOAPAC and between 
some users and the cooperatives. Therefore, I was mindful of the ethical implications when 
completing these projects. The compilation of a database on the cooperative for FECOAPAC 
required the collection of information from the cooperative respondents. As explored in 
Section 3.3, I endeavoured to clarify for my respondents what information would be made 
available to FECOAPAC and what would be used exclusively for my thesis. I explicitly 
asked for their permission to use that data to build a database for FECOAPAC. I finished the 
database months after my field work and sent it to the president of FECOAPAC, who 
subsequently commented that the information contained would be useful for them. The 
project I completed in Quintanilla was a report aimed to explain to their members the amount 
of work necessary to provide them with water and sanitation. Most of the information 
necessary for the report was obtained through employees and members of the board of the 
directors. 
The project I undertook in San Pedro was more delicate, as it implied using the information 
given to me by the users to compile a report on how they viewed the cooperative. This report 
focused on practical issues, such as water quality, continuity, the sewage system and water 
prices, as well as the overall management of the cooperative. In the report, I did not include 
statements about specific members of the board of directors, political statements or 
discussions on the tensions in the OTBs or in the cooperative. I felt that this was outside the 
remit of such a report, which focused on issues concerning the service and how it could be 
improved. I informed interviewees that some of the information I was given would be used 
to write a report for the cooperative and asked if they consented. All informants in this report 
were anonymized. 
119 
 
  
During my research, I was also aware of my position as a white, young(ish) woman. This 
position influenced my research in different ways. Due to the frequent presence of (often 
female) foreign development workers, volunteers and researchers, NGOs and some state 
organizations were used to collaborating and being interviewed. Sometimes, especially at 
the beginning of my research, I would feel slightly patronized (one of my respondents asked 
if I had heard of the water war). This, however, changed in the re-interviews and in the last 
part of my research, both because some of my participants had seen me before and because 
my questions were more detailed and demonstrated more knowledge of what was occurring 
in the sector. The fact that I could demonstrate a degree of knowledge on the topics discussed 
also seemed to inspire more confidence. This effect has been particularly observed when 
experts are been interviewed (Mikecz, 2012, p. 483). However, I still had the impression 
that, as an outsider, I was considered harmless because I was not personally involved in some 
of the tensions in the sector. Researchers who are considered ‘outsiders’ can enjoy the tag 
of neutrality (Pack, 2006, p. 111). I believe that this positively affected the amount of data I 
obtained, as well as how open the interviewees were about their opinions. 
My positionality also had an influence on my research with my two case studies. San Pedro 
was more welcoming than Quintanilla, as examined in Section 3.6. This could be due to 
many factors. Overall, the people sitting on the San Pedro boards of directors seemed more 
interested in my research, possibly because many of the board members were teachers and 
as it emerged from some interviews, they gave considerable importance to education. 
Another noticeable difference was the more predominantly ‘feminine’ environment of the 
cooperative. The influence that gender roles have during field work is well established (Bell 
et al., 1993) and often context-dependent (for an example from a classic ethnographic study 
in the Andean region, see Allen, 1988, pp. 81–89). The president and the plumber were not 
in the cooperative for most of the day. As a result, I would often be left chatting with the 
secretary, the person that guarded the cooperative water towers and the administrator (who 
were all women). Building personal relationships made my experience in the cooperatives 
easier as often people in the cooperative would actively try to help me and spontaneously 
tell me about issues I might find interesting. My experience was different in Quintanilla. As 
I already underlined, while the cooperative was used to having volunteers, the ones I was 
aware of were men. Also in Quintanilla, I was able to create a solid relationship with two 
female members of the board and with an older member of the board. Furthermore, as I 
underlined in Section 3.6.2, I was able to make myself useful to the cooperatives, even if I 
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was not asked to participate in the kind of manual work in which the male volunteer would 
participate. This allowed me to be accepted into the cooperative and to obtain the information 
necessary to my research. 
The long time that I spent in the field and the personal relationships that I built with my 
informants helped me to obtain a clearer idea of the situation in Cochabamba, as well as 
giving me access to high-quality information. I was concerned, however, about the 
implications of my friendships with some of my participants. It became difficult to keep a 
distance from people that I saw every day and that I personally respected. Friendship with 
informants in the field has been examined in the literature, sometimes leading to the 
conclusion that the position of an informant and that of a friend should not overlap (Pack, 
2006, p. 119). Like others (Geest, 2015; Walnycki, 2013, p. 62), however, I found it nearly 
inevitable and not an occurrence I actively tried to stop. When examining data, nevertheless, 
I endeavoured to be mindful of the effect of such personal relationships. For example, since 
some people who helped me since the beginning of my study saw the cooperatives as being 
undermined by the state, it was difficult for me to neutrally examine this view. I tried as 
much as possible to be unbiased in my analysis; however, this simply means I was mindful 
of my own biases, as much as such a feat is possible. 
 
3.8. Data analysis 
Data analysis does not necessarily start after leaving the field. During my long-term 
qualitative field work, in fact, new themes and hypotheses emerged, thus reshaping my 
analytical categories (Abel and Sankar, 1995, p. 4; Gilbert, 2008, p. 280). Furthermore, the 
reports I prepared allowed me to start ordering my empirical data. However, a more 
systematic data analysis started after I came back from Bolivia. 
My research yielded a significant amount of data. I collected more than two hundred 
interviews, as well as multiple re-interviews (nearly 300 hundred interviews overall) and a 
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significant number of internal documents from the cooperatives and from state actors and 
field diaries. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed in Spanish through the 
software Nvivo. Fieldwork diaries were also coded through Nvivo. I am aware that  using  
qualitative analysis software might result in an excessive fragmentation of information 
(Bryman, 2008, p. 592). However, in my case, Nvivo was used simply because it was the 
best method to code a large mass of information. While I did code my interviews, I generally 
coded multiple sentences together to clarify the context in which statements were made. 
There was not, in my opinion, a qualitative difference from manual coding. The use of Nvivo 
simply made it easier for me to keep track of my themes and which groups of interviews had 
been coded and to retrieve them quickly when I needed them. 
I first categorized interviews into five different groups and proceeded to separately analyse 
them. These groups were cooperative leaders, leaders of cooperative federations, state 
officials and respondents from each of the two case studies. The interviews were analysed 
thematically (Bryman, 2008, p. 554), allowing me to understand the respondents’ different 
points of views concerning the conurbation. Themes and issues that assumed a particular 
importance for the research question were pinpointed (Buetow, 2010). In this period, I 
started to write descriptive pieces that synthesized my observation and gave brief 
descriptions of actors or issues. In this way, I was able to keep track of my reflections and 
to pinpoint further emerging themes. 
When the coding was finished, I established the main themes on which I wanted to focus for 
each set of actors. I re-analysed the set of themes that emerged from the interviews, as well 
as my preliminary observations and analysis. In this way, I was able to establish common 
patterns in the way in which actors (i.e. the state and the cooperatives) talked about and 
conceived the waterscape, as well as the way in which they acted on it. A remarkable 
uniformity emerged around how sets of actors talked about certain themes, as well as 
differences amongst them (e.g.  different levels of the state). Both were noted and 
transformed in descriptive pieces, and subsequently analysed. These descriptions constitute 
the bedrock of Chapters 3 and 4, as both report on how different levels of the state, the 
cooperatives in general and the two case studies act and see the waterscape. In both chapters, 
assertions over the way in which state or cooperatives actors act and conceive the waterscape 
emerged from this analysis. Once the chapters were drafted, I went back to the interviews to 
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re-check that, after the analysis process, my conclusions were consistent with the original 
interviews.  
Later, I started to focus on some state projects or issues emerging in the conurbation (such 
as the construction of the Misicuni Dam and the issue of pollution in Rocha River). These 
projects and issues represented the lenses through which contrasts, collaboration and 
relationships between state and communitarian providers could be better observed. In this 
case, I compared the discourses of different state and non-state actors on the same subject to 
understand how these discourses differed. These discourses were useful to understand how 
different actors interpreted the same subjects, as well as their relationship with each other. 
These interpretations were supported through the analysis of state documents, when 
available. These discourses and contrasts were used mostly to draft Chapter 6, as they 
allowed me to examine the relationships between the state and the cooperatives. Some of the 
themes and issues that emerged were also used in other chapters. After drafting an initial 
version of Chapter 6, I again went back to the original interviews to check my conclusions. 
I also prepared maps, which allowed me to make a disordered waterscape more legible.  This 
allowed me to better understand the shape of the waterscape, as well as make it more 
accessible and understandable to the reader. These maps are presented in later chapters. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the research process. Central to my capability to 
answer my research question was a mixed-methods, multi-scalar research design that aimed 
at understanding both how state and non-state actors placed on different scales influenced 
water governance and the deep relationships that communitarian organizations build on their 
territory. This research design allowed me to explore the different methods with which the 
cooperatives exercise power and influence water governance, as well as the roots of such 
power. As explored in Chapters 4 and 6, I argue that the cooperatives capability to control 
their territory through their members is the basis of such powers. The use of in-depth case 
studies allows me to understand how users and cooperatives create strong links with their 
waterscape and how these links are understood and represented not only at a material, but 
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also at a discursive level. Interviews with state officials at different scale also allow me to 
explore the differences and similarities between the views that different levels of the state 
hold over the waterscape of the conurbation (see Chapter 5).  
Like all research processes, mine had some limitations. I had to make choices that allowed 
me to pursue certain lines of enquiry while limiting my capability to deepen my 
understanding of others. For example, my decision to conduct a case study of two 
cooperatives located in the same district had the positive sides that I underlined, but it 
stopped me from delving more deeply into the relationship that different cooperatives build 
with different municipalities. However, the research I conducted gave me enough material 
to allow me to adequately answer my research question. 
4. The cooperatives’ discursive and material control over the 
waterscape 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the way in which the cooperatives exercise power over their 
waterscape. This power is the basis of their relationship with the state and, more generally, 
of the way in which they influence water governance in the conurbation.  
The mechanisms through which the cooperatives exercise power are different facets of the 
way in which they materially and discursively build and control the waterscape. By material 
control, I mean their capability to shape the material waterscape. This involves a concrete 
control over their water sources, infrastructures and area of service. Their discursive control 
is created through the way in which they portray their waterscape, and it may include legal 
arguments, customary rules and the feeling of belonging and ownership over the waterscape. 
This discursive control, therefore, is often based on a shared vision of the waterscape, that 
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is: a shared hydro-social territory. The ways in which these two methods of control are 
exercised are the consequence of several factors. This chapter analyses what these factors 
are and how they developed. 
The chapter draws on in-depth interviews with the leaders of 21 cooperatives and on the case 
studies of two cooperatives placed in District 2 of Sacaba.  These different scales and spaces 
of analysis allow me to explore how the cooperatives use similar discourses and methods of 
control to assert and reinforce their power over the waterscape. 
The first section explores why it was necessary for water cooperatives to establish their 
control over the waterscape and which characteristics influenced their capability to do so. 
To this end, I place the cooperatives in the context of the historical development of the 
conurbation. The second section examines how the cooperatives establish control over their 
waterscape. In that context, I explore their local history and the evolution of the local 
waterscape. The third section focuses on the challenges the cooperatives presently face to 
maintain control over their waterscape. I argue that the relationship between them and their 
members is fundamental for the capability of the cooperatives to confront these challenges. 
4.1. The need for communitarian water organizations 
This section analyses the way in which the evolution of the conurbation influenced the 
necessity of the cooperatives for acquiring control over their waterscape and the factors that 
influenced their capability to do so.  To analyse such a process, it is necessary to place the 
cooperatives in the context of the evolution of the conurbation waterscape.  
This section is divided into two subsections. In the first one, I analyse the overall process of 
urbanization of the conurbation, and its influence over the cooperatives as a whole. In the 
second, I focus in more detail on the case of the evolution of the waterscape of District 2 of 
Sacaba. An examination of the history of District 2 allows me to analyse more deeply how 
historical events, the evolution of different rural and urban organizations, and processes of 
urbanization influenced the cooperatives. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the District 2 
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waterscape is controlled by a mixture of rural and urban institutions whose interaction is an 
important issue for water provision in the conurbation. 
4.1.1. The gradual co-production of the Cochabamba waterscape  
This section describes the reasons for which communitarian water providers needed to take 
control over the waterscape. It also explores which effects that had in the distribution and 
quality of service of the cooperatives. The timescale in which that has happened is the same 
as that of the urbanization process of the Cochabamba conurbation. This is important for 
understanding the present characteristics of the cooperatives and how these characteristics 
influence the different challenges they now face to control their waterscape.  
Accounts of the construction of the cooperatives by my interviewees emphasized the absence 
of the state from their neighbourhoods at the time in which they settled, at times underlining 
a sense of resentment that still influences their relationship with the state (see Chapter 5 and 
6).  Because of the disordered process of urbanization, large parts of the conurbation were 
excluded from access to state services and were built outside of state planning, in peri-urban 
areas12. These are where nearly all cooperatives are located today13. This void led to the 
foundation of communitarian organizations which proceeded to build their own water 
infrastructure, often together with other fundamental services, in a process that is the base 
for the control that they now exercise over the waterscape.  
And since the 1989, we dig the wells as much as we needed, and there were 
approximately 80 families at that time, and with the help of the international 
cooperation (...) and with our work, with our contributions, we built the well number 
one, that has one litre per second, that one has already finished its service, it is 20 
years old this well. In this sector, in our neighbourhood, no government helped us, 
not the prefectures, not the municipality, all that we have it the fruit of the sacrifice 
                                                 
12 In this thesis, I use the term peri-urban to indicate neighbourhoods that went through a process of self-
construction outside the reach of state planning, therefore determining the construction of a multitude of 
waterscapes, through the construction of independent providers.   
13 An exception is the cooperative San Lorenzo, which serves the city centre of the municipality of 
Colcapiruha.  
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of the inhabitant, the schools, the cooperative, all that we have (President 
Cooperative Primero de Mayo, 21.11.2013) 
An examination of the history of the cooperatives is fundamental for understanding their 
current characteristics. The capability of communitarian providers to settle in areas with 
access to good water sources was influenced by the moment in time in which their 
neighbourhoods were established and the resources that were available to the first settlers. 
The process of urbanization pushed younger and poorer neighbourhoods towards areas with 
worse access to water sources (Walnycki, 2013). Furthermore, growing water scarcity made 
it difficult for newly established neighbourhoods to reach agreements with rural 
organizations for the control of water sources (Walnycki, 2013). Additionally, as established 
by Durán, while poorer and younger neighbourhoods are pushed to the outskirts of the city, 
older ones often assume ‘urban’ characteristics, obtaining legal status and access to services 
(Durán, 2007). In turn, these characteristics attract inhabitants with better access to economic 
and social resources. 
The process of change, evolution and social differentiation of neighbourhoods was reflected 
in my interviews, and strongly influence the way in which the cooperatives are able to 
exercise discursive and material control over their waterscape (as examined in Sections 4.2 
and 4.3). Some of them described their neighbourhood social composition as mixed, with 
middle-class, professional residents along with inhabitants with lower professional 
qualifications, or working in lower-income professional jobs, and at times precarious sources 
of income.  A few interviewees attributed this mixture to internal migration.  The expansion 
of the city, the transportation network and the rise of the cost of the land might have been 
the cause of these changes, as formerly undesirable neighbourhoods became more attractive.  
To give an idea we could classify the inhabitants in a variety of professions 
as you said, many dedicate themselves to agriculture, the fabrication of bricks, 
how can I say, the majority have their own land, they cultivate it, the majority 
do this … Now, those that came from other places, they are professionals in 
their work, they are lawyers, doctors, professors, a cultural variety, but the 
majority devote themselves to agriculture and brick making (Manager, 
Cooperative Chacacollo Oeste, 25.11.2013) 
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Such evolution of the waterscape led to today’s distribution of cooperatives, the location of 
which is marked in the following map. As can be observed, most cooperatives are placed in 
the east-west direction of the conurbation and in the northern areas of Cochabamba. These 
are areas with relatively good water sources. Cooperatives tend to be well-established 
organizations, to be placed in likewise well-established neighbourhoods, and to have access 
to adequate water sources.  In this sense, their service is on average better than that in other 
communitarian organizations (Lavrilleux and Compere, 2006, p. 52). This effect is not due 
to qualitative differences between cooperatives and other organizations. What emerged from 
my interviews is that mainly well-established water providers make the decision to officially 
register as cooperatives (for reasons that will be explored in Section 4.2).  Only a few of 
these are placed in more marginal areas. These are the cooperatives that were more likely to 
be described as having low-income inhabitants and to have problems with water quality and 
availability. We can then see how wider process of urbanization influence the characteristics 
of the cooperatives, to say their physical location, access to water sources and economic and 
social resources. As such, the control that the cooperatives exercise over their waterscape is 
always directly or indirectly influenced by wider processes. A more in-depth example of 
such processes is given in Section 4.1.2. 
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Figure 6: Map with the location of the cooperatives interviewed; base map: Google Earth. Author’s elaboration, based on 
interviews and internal documents. The location of the Cooperatives Nueva Betania and Candelaria is approximative. 
However, there are other causes for the variation in service amongst the cooperatives than 
their geographical location. Their capability to build better infrastructure also influences 
their ability to offer a good service. Better organized cooperatives or with inhabitants with 
higher access to resources could build, for example, water purifications systems. Only eight 
cooperatives had some system of purification in place, usually in better-established ones. 
This is natural, as purification systems are expensive. Only one cooperative’s water (that of 
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Virgen de Urkupiña) was heavily contaminated (due to the sewage-polluted Rio Rocha’s 
flooding their network). This cooperative is in a disadvantage neighbourhood, far from the 
city centre. 
As it has been established, cooperatives were forced to take control of the waterscape due to 
the historical process of urbanization of the conurbation. Additionally, the waterscape 
evolved because of that process in a way that reflects the social inequalities of its inhabitants.  
This pattern was reflected in my interviews on the current situation. Respondents who 
described their neighbourhood as being composed of people with low incomes tended to 
belong to cooperatives that had problems providing adequate service due to characteristics 
of their waterscape. Age, resources and location in the conurbation influence the ability of 
the cooperatives to establish and control a functioning waterscape.  
4.1.2. The evolution of the District 2 waterscape 
In the previous subsection, I described why the cooperatives needed to establish control over 
their waterscape due to the absence of the state and the present effects of that process. 
However, it is not only the physical absence of the state that has an impact on the waterscape. 
Even if the state was not physically present in the waterscape where the cooperatives were 
established, certain state policies had a direct influence. In District 2, state policies 
influenced the shaping of the waterscape, even if state services only physically arrived 
recently.  
Additionally, as the conurbation expands, it enters areas controlled by pre-existing rural 
organizations (Hines Thompson, 2015). Their influence is fundamental to understanding the 
shape of the waterscape today. These elements have a strong influence in the cooperatives, 
especially those that lack access to water sources in their own territory. In that case, the 
capability of a cooperative to control the waterscape is influenced by its capability to create 
and sustain relationships with pre-existing communitarian organizations. The cooperatives, 
therefore, are always influenced by external forces, and their waterscape should always be 
considered as part of larger waterscapes. Analysing the waterscape of District 2 allows me 
to exemplify the effect of such connections.  
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A former agricultural area, District 2 is placed between the river Rocha and the slopes of the 
mountain range Tunari, at the border with the Cochabamba municipality.   The waterscape 
of the district is in large part controlled by communitarian organizations. The arrival of the 
municipal service provider (EMAPAS) in the waterscape is recent (approximately 10 years 
ago) and limited (the effects of its arrival in the district are analysed in Chapter 6). The 
location of the district can be seen in the map below.      
      
 
Figure 7: District 2 of Sacaba. Base map: PMMC, 2013. 
However, this situation does not mean that the waterscape has not been influenced by the 
state. State policies, as well as national processes, did so strongly and still do. Of central 
importance was the Agrarian Reform of 1953, which is still the basis of the distribution of 
part of water rights in the district.  Mountain water has been channelled and collected in the 
district since the Colonial and Incas eras (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 208).  Before the 1953 
agrarian reform, a few large landowners (haciendados) owned most of the districts, the most 
important of which were the Rivero-Torres. After the reform, part of the land and water 
rights passed to agricultural workers (Crespo Flores et al., 2004, p. 29), while some lands 
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were sold to urban settlers. The descendants of some of those rural workers still retain water 
rights and are organized in the Association of Irrigators of District 2.  
Some landowners had very large lands. Very large. But they started selling, selling. 
And there were some haciendados, or landowners, that had large extensions, like 
those of El Castillo. It was the family Rivero-Torres, from mountain to mountain, 
right? Then there was another, more in that direction, another Rivero-Torres, that was 
from this mountain, from there, to that other mountain (…) The government took the 
lands away from many of them, right? Because there was … with the agrarian reform, 
agrarian reform, because they were big landowners (founding member Coop. 
Quintanilla n.16, 09/06/2014) 
Furthermore, state organizations control part of the water sources in the district, materially 
influencing the waterscape. The Cochabamba municipality has long used water sources 
located there to serve its municipal water service network (Hines Thompson, 2015). The 
mountain lake Wara Wara, traditionally used for water irrigation in the district, is now under 
the control of SEMAPA. Their right to do so is currently contested by the Association of 
Irrigators of District 2. 
The current distribution of water rights in the district is thus still strongly influenced by both 
the consequences of the agrarian reform and by state intervention. The Association of 
Irrigators exercise considerable power over the water sources present in the district, and 
therefore on its waterscape. This is not an isolated case: the power of rural organizations to 
control water sources is widespread in the conurbation. This is also a consequence on the 
fact that the conurbation did not expand in a void, but in areas in which water rights were 
already established (Hines Thompson, 2015). Tensions between rural and urban uses are 
therefore frequent in the conurbation (see Chapter 2). 
Additionally, the evolution of the district cannot be separated from the wider process of 
urbanization. District 2 underwent a disordered process of urbanizations, which led to a 
fragmented waterscape and strong socio-economic differentiation. Starting in the 1970s, the 
population spilled over the Cochabamba borders and began to build in areas surrounding the 
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highway that connects Cochabamba to Sacaba (Municipality of Sacaba, 2007).  District 2 is 
no longer a rural district, even if some agricultural land is still present. It is now one of the 
most populous urban areas of Sacaba14, and a fast-growing one. Interviewees reported that 
the price of land is increasing continuously, contributing to its socio-economic 
differentiation.  
Due to the process of urbanization, some water rights passed from rural organizations to 
communitarian potable water providers, which currently largely guarantee water provision 
in the district. Most water organizations in it rely on well water. However, its three largest 
cooperatives (Quintanilla, Arocagua Puntiti, and Puntiti) and one water committee (Puntiti 
Chico) are currently able to access the water sources coming from or placed in the mountain 
range, most of which were previously controlled by rural organizations. These organizations 
are both irrigators and mountain communities in whose territories the water reservoirs are. 
The process through which cooperatives had obtained these sources was not smooth and 
took place through both formal and informal agreements, payments and communitarian 
decisions. These sources are governed through networks of overlapping rights and 
agreements, as well as constituting a physically complicated network that needs continuous 
attention to function. These agreements allowed these organizations to exercise control over 
the wider waterscape of District 2, however this control is negotiated and at times fragile.  
Therefore, the waterscape of District 2 has been strongly influenced by state policies, direct 
state interventions, wider processes of urbanizations and relationships between different 
communitarian organizations. The consequences of such processes can be observed when 
looking at the control that different actors exercise over water sources. Such control is the 
result of the accumulation of historical events, which led to a very complicated set of power 
relations. For example, water from three mountain lakes, Wara Wara, Mercedes and 
Chungara, has traditionally been used for irrigation in the district15. Wara Wara is currently 
under the control of SEMAPA. A descendant of the Rivero-Torres family was still 
considered by district respondents as the legitimate owner of Lake Mercedes, but thanks to 
an agreement with her, the irrigators and the cooperative Quintanilla use its water. The 
irrigators have water rights over Lake Chungara. The cooperatives Arocagua-Puntiti, Puntiti 
                                                 
14 Interview,  Officer Planning Unit, Sacaba Municipality, 07/07/2014. The municipality estimated that the 
district hosted 50,785 inhabitants in 2005 (Sacaba; Municipality 2007: 54). 
15 Interview with the president of the Associacion of Irrigators of District 2 (19.07.2013). 
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and the water committees Puntiti Chico were able to obtain water rights to other mountain 
lakes, thanks to agreements with mountain communities16. The location of some of these 
sources is depicted in the map below.    
 
Figure 8:Mountain lakes and ravines of district 2. Base map: Google Earth. 
To control and maintain such a complicated waterscape, cooperatives and other 
communitarian actors need to exercise both material and discursive power. The shape this 
control takes will be considered in the next section.  
                                                 
16 Coop. Arocagua Puntiti: Laguna Asna-Ciénaga, Laguna de Sara Sara, Lagunas Piliwayt'ana (interview 
President Coop Arocagua Puntiti). Coop. Puntiti: Laguna Toro (interview President Coop, Puntiti).  I was not 
able to pinpoint the exact location of the Lagunas Sara Sara and Piliwayt'ana. Furthermore, the Plan Maestro 
Metropolitano (PMMC, 2013, p. 3-4) contains some conflicting information. Therefore, only the lakes that 
were confirmed as water sources of the cooperatives through a process of triangulation are included in the 
map. 
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4.2. How the cooperatives established their material and 
discursive power 
This section explores how cooperatives established their control over the waterscape, which 
is fundamental for understanding the basis of their power. To do so, the cooperatives needed 
to establish both material and discursive control. I frame material control as the capability 
of the cooperatives to create, maintain and modify the waterscape, while discursive control 
is the creation of an imagined hydro-social territory. This section shows that the two shape 
and co-create each other. To analyse how these forms of control were created and enacted, I 
focus on the micro-waterscapes of the cooperatives.  
This section is divided into three subsections. The first one examines how power over the 
territory was established and looks at cooperatives operating in the whole conurbation.  The 
second and the third sub-sections focus respectively on the cooperatives San Pedro 
Magisterio and Quintanilla. These two case studies allow me to gain a deeper understanding 
of how such forms of control were established. The case of San Pedro Magisterio allows me 
to examine how a strong link between a specific territory and a specific hydro-social territory 
made it difficult to expand the waterscape of the cooperative outside the limit of what was 
considered the residents’ ‘community’. The case study of Quintanilla allows me to examine 
the way in which control over water sources based outside their area of service resulted in a 
more intensive, but fragile, control over their material waterscape.  
4.2.1. How material and discursive control empower cooperatives  
This section analyses how the material and discursive control of the cooperatives over their 
waterscape was established, using interviews I carried out with the representatives of the 
conurbation cooperatives. In this subsection, I focus on the history of the cooperatives, on 
their control over water sources and on their process of formalization. These three elements 
allow me to understand how material and discursive control were established and how they 
co-created each other. 
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I start by analysing the retelling of the history of the cooperatives. In interpreting these 
histories, I argue that the construction of the cooperatives’ physical waterscape and the 
creation of a hydro-social territory influenced each other, creating the two facets of the 
cooperatives’ control of their waterscapes.  
Historical analysis allows us to comprehend the material and discursive ways through which 
communities exercise control over their area of service and their water sources, which might 
overlap or not depending on whether the water sources are placed in the area of service. The 
construction of the waterscape of the cooperatives and the work, efforts and economic 
resources invested by their users are the reasons why the cooperative members conceive the 
territory of the cooperatives as ‘belonging’ to them. This feeling of belonging is often an 
important element of the members’ willingness to protect their waterscape (in ways that will 
be examined in Section 4.3). This discourse of belonging through the sacrifices of their 
members is often supplemented with legal discourses. These are often secondary, as they are 
used to defend an ownership that is already deeply felt. Cielo (2010),  in her study of the 
South Zone of Cochabamba, also explored how the efforts of the inhabitant to build their 
neighbourhood is used to justify their rights over their land, even if legal rights are absent. 
However, I argue that such method of control is widespread and it also used where the 
ownership over infrastructures and access to water sources is officialised.  
When asking representatives of cooperatives to explain the latter’s histories, I found 
significant similarities in the way in which they were told.  Interviewees were keen to 
underline the contribution of neighbourhood inhabitants (vecinos) and members 
(shareholders/socios) of the cooperatives. This contribution was retold by relating that the 
cooperative was built through the efforts, sacrifice and work of all the inhabitants. Many 
emphasised how everything came from ‘our pockets’.  There was often a general respect for 
those who had contributed to the creation of the cooperatives.  
The participation of the members of the cooperatives contributed to establishing and building 
the material waterscape, and therefore to establishing the material control of the cooperatives 
over the territory. However, the way in which this history is told often underlines the 
importance it now holds for the members of the cooperatives, beyond the simple physical 
construction of the waterscape.  The importance of this history can be seen when looking at 
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retelling of communitarian works, that was used in most cooperatives to build at least part 
of the material waterscape. Again, the interviewees focused on the sacrifices that such 
communitarian works implied for the members of the cooperatives. Communitarian works 
were described as exhausting and often dangerous: in one cooperative two people died 
during the construction of the system.  
We went to the mountain to search for sources, and we got two to start with, and we 
went all to work in a group. We called the people, and we started with two sources, 
and, even during the first work, one person died because it is very steep, the mountain 
is very steep. And the next year, another person died because he fell, so that it costed 
us enough to do this work. First, we started with some pipes, and at the end there 
were some resources and we started to get members. To say, everything that we have 
done comes from our pockets. So, if we have to put a quota we put it ourselves for 
the pipes, for everything, because no one asked for payment for their work. Because 
we did it, everyone, in the weekends, every Sunday we worked, we succeeded and 
after we did all the documents. We did all of that, and now here it is, everything is 
legal already, right? (Interview president of the Cooperative Candelaria ltda. 
30.11.2013)  
The history of the cooperative is therefore necessary for understanding the way the 
waterscape was conceived, imagined and built, as well as the value granted to the 
cooperative due to the efforts invested in these processes17. These issues are explicitly stated 
in the following quote.   
Eh, I believe that our members … They care about the cooperative because they 
worked with shovel and spade … They did it personally. We have all done it, isn’t it 
right? Men, women, children, we all worked. When we did not have resources, we 
went to the mountain with trucks and other things. And we dug the trenches, we 
buried the pipes. Others brought stones, others did other things … The ladies cooked 
… So, I believe that there was more will … Eh more will to want to have something. 
                                                 
17 Most cooperatives received some external help to build their system from international cooperation 
agencies, international NGOs, church organizations and the state. In only one case however (coop. San 
Lorenzo), the initiative to build the system came from an external source.  
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And it was for that, when during the water war they told us that we really would be 
affected, that the people started to get out. And we took part in it with Oscar, Omar18, 
and other comrades, we took part in it. (Presidente Cooperative Arocagua-Puntiti 
11.08.2014)  
The president of the cooperative Arocagua Puntiti then underlined how the physical 
construction of the territory created a feeling of ownership and of ‘care’ in the members. 
This was the reason why they were ready to physically defend their waterscape against 
external menaces. 
This physical control over the territory is not limited to the cooperatives, and it can have 
exclusionary effects, that is, other communitarian organizations’ control over the territory 
may lead to clashes. The fact that communitarian organizations materially defend their 
territory against perceived external menaces (e.g. through blocking works and streets and 
participating in protests; see Chapter 2) can be analysed by looking at how cooperatives 
access water sources outside their area of the service. All cooperatives that do so need to put 
in place agreements with those communities that control the water sources. Agreements with 
external actors are one of the means through which the cooperatives exercise material and 
discursive control in areas outside their areas of services. This control is material, as 
infrastructures are built and often defended physically. Legal discourses are often used to 
justify their access.  However, this control is often fragile.  
An example is the attempt of the cooperatives Primero de Mayo and Nuevo Amanecer to dig 
wells outside their service areas. Both operate on the same difficult-to-drill rocky hill, and 
they attempted to build a well on a lower terrain controlled by an agrarian union. Primero de 
Mayo did not succeed. The president of the cooperative framed the activities of the agrarian 
union as illegal, as underground water is owned by the state, but did not manage to get 
support from the regional authorities, and without that support could not dig in an area that 
was outside its jurisdiction.  He underlined the lack of help from the state and commented 
that when it was a state organization that needed to be defended, to say SEMAPA during the 
water war, they had come to its help. The cooperative Nuevo Amanecer, instead, managed 
                                                 
18 Oscar Olivera and Omar Fernandez, two of the figureheads of the Coordinadora.  
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to reach an agreement with the owners of the land that allowed the cooperative to dig a well 
in exchange for free water. 
This example illuminates how the cooperatives, and other communities, use a mixture of 
state rules (e.g. framing the behaviour of the agrarian union as illegal; calling on the 
departmental authority), informal agreements, and physical control to protect their 
waterscape. It also underlines how the state itself does not have complete control over these 
spaces and may avoid putting itself in the middle of territorial disputes.  
Discursive control of the cooperatives over their waterscape includes both legal discourse 
and communitarian organizations’ discourse of ‘ownership’ over it.  This issue also emerged 
more widely when cooperative leaders were asked about the ownership of water sources. 
The cooperatives acknowledge that the state is the owner of underground water and often 
consult territorial authorities when a well needs to be built. However, there is a sense that 
when water is available in their community, it is the community that has the right to access 
and regulate it. In fact, cooperatives often consulted with the OTB when carrying out works. 
It should be noticed, however, that the OTB is still an organization that is controlled by the 
neighbourhood, even if it is a territorial authority and part of the state apparatus. OTBs are 
considered at risk of co-option by the state, however a good relationship seemed to exist 
between them and the cooperatives in most of the cases I examined.  Therefore, the control 
might not totally lie with the cooperatives but still partially resides with the neighbours.  
Therefore, while cooperative leaders claim that the state owns the water, they reserve to 
themselves the right to access it. Even if originally not formalized, the right to access water 
in their own area of service is seen as a result of the sense of communitarian ownership over 
their own neighbourhood. The right of communitarian providers over their water sources is 
now undergoing a process of formalization (discussed in Chapter 5). This dynamic 
underlines how legal discourses are a secondary means of control over the waterscape, as 
they are often used to ensure what are already conceived as legitimate rights over it. Legal 
arguments are used when external support is needed, often to defend the cooperative against 
external menaces. This process can also be clearly seen when analysing the reasons why the 
cooperatives decided to officially register as such.   
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Reasons to register changed in time, to respond to the difficulties faced by the cooperatives19. 
The representatives of the oldest cooperatives mainly related that their decision was based 
on a wish to strengthen their organizations and make their leaders more accountable. 
However, respondents belonging to cooperatives that were registered officially in the late 
1990s and early 2000s told me they were afraid that infrastructures and water sources could 
be expropriated and put under the control of a private company. This fear is clearly related 
to the events that led to the water war. More recently-established cooperatives mentioned 
that they are afraid that the state would ‘take over.’ In this case, official registration as a 
cooperative is seen as a way to protect their physical waterscape from external appropriation. 
4.2.2. Discursive and material control in San Pedro Magisterio  
The San Pedro Magisterio cooperative has a small, well-established area of service where it 
exercises a strong discursive and material control. Such control was established through the 
foundation and building of the neighbourhood and the cooperative. This process contributed 
to the creation of a strong sense of community amongst the original inhabitants of the 
neighbourhood. Such strong, discursive control over a specific waterscape engendered 
conflicts when newcomers asked for the waterscape of the cooperatives to be expanded in 
the new areas of the neighbourhood.  Some of such areas now receive water through small 
networks built and administered by the municipal water provider. Difficulties in expanding 
their territory is part of the municipal discourse over the weakness of the cooperatives and 
is therefore relevant to their relationship with the state.  
The envisioning of a strong hydro-social territory connected with a clearly defined 
waterscape allowed the cooperatives to create a strong link with its members. This 
connection, however, also created exclusionary effects that damaged the legitimacy of the 
cooperatives in front of external actors. The example of the cooperatives San Pedro 
Magisterio, therefore, allows me to explore how the discursive control of the cooperatives is 
connected to its history, and how such control is related to the capability of the cooperative 
                                                 
19 Of the 20 cooperatives interviewed, the two oldest ones were officially founded in 1987 and 1989, 
respectively; 12 more between 1990 and 1999, and 5 between 2000 and 2005. One is waiting for official 
recognition. 
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to control its waterscape. This example also underlines, however, that changes in the 
neighbourhood composition might weaken the shared hydro-social territory.  
Discursive control in San Pedro is based on a sense of community created through its history, 
and a strong attachment to a single neighbourhood. San Pedro Magisterio was formed by a 
cohesive group of people with a similar background over a well-defined territory. Histories 
about the foundation of the cooperative often underlined a strong sense of community. The 
neighbourhood of San Pedro Magisterio was established in 1972 when the Federation of 
Urban Teachers of Cochabamba bought a stretch of land in the District 2 of Sacaba from the 
Rivero-Torres family and sold parcels to its members. When the first 20–30 families arrived, 
the only urbanized area nearby was the gated community El Castillo. Water could be 
obtained easily through shallow wells. In a few years, the inhabitants brought electricity and 
telephone lines to the neighbourhood, dug shallow personal wells and built septic tanks. The 
first water and sewage systems were built in the 1980s and were fed by a deep well. The San 
Pedro Magisterio cooperative was registered officially in 1996, and it evolved from an 
informal community organization to a professionally managed institution.   
The imagined hydro-social territory of the cooperative is strongly linked and interwoven 
with that of the neighbourhood community. When asked about the history of the cooperative, 
interviewees often talked in general about the history of the neighbourhood, underlining the 
efforts of the inhabitants to make it a liveable area.  Interviewees recounted that the first 
water and sewage systems were built through communitarian works and monetary 
contributions. The community also collected money through kermesses (a festival organised 
for fundraising through the selling of food and other activities).  These efforts included not 
only the construction of basic structures and services necessary for individual families but 
also of those necessary for the construction of a real community: the elementary school, the 
Catholic church, as well as cobbled roads, sidewalks and the football field.  
And even before we arrived, we had already decided that we wanted a school for the 
children since public transportation was rare, it was difficult to bring the children to 
the city. At least we wanted a kindergarten, and it was established in the house of 
Moya, the first kindergarten. It was half built and so we made the chairs and some 
little tables out of bricks. And there was a teacher, which was also improvised, but 
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she taught them well, and so we did everything as a community (Water user n. 36 
15.07.2014 San Pedro Magisterio) 
The neighbourhood is now a pleasant area, with good transportation links. Basic services are 
provided for the 1 454 people living in the neighbourhoods, including water, sewage, phone 
lines, electricity, domestic gas and rubbish collection (INE - 2012 census). 
 
Figure 9: San Pedro Magisterio. 
As the neighbourhood grew physically, tensions began to emerge between ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
inhabitants as to whether new areas belonged to the San Pedro Magisterio OTB. Their right 
to obtain water from the cooperative was also contested.  These tensions exemplify how the 
discursive control that the cooperative exercises over the waterscape through a shared, 
imagined hydro-social territory influenced the evolution of the physical waterscape of the 
cooperative.  
People living in new areas of the neighbourhood accused older inhabitants of behaving as if 
they owned both it and the cooperative. Longtime inhabitants responded that new neighbours 
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arrived when every service was provided, so they did not have to make any sacrifice. The 
newcomers claimed they had to pay a large amount for the land, while the pioneers bought 
it ‘for a dead chicken’20. These arguments, as well as the overall clash, seem to be based on 
different justification for the rights to access and control the territory. The inhabitants of the 
new part of the neighbourhood underlined their rights as connected to their purchase of the 
land and on legal rights to receive the service. Older inhabitants connected their rights to the 
sacrifices they made, while also using legal arguments.  Discourses are therefore mixed, but 
their importance varies. This reinforces my argument that both legal rights and discourses 
connected to the sacrifice made to build and control the territory can be employed by the 
cooperatives to reinforce the discursive control that they exercise on the waterscape.  
This conflict is deeply rooted in the neighbours’ sense of ownership and control over their 
shared space. The conflict started when the ‘new’ neighbours tried to modify the 
neighbourhood physically. Although versions of this conflict vary, it seems apparent that as 
the neighbourhood expanded, the inhabitants living in the ‘new side’ were able to take 
control of the OTB. As affirmed in the next quote, this shift was not welcomed by the older 
inhabitants. 
They do not want it, they say that we are usurpers, that we came to rob them, to 
invade, but it is not like that; (…) There was no capacity of the people from here to 
construct a common front and to win, there were always people with more initiative 
that wanted to work for the neighbourhood, but of course these people are “special” 
and do not let us, they say “only us and only us”, and that is what is going on in the 
OTB (Interview member of the board of directors Cooperative San Pedro 
Magisterio, 14.06.2014) 
The real conflict started in 2008 when the OTB, controlled by the inhabitants of newer areas, 
attempted to modify the physical space of the neighbourhood. The president of the OTB 
decided to give one of the last green areas in the neighbourhood to an NGO that intended to 
build an educational centre for children with disabilities21. This move was contested by some 
                                                 
20 Bolivian expression for a very small amount of money, field notes, San Pedro Magisterio 2014. 
21 http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/local/20081130/telemarat%C3%B3n-2008-logra-bs-
1122245-e-inicia-otro_26331_34857.html (accessed in November 2016). 
143 
 
  
of the old inhabitants, who interpreted it as an attempt to ‘give away’ to a private association 
a place that they had hoped to transform into a recreational park for senior citizens. In the 
end, the project was dropped, and the old inhabitants decided to challenge the legality of the 
OTB elections, since the original documents of the OTB only included the original group of 
houses, even if the expansion of the OTB borders had been acknowledged by the 
municipality. A new president from the ‘old side’ was elected, and the OTB was effectively 
split in two. These events were recalled by the current vice-president of the OTB as an act 
of retaking control of the territory for the people who participated in its construction, 
underlining again the importance of history for maintaining control over the territory.  
I think that when someone takes such a responsibility, he also must know the history 
of the place where he lives, and in this neighbourhood the first inhabitants … It was 
a neighbourhood that was disregarded because at that time it was far away.  The 
neighbourhood must be 30 years old, even more. At that time no one wanted to live 
here, and the first neighbours that came, they brought all the basic services to the 
neighbourhood (…) These people in the majority are now old, and our aim has always 
been to give them a place to meet. Because they were the ones that worked, that 
organized, they built the cooperative, they constructed the sewage, they cobbled the 
streets and now they are old. So that we thought that this space that we have available 
should be transformed into a space for old people. A place where they could go and 
meet, to remember their times … Because they were really friends, and if it was not 
for that unity we would not have the neighbourhood that we have now (vice-president 
OTB San Pedro Magisterio 11.06.2014) 
In the case of San Pedro, there is a strong link between a specific neighbourhood and the 
imagined hydro-social territory of the cooperative. The cooperative, the neighbourhood 
history and the waterscape strongly overlap. Disputes over the control of the neighbourhood, 
therefore, also influenced the cooperative. Most of ‘San Pedrito’, a new area, is now served 
by the cooperative. The expansion of the network, however, caused tensions. Two ex-OTB 
directors living on the ‘new’ side of the neighbourhood explained that they were able to 
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obtain a network expansion only after ‘an enormous fight22.’ Various points of view of this 
fight were summarized by a long-time employee of the cooperative: 
They said that San Pedro Magisterio, was only until the Avenida Perú, and on the 
other side it was another neighbourhood, so that it was not their responsibility to give 
water there. But the others said that San Pedro included also those roads, that is, it 
was not only certain roads. And also that if we had water we had to give it, that it 
was an obligation to give water to those that came to live here. And that our area of 
service was up to there, so that we could not deny the water service (Employee 
Cooperative San Pedro, 08.08.2014). 
Any significant expansion of the water mains, however, needs to be approved by the general 
assembly. During that first expansion, the vote was split in the middle and the cooperative 
president at the time solved the impasse by voting yes. The expansion, however, is still 
remembered with unhappiness by some of the older inhabitants. This feeling has to do with 
its material consequences (a lower water pressure) but also with the fact that this water is 
seen as being ‘owned’ by the neighbours. These two elements can be observed in the 
following quote from one of the users of the cooperative.  
And everyone wanted to take our water everywhere. Do me a favour. It is not correct. 
I am like a pillar, a ruler. If things are not correct, even it is my mother that ask me, 
I say no. And I do not think that it is correct. But yes, furtively they gave to one 
family, then another and another. And there were problems for this, and for this there 
was the division of the neighbourhood. Because they asked, those of the other side. 
Now, what is going on, it is not to be stingy with the water, what happened is that the 
water, following the rule of gravity, go down to the lowest level, right? So that all of 
us in the area, we are without water. Only when they let the water go, in the first 
moment the pipes are full and it goes into our house. There in San Pedrito, they have 
water day and night (User n. 36 Cooperative San Pedro Magisterio) 
                                                 
22 Interview user n. 32. 
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After that first expansion, only small network expansions took place, excluding part of the 
neighbourhood from the service of the cooperative. As can be observed in the map below, 
the network of the cooperative does not cover the whole OTB. 
 
Figure 10: Map area of Service Cooperative San Pedro Magisterio. Base map: Municipality of Sacaba. Drawing mine. 
Red lines: limit of water service. Yellow lines: limit of sewage service. 
This strong material control over the cooperative’s waterscape, connected with a strong 
discursive control, creates exclusionary effects. These have repercussions for the cooperative 
itself.  During the time in which the ‘new’ inhabitants controlled the OTB, they were able to 
obtain municipal funding to build a small water network that is now administered by 
EMAPAS. The conflict, therefore, led to a certain loss of control of the territory, as the 
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municipality started to take a more active role.  The tensions that arose due to the physical 
presence of EMAPAS in areas bordering the cooperatives are examined in Chapter 6. 
4.2.3. Discursive and material control in Quintanilla 
The cooperative Quintanilla exercises control over its waterscape by mainly focusing on its 
need to access water sources placed outside its area of service. Access to most of these 
sources was obtained through other communitarian organizations.  For this reason, the 
cooperative needs to exercise an intensive effort to maintain material control over the 
waterscape. Their material control is fragile, however, as it is mediated through other 
organizations.  
Likewise, discursive control is focused mainly on affirming the right to access these sources, 
which is done in two ways. One is based on the rights of the ‘inhabitants of District 2’ to 
access certain water sources. These discourses are often based on a pre-existing system of 
rights and are used against actors external to the district, often during clashes in which 
cooperatives and irrigators defend their rights to access mountain water sources.  The 
discursive control of the cooperative over the water sources is also carried out specifically 
through a retelling of their history, which is focused on how the infrastructure to bring water 
from the mountain sources to their system was built. This is part of the reason for the 
participation of the inhabitants and will be discussed on more details in Section 4.3.3. 
However, such a focus on the need to control water sources corresponds to a somehow weak 
discursive and material control over its large and fragmented area of service.  Examining the 
case of the cooperative Quintanilla, I can see how discursive and material control influence 
and ‘serve’ each other, and often focus on point of tensions for the capability of the 
cooperative to maintain control.  
An important element of discursive control comes from the history of how the infrastructure 
was built. The cooperative Quintanilla was funded officially in 1990, even if the works to 
build the infrastructure started at least a decade before. At the time, the area was sparsely 
populated, and the inhabitants received water from irrigation channels or shallow wells. A 
committee created by a few of the inhabitants organized to build the water infrastructure. 
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The first water source was a filtering gallery built in the ravine23 Chaquimayo. The digging 
required in its rocky bed was physically demanding and at times dangerous work. The 
construction of the water system was partially financed by the Caritas Antoniana (an 
organization of the Catholic Church). In 1992, a sewage system and a Imhoff tank (a basic 
wastewater treatment procedure) were built. 
Fast urbanization and therefore an increase in demand led to water scarcity. The cooperative 
accessed new water sources through a network of agreements with communitarian 
organizations, monetary payments, and communal works. Documents in the cooperative 
indicated that it acquired permanent rights to water turns for water sources from individual 
irrigators and that it occasionally receives water turns from single irrigators.  Even though 
the board of directors in charge during my fieldwork managed to improve the situation, 
Quintanilla is still plagued by scarcity in the dry season. The need to acquire control over 
water sources, therefore, is a continuous struggle for the cooperative.  
Material control over the water sources is obtained through agreements with other 
organizations. Such control, need to be continuously maintained. One of the ways in which 
access and control over water sources are maintained is through participation to work to 
repair and improve the infrastructures, often in collaboration with other organizations that 
share the same sources. This is not only physically needed but reinforce the right of the 
cooperative to access such sources as, traditionally, water rights are connected with the duty 
to help with maintenance (interview president of the association of irrigators, 19.07.2014). 
Mountain sources and infrastructures are often located in areas difficult to reach, so that 
sometimes work needs to be carried out without machines. Furthermore, extensive repairs 
are needed after the rainy season. Examples of such infrastructure and works required can 
be seen in the figures below. 
                                                 
23 I here call ravines those structures that were referred as quebradas by my respondents. These are seasonal 
rivers that fill with water only during the rainy season. 
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Figure 11: Ravine Chaquimayo, District 2, Sacaba. 
 
 
Figure 12: Work in progress to repair a broken pipe in the ravine. 
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Figure 13: Entrance of a filtering gallery. 
Also, the maintenance of the networks of agreement through which the cooperative 
maintains control over water sources needs extensive efforts from the cooperative leaders. 
The cooperative was never able to obtain exclusive access to any mountain reservoirs, which 
weakens their capability to maintain material control. Control was then obtained through the 
negotiation of a shared access to mountain sources through the organisation of irrigators. 
The cooperative also participates in the Association of Cooperatives and Irrigators of District 
2, composed of the three cooperatives of District 2 that receive water from mountain sources, 
the water committee Puntiti Chico, and the irrigators. This organization allowed the 
cooperative to strike agreements with other organizations for the shared usage of some water 
sources and to coordinate their management and maintenance. Adding to this, the 
cooperatives and the irrigators, separately and as a group, negotiated agreements with the 
mountain communities that control the areas in which mountain reservoirs are placed. The 
following figure represents the physical networks through which the cooperative receives 
water. Water arrives from different water sources and is distributed to different providers. 
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Figure 14: Water system of Cooperative Quintanilla. I developed this model using information I received during interviews 
with its members, and it was first used in the report I prepared for them. 
The network of relationships that allows the cooperative to access water sources is fragile, 
however, and often based on personal connections. The relationship between the cooperative 
and the irrigators had in fact been shaky during the previous administration of the 
cooperative. The new board of directors instead worked to strengthen the Association of 
Cooperatives and Irrigators, and they obtained better access to shared sources. Most of the 
dealings with the irrigators in this period were carried out by one member of the board whose 
family had been part of the organization of irrigators. 
The need to act with other organizations makes the material control of the cooperative over 
their water sources precarious. However, their ability to organize with other organizations 
to confront menaces to their water source coming from outside the district reinforces their 
collective material control. This was notably the case during the Water War, but also when 
problems emerged with mountain communities. The associations of cooperatives and 
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irrigators also organized a protest when a version of the yet-to-come Water Law seemed to 
menace their water access.  
To control its waterscape, the cooperative sometimes needs to exercise a measure of material 
control on the entire district, often in alliance with other organizations. A problem that 
exemplifies this need is the issue of the Metropolitan Park, a protected area on the banks of 
the ravine Chakimayu. This is an area of recharge of the aquifers placed near the water 
deposit of the cooperative Quintanilla.  Constructions in this area would damage the aquifer 
and therefore wells (which represent a secondary water source in the cooperative). 
Furthermore, it was feared that settlers could interfere with the water system of Quintanilla.  
The park was threatened when parcels were sold to expand urbanization. In 2009, members 
of the cooperatives Arocagua-Puntiti and Quintanilla carried out protests over the situation. 
In 2013, would-be settlers were evicted by inhabitants of the area. Both the president of the 
cooperative Arocagua-Puntiti and Quintanilla were active in initiatives to protect the park.  
Such a strong focus on the control of the water sources does not correspond to a strong 
discursive control over the area of service of the cooperative.  The cooperative is not based 
on a strong territorial community. The consequence of this on the cooperative relationship 
with their members is analysed in Section 4.3.3. The cooperative, furthermore, does not 
exercise a strong material control over their area of service. The waterscape of the 
cooperative is in fact physically fragmented. Its area of service overlaps in certain areas with 
other communitarian providers (see map below). EMAPAS has entered its area of service 
and taken over some areas of its sewage network. The consequences of this entrance will be 
analysed in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 15: Service area of Cooperative Quintanilla. Base map: municipality of Sacaba. Elaboration mine. Red line: limits 
of water service, Yellow lines: Area where sewage service only is provided. Blue lines: service area of the Water Committee 
of Quintanilla Sud. 
Looking at the three preceding sub-sections, we can then draw some conclusion on how the 
cooperatives established control over their waterscapes. Within the micro-waterscapes of the 
cooperatives, material control is established through the construction of infrastructures and 
the control over water sources, the mobilization of members of the cooperatives, and the 
creation of networks with other organizations — in brief, through the different forms through 
which the cooperatives create and maintain their material waterscape. Discursive control is 
established through the creation of imagined hydro-social territories. A central method is 
retelling the history of the cooperatives, which represents the central justification for 
ownership and control over their territory and water sources. A secondary way is through 
legal arguments. A minority of cooperatives, usually those in District 2, also establish 
discursive control on their water sources through customary rules.  
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This section also emphasizes how there are some differences in the shape these forms of 
control takes. These differences are influenced by the history of the cooperatives, and, more 
specifically, by their physical waterscape and the way in which it was created and evolved. 
In Quintanilla, the discursive and material control of the cooperatives over the waterscape is 
focused on guaranteeing its access to water sources. This is due both to the fact that these 
water sources are placed outside its area of service and on the fact that the cooperative area 
of service does not correspond to a coherent territorial community. As a result, the 
cooperative exerts a strong influence on the waterscape of the District, but its control over 
its area of service is not as strong. In San Pedro, instead, control of the cooperative focused 
on the control over its area of service. This is due to its history, and to the connection of to 
a well-defined territorial community. However, as the territorial community grew and 
changed this affected the control of the cooperatives and caused some exclusionary effects.  
4.3. Control through membership 
This section analyses how the cooperatives maintain control over their waterscape, focusing 
on the participation of their members. To this end, I explore the different forms of 
participation of the cooperative members and their effects on the ability of the cooperatives 
to control their waterscape.  I argue that this participation is crucial for both the material and 
discursive control over the waterscape and that changes in the demographic composition and 
in the material waterscape of the cooperatives are modifying the forms of participation 
undertaken by their members.  
The first subsection focuses on the entire group of cooperatives, to analyse overall trends. I 
analyse the ways in which the members contribute to the control that the cooperative 
exercises over the waterscape, and pinpoint emerging issues. To analyse the reasons for and 
effects of these issues in more depth, I then explore the two case studies. The cooperative 
San Pedro has a strong discursive control (analysed in Section 4.2.2), which can be seen in 
their relationship with their members. However, new members are reluctant to assume an 
active role in the cooperative, which could damage the material control of the cooperative 
over the waterscape in the long term. In the case of Quintanilla, I analyse how the 
cooperative’s weak discursive control over their area of service (analysed in Section 4.2.3) 
is reflected in the weak participation of its members.  
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4.3.1. Maintaining control over the waterscape 
To analyse how members participate in the cooperatives, this section focuses on both active 
forms of participation (such as in assemblies) and in passive ones (such as the payment of 
water bills). Both of these contribute to the discursive and material control of the cooperative 
over the waterscape. Different forms of participation are not used with the same intensity in 
all cooperatives. Changes in the relationship between cooperatives and members, in what I 
describe as a ‘process of professionalization,’ is transforming the way in which the 
cooperative exercises control over the waterscape. Such changes can have a weakening 
effect on the cooperatives.  
As this section examines member participation in the cooperatives, I need to clarify what 
membership entails, as well as a member’s official role in the cooperative. To establish a 
connection to a cooperative’s network, it is generally necessary to buy a share and become 
an official member (socio/shareholder). The members’ general assembly is the highest 
authority, and it makes the most important decisions (e.g. changes in water prices; 
construction of a new infrastructure). The assembly elects the board of directors, and only 
members can be elected to this cooperative governing body.  
In contrast to the classic model of centralized service provision, the role of the members is 
not limited to paying the bills. They contribute with the payment of a share for the right to 
enter the cooperative, occasionally provide fixed monetary contributions for projects, 
participate in communitarian works and in the assembly, form the board of directors, and 
participate in protests and public events.  Not all forms of participation are mandatory (see 
table below) but when they are, negligence is usually punished through fines. All these forms 
of participation ultimately contribute to the control of the cooperative over the waterscape. 
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PARTICIPATION OF THE MEMBERS 
Monetary contributions Active participation 
(mandatory) 
Active participation 
(discretionary) 
• Payment of water 
and sewage bills 
• Payment of share 
• Payment of a 
‘quota’: a share of 
the cost of projects 
• Payment of fines 
 
• Participation in the 
assemblies 
• Participation in 
communitarian 
works 
• Participation in 
protests, streets 
blockades, civic 
events, various 
neighbourhoods 
events… 
 
• Participation in the 
board of directors of 
the cooperatives 
• Asking for 
information on the 
functioning of the 
cooperatives 
• Offering 
professional help to 
the cooperative  
Table 2: Duties and responsibilities of the cooperatives’ members. I developed this table with data obtained from interviews 
with representatives of the conurbation cooperatives. 
Members’ participation is paramount in the cooperatives from a practical point of view, as 
it allows the maintenance, evolution and protection of the physical waterscapes, but it also 
has a symbolic meaning. Member participation reaffirms the sense of belonging of the 
cooperatives and the waterscape more in general to their members, and therefore strengthens 
the discursive control of the cooperative.  
The payment of the share is one example. Shares have practical importance for the 
maintenance of the physical waterscape, as infrastructural works are often supported through 
new shares. The share’s price is generally quite high: it can vary from around US$ 300 to 
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US$ 850 for a water connection, while the sewage connection is cheaper, around24 US$ 200 
to US$ 300. The share has more than a monetary significance. Through its payment, the 
members contribute to the construction of the waterscape, as well as acknowledging 
sacrifices from preceding members. In this way, the share payment legally and symbolically 
establishes that the cooperatives are also owned by new members and not only by those who 
participated in the first construction of the waterscape. The cooperative Arocagua-Puntiti 
makes this explicit: new members pay an amount considered the monetary equivalent to the 
labour of the first members. 
Water price structure also contributes to the cooperative’s discursive and material control 
over the waterscape. Cooperatives usually establish a ‘basic monthly price’ for a given 
amount of water. They then raise the bill as a function of the usage, with water becoming 
progressively more expensive. This structure allows for low prices for a basic amount of 
water, discourages waste and for-profit usage, and targets the wealthier members of the 
community. Special treatment is often reserved for services such as schools. 
This is why we have 10 categories for consumption, we do not want to make 
everyone pay a lot. There are poor people, old people, but there are people that are 
living in big houses. So, let them pay more, it depends on usage because we have 
meters.  The basic consumption for a family is around 15 m3. If you are using more, 
I think, what are you doing, you are either selling or you are profiting. This is to make 
sure that the water is used by those that need it (President Cooperative San Lorenzo, 
11/12/2013). 
This arrangement reaffirms the material control of the cooperative, as it confirms their right 
to control water consumption, either through prices or through forbidding certain usages, 
especially when water is scarce. It also underlines that water is not treated as a good to be 
sold, but as a service that must be managed to benefit the entire community. In this way, the 
                                                 
24 For comparison, the minimum wage in 2014 was 1440 BOB (US$ 208) 
https://www.ine.gob.bo/subtemas_cuadros/salarioMinimo_html/SalarioMinimo_41201.htm consulted at 
16/04/2018. 
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cooperatives reinforce the ownership of the community over the service and therefore their 
discursive control over the waterscape.  
However, price structures in many cooperatives were revealed to be insufficient to guarantee 
their survival; that is, to ensure their capability to maintain their physical waterscape. Price 
structures determined at the time of foundation often did not consider the eventual need to 
renew the water and sewage systems. A consultant for water projects based in Cochabamba 
argued that water prices in communitarian organizations are usually too low and that 
communitarian providers rely too heavily on new shares for infrastructural works.  
They believe that they are all right, but in reality, they are a time bomb. And that time 
bomb is the infrastructure (Cochabamba water projects consultant, 06.12.2013) 
In the long term, problems with water prices damage the cooperatives’ control over their 
physical waterscape. Most of them stated that they had enough money to cover running costs, 
but most had problems with long-term maintenance and large projects (e.g. a new well). To 
finance emergencies and infrastructural works, some cooperatives revealed a reliance on 
‘quotas’ from the members for infrastructural projects. This is a heavy burden, especially 
because this practice is more common (although not exclusive) to poor neighbourhoods, 
recently established cooperatives, or those with a poor infrastructure (features that are often 
correlated). 
Awareness is rising of the necessity to cover long-term infrastructural needs: some 
interviewees commissioned professional analysis to establish new prices. However, 
increases must be approved by the members, and some cooperatives find this process 
difficult.  A few that increased their prices stressed the importance of communication with 
the members. The Arocagua-Puntiti president stated that since the members participated in 
the construction of the water system and still do much communitarian work, they think that 
the water should be cheap. Communication and perception of the cost of running the water 
system, therefore, plays an important role in the failure to increase prices. This is a clear 
example of how the relationship between the cooperatives and their members influence their 
capacity to control and maintain their physical waterscape.  
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However monetary payments are not the only forms of participation. Active participation is 
also fundamental (e.g. in assemblies and communitarian works). In the cooperatives (as in 
most communitarian water providers), fines are established for failing to participate. 
Different forms of participation correspond to different requirements for controlling the 
waterscape. In some cases, however, a reduction in participation can weaken the cooperative 
control. How intensive the active participation of the members is, changes between 
cooperatives. Poorer and younger cooperatives often require more intensive participation in 
communitarian works, for practical reasons.  Better established cooperatives often need less 
member participation in the material construction and protection of the waterscape. In some 
cooperatives, the role of the members now approximates the role of a customer, shifting 
most of the work to employees and elected officials. We can then speak of a growing 
‘professionalization’ of cooperatives. However, member participation is also necessary in 
the assemblies and on the boards of the directors of these cooperatives. Scarce participation 
in both might lead to a scarce legitimacy to decision-making and/or a heavy burden placed 
in the few willing to participate. 
Furthermore, active participation in communitarian works and the active defence of the 
waterscape remains fundamental in certain cooperatives. While some of the younger/placed 
in more disadvantaged neighbourhoods ones often maintain a high level of participation, this 
is a problem for older/better-established cooperatives, which nonetheless need the active 
participation of their members. This is particularly true for cooperatives with water sources 
placed outside their area of service, which need active maintenance and defence.  A few 
interviewees complained that some members expected the cooperative to take care of all 
manual work or might prefer to pay a fine for non-participation. In some cases, this change 
in attitude was attributed to socio-economic transformations of their neighbourhoods. 
One of such cases is the cooperative Arocagua-Puntiti, whose president described how they 
needed to actively rebuff attempts to avoid communitarian works. Their water sources are 
placed in the mountain range. As such, they need to be protected (e.g. from other 
communities and from legislative changes); they also require intensive work to carry out 
maintenance. Lack of involvement could seriously compromise the capability of the 
cooperative to control and maintain the waterscape. 
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The people of the place, the people from before, they are very hard-working. They 
do not care about the rain, the water, they go, they work and everything else. And the 
people from the city, they went there and then said: “I did not pay to have to do this 
work.” So, they believe that if one pays that is enough (...). To say, they would like 
to behave like it was a private enterprise: “I pay and I demand that they do all this” 
(President Cooperative Arocagua-Puntiti, 11.08.2014) 
I analysed how the participation of the members in the cooperative is fundamental to 
maintain the symbolical and discursive control over the waterscape. I underlined some 
emerging issues that could damage this control. Why these issues emerged in the context of 
the case studies, and how the cooperatives reacted to them will be analysed in the next two 
sub-sections. 
4.3.2. San Pedro Magisterio and the maintenance of control  
As underlined in Section 4.2.2, the cooperative San Pedro Magisterio developed in a way 
that ensured its strong discursive and material control over the waterscape. Over time, this 
control was maintained through strong continuity in the administration of the cooperative, 
which was carried out by employees and directors with a strong base of knowledge over the 
waterscape and with a personal relationship with many of their members. Such knowledge 
also works the other way, with water users having more knowledge and more faith in the 
working of the cooperative than the ones in Quintanilla. The cooperative presents some 
issues, however, such as a certain lack of initiative to solve old problems, and scarce 
participation of members outside a group of ‘old members’. This situation threatens the 
capability of the cooperative to create and recreate its waterscape.  
The cooperative has good material control over its waterscape. Observing the day-to-day life 
of the cooperative, I could see that most issues were swiftly dealt with, and that the three 
employees and board of directors had things well in hand. A map hanging in its office 
underlines each pipe and connection (as names of users were on the map I do not show it 
here for privacy reasons). Employees seemed to know nearly all users. A strong material 
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control over the waterscape also meant that the cooperative was able to keep payment arrears 
to a low level through warnings (and even water cuts).  
While the cooperative can function relatively efficiently, several long-term problems might 
affect their capability to control and maintain the waterscape.  The cooperative could cover 
current costs, including sudden expenses (e.g. a broken computer); however, an internal 
report stated that its patrimony was diminishing, and that new members’ shares were not 
enough to replenish it (in fact, it had only 3-4 new connections per year). Therefore, the 
cooperative encountered difficulty in financing the large projects necessary to renew an 
ageing infrastructure and solve problems in service quality. Water continuity is good, but 
water quality is not high, and members often complained about the presence of residues in 
the water, which caused it to run dark at times25. 
Due to the need for infrastructural works, a few directors stated that prices should be raised, 
but that members would disagree. As far as I know, however, there were no recent attempts 
to raise water prices. Water and sewage prices were already relatively high compared to 
other cooperatives, especially for high water usage (as the price grows exponentially with 
the usage).  The average bill26 is 50 bs. When I discussed the possibility with the members, 
most stated that they would be open to raising the prices if it was associated with an 
improvement of the service, or if it was needed to respond to economic difficulties. In a 
concrete indication that the members are open to paying more for improvements, the 
assembly agreed to raise sewage prices to take care of the new wastewater treatment plant. 
A good relationship between members and the cooperative, therefore, could mean that the 
cooperatives could be able to raise their prices if needed. This could ensure the capability of 
the cooperative to maintain and improve the waterscape. Underlining this, users interviewed 
often mentioned that it was the duty of the users to pay their bills so that the cooperative 
could work. They did not seem to resent its strict policies on arrears, and even some 
interviewees, who arrived hastily after their water was cut, told me that they felt the cuts 
were necessary. Such good relationship between members and the cooperative is therefore 
                                                 
25 A 2012 analysis indicated that concentrations of iron, manganese, nitric nitrogen, and turbidity were 
beyond the acceptable limits. While not mentioning health effects, the analysis report noted that water 
might have a displeasing aspect, stain clothing, and deposit residue in pipes — all effects that took place.  
26 2012/2013 internal document. 50 Bolivianos are 3.5% of the Bolivian minimum wage.  
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fundamental to maintain material control, ensuring that the members contribute enough to 
the cooperative.  
However, a good relationship between members and the cooperatives did not necessarily 
result in active participation. As San Pedro does not need extensive communitarian works, 
due to the simplicity of the network, participation should mainly take the form of partaking 
in assemblies and in the board of directors.  Yet involvement of most of the members was 
limited to participation in the assembly, which meets once or twice a year. While fines 
ensured that most members come to the meetings, very few people were willing to stand for 
elections, outside a circle of old-timers. Furthermore, the many renters in the neighbourhood 
are not allowed to participate in the cooperative, reducing the pool of people that would be 
able to contribute to it. This aspect also contributes to a certain detachment from the 
cooperatives of part of the population. 
A limited pool of members ready to participate in the board of directors of the cooperatives 
could lead to damage in the long-term relationship between cooperatives and members. One 
of the members of the board of directors told me that some members complained that the 
same people are always in the board of directors. One of the interviewees alleged that a 
group of friends in the board of directors keep voting for each other, and a group of older 
ladies in the assembly always vote for the same candidates. This is not a general complaint 
but, in the long term, it could damage the legitimacy of the board.  
However, there are some encouraging signs concerning member participation. As the 
cooperative has evolved and changed, different forms of participation are needed to control 
the waterscape. In this sense, the impact of a decrease in traditional forms of participation 
might be mitigated through alternative forms of participation. For example, one lawyer was 
invited to be part of the board of directors, and she contributed to the cooperative mainly 
through her expertise as a legal consultant. Several other interviewees told me that they 
would be ready to contribute with their expertise, in a less structured and time-consuming 
way than as a member of the board of directors. 
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4.3.3. Quintanilla and the maintenance of control 
As analysed in Section 4.2.3, the focus of the Cooperative Quintanilla material and 
discursive control over the waterscape is linked with the struggle to obtain water sources. 
This situation led the cooperative to become an important district actor and to exercise both 
material and discursive forms of control over the entire waterscape of District 2. These forms 
of control, however, are both intensive and ultimately fragile, as they need to be negotiated 
with other communitarian organizations. This fragile control is also reflected in the 
incomplete control that the cooperative exercises over its area of service. They do not have 
a strong discursive control over it, as they are not connected with a specific territorial 
community. 
These elements weaken their relationship with their members. Newer members, specifically, 
often do not participate beyond paying for their bills and fines. Furthermore, lack of 
knowledge about the needs of the cooperative led the members to stop a modest price rise 
that would be fundamental for the cooperative’s capability to maintain control over its 
physical waterscape. However, willingness to protect water sources also emerged from 
interviews with members. Older members often underlined the difficulties of obtaining water 
sources, and even newer members were aware of problems menacing their water sources 
and declared they were ready to defend them. 
I start by examining how the cooperative relates to the OTBs, and how this relationship 
influences their connection to their members. The weak control of the cooperatives over their 
areas of service led to the need to use OTBs as mediators with their members. This also 
means that OTBs can make decisions that might weaken the territorial control of the 
cooperative. 
Quintanilla has a large area of service and provides water and/or sewage service to 9 OTBs. 
Interviews with presidents of these OTBs revealed that some of them mediate the 
relationship between their members and the cooperative, relating the requests of their 
inhabitants or discussing with them the needs of the cooperative. However, during my stay 
in the cooperative, I observed that members, in particular older ones, would often come to 
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speak about issues directly with the president of the cooperative. Therefore, members do 
interact directly with the cooperative, even if some of these interactions could be at times 
ascribed to personal relationships with the president of the cooperatives, or to his role as 
president of an OTB. 
The relationship between members and the cooperative then varied based on different 
factors. It was particularly weak in OTBs with their own water service, which receive the 
sewage service only from the cooperative. The particularly weak material control that the 
cooperative has in those communities is exemplified by the fact that one neighbourhood 
decided to pass its sewage network from the cooperative to the municipal company. 
Quintanilla was not able to stop this change (the reasons for and consequences of this action 
are discussed in Chapter 5 and 6). 
The at times wavering control that the cooperative exercises on its area of service can also 
be examined through looking at the role of knowledge from the following two points of 
view. First, holes exist in the knowledge of the cooperative’s leaders about their waterscape.  
Second, a general lack of knowledge about the cooperative exists amongst the members. 
Both issues influence its capability to control its waterscape, both materially and 
discursively. 
In past chapters, I underlined the problem of lack of knowledge over the waterscape of the 
conurbation, as caused by its disordered growth. This issue is exemplified by a lack of 
precise maps. The maps of the cooperative Quintanilla (see figure below) were not 
particularly detailed, and I was told that even employees of the cooperative ignored the 
location of a few sewage connections. This omission was also probably due to the disordered 
and fast-paced growth of the neighbourhood and of the cooperative’s network.  It influenced 
the capability of the cooperative to control their area of service materially.  
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Figure 16: Map of the water network of the Cooperative Quintanilla. 
Furthermore, the complicated nature of the infrastructure that brings water to the 
cooperatives also made a detailed knowledge over it difficult. To run the cooperative, this 
‘local’ kind of knowledge is necessary: on the one hand knowledge of its complicated 
infrastructures, and on the other awareness of the intricate webs of agreement that regulate 
water access. Not all members of the board of directors had a clear idea of how this network 
worked. Furthermore, the management of the cooperatives implies the knowledge of 
bureaucratic and accountancy rules. Many members of the board of directors admitted that 
before being elected, they had no idea of how difficult it was to manage the cooperative. The 
need to quickly acquire a large amount of information when new members of the board of 
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directors are appointed also affects the capability of the cooperative to control their 
waterscape efficiently.  
Lack of knowledge also influenced the relationship between the members and the 
cooperative, both in terms of discursive control and, consequently, its material control. The 
lack of knowledge among the members of how difficult it is to bring water to the cooperative 
was considered a central problem by the members of the board of directors. Specifically, the 
general assembly’s refusal to increase water prices was attributed to ignorance of the 
cooperative’s situation. The refusal to increase prices then jeopardizes the capability of the 
cooperative to exercise a material control over its waterscape.  
The cooperative needs to renew parts of its network and improve its wastewater treatment 
and water sources. Members of the board of directors stated that current prices were not 
enough to sustain the organization in the long term. Infrastructural works were made possible 
by new shares; however, further enlargement of the cooperative was becoming more and 
more difficult. Raising the water prices, one of the lowest in the conurbation, is then 
considered fundamental by the members of the board. The increase proposed in the assembly 
was nominally high (25%), but modest overall (5 bolivianos added to the basic price; as one 
director put it: ‘the price of a sandwich’). However, the proposition caused protests and was 
partially rejected by the assembly (it approved an increase for commercial users only). 
The board of directors tried to strengthen the material control of the cooperative over its area 
of service. One aspect of this was an intensive campaign to reduce arrears. It imposed fines 
for late payment, sent notifications to those at risk of water cuts, and even carried them out 
(after 6 months in arrears). The president met directly with debtors to convince them to pay. 
Payment plans were also allowed. These practices reduced arrears for the water service and 
put the cooperative in touch with users who were not even aware that they were supposed to 
pay for their sewage connection. However, there were long-term arrears for a few sewage 
users. Reducing arrears strengthens the control of the cooperative over its area of service, 
while it also improves their economic situation, and therefore their capability to carry out 
infrastructural works. 
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Another aspect that influences the cooperative’s material and discursive control is the active 
participation of the members. This is particularly important in Quintanilla, as it is needed to 
reinforce control over water sources placed outside their area of service. While willingness 
to pay bills increased, it did not necessarily coincide with a willingness to participate actively 
in the cooperative.  In sum, most respondents were good clients, but did not wish to take an 
active role in the cooperative. As an example, one interviewee told me that he would be 
happy to pay more for water, but also stated that the board of directors should make most 
decisions without asking the members. 
Most of the members I interviewed participated in the assemblies, but their participation 
stops there. Communitarian work does not seem to be used often in the cooperative (I did 
not observe any instance). However, I was told that one project was carried out earlier the 
same year: cleaning out water channels. A few members were not even aware that 
communitarian works took place. There were, however, some positive signs concerning the 
capability of the cooperative to mobilize its members to protect its water sources. Those who 
participate at least modestly in the assemblies often mentioned the need to protect the 
cooperatives from external menaces, especially concerning their water sources.  Most 
recalled the struggle to protect the cooperative’s water sources from the harm that the 
urbanization of the metropolitan park would do (see Section 4.2.3) or spoke about 
organizations that wanted to ‘take their water’. This way of thinking reinforces my argument 
that the discursive and material control of the cooperative is based on a sense of ownership 
and on a need to materially protect its water sources. 
To resolve these tensions, the active participation of the members of the cooperative is 
needed.  Such participation, as in other organizations, is ensured both through a form of 
discursive control and through fines for non-participation. In the Quintanilla cooperative, 
such discourses are also focused mainly on ensuring support when the defence of their water 
sources is needed.  As explored in the preceding section, the sacrifices of the inhabitants to 
build the cooperatives are connected to a feeling of ownership. In the Quintanilla 
cooperative, however, the retelling of its history is focused mostly on the construction of the 
first water sources and on general changes in the district, and rarely on the development of 
the neighbourhoods that compose Quintanilla. 
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While the cooperative’s officials have problems communicating with their members, and 
many of them are unaware of the difficulties of managing it, some of the members would be 
ready to contribute to the physical defence of the water sources. However, if participation in 
assemblies keeps decreasing, the capability of the cooperative to mobilize its members 
would diminish.  Furthermore, if members keep repelling the proposal for a price increase, 
the long-term sustainability of the cooperative could also be damaged. A weak discursive 
control of the cooperative’s area of service, therefore, led to a weak connection with the 
members that, in the long run, poses a risk of severely damaging the capability of the 
cooperative to materially control its waterscape. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored the ways in which the cooperatives control their waterscape. I 
conclude that they do so by exercising both material and discursive control. This control 
assumes the form of building and maintaining the physical waterscape and of creating 
imagined hydro-social territories. These two forms of control influence and co-create each 
other. This chapter establishes the importance of the creation of a sense of ownership towards 
the waterscape, created through a communal history and a continued relationship between 
members and the cooperative. The weakening of these links reduces the discursive control, 
and consequently the material control of the cooperative over the waterscape. 
This chapter establishes that the cooperatives strongly influence water distribution within 
their own waterscape, to say water governance. However, it also underlines that they are not 
the only actors influencing such governance. A series of other actors, such as other 
communitarian organizations and the state, also influence water governance in minor and 
major ways. Even within the micro-waterscape of the cooperative, therefore, water 
governance is a multi-actors affair.  
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5. State vision of the waterscape: knowledge, order and 
contradictions 
 
Introduction 
This chapter explores how the state affirms its role in the water sector. I argue that the state 
strengthens its role in the conurbation by modifying both the hydro-social territory and the 
physical waterscape.  
State officials often view the waterscape as disordered. This perspective is due to the 
unplanned growth of the conurbation, which has led to the construction of autonomous 
providers over which the state has scarce precise information and even less control. These 
conceptions have prompted a desire to order the waterscape as well as strengthen the control 
of the state over it. The Bolivian state carries out three main policies which have the effect 
of modifying both the hydro-social territory – by making it more ordered and knowable – 
and the physical waterscape – through the construction of infrastructures controlled by the 
state.  The first policy is the formalisation and registration of communitarian providers by 
the Bolivian Potable Water and Sanitation Authority (AAPS), the second is the consolidation 
of municipal providers, and the third is the construction of large-scale water and sanitation 
infrastructures. 
These policies are carried out by different levels of the state, sometimes in cooperation with 
each other. The national state, specifically through the Ministry for Water and the 
Environment and its agencies, finances and carries out large infrastructural works in 
coordination with the municipalities. The AAPS regulates the sector. In Cochabamba, the 
departmental government is also involved in financing water projects, as well as in waste 
water supervision and mediation and coordination in the use of water sources. The 
municipality has a fundamental role in directly providing the service, and co-financing water 
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projects. While there are common perceptions over the need to strengthen the control of the 
state over the waterscape, the way in which such control is to be carried out and the way in 
which the communitarian providers are perceived varies with the level of the state. This has 
an effect on how different levels of the state interact with the cooperatives.  
Section 1 of this chapter elaborates on the view of the hydro-social territories of the state 
which considers the waterscape to be disordered. I then focus on how the different levels of 
the state see communitarian providers. Section 2 looks at how the state is modifying the 
hydro-social territory of the conurbation and the consequences of such attempts. Section 3 
examines the consequences of the state’s direct modification of the waterscape.  
5.1. State imagination of the hydro-social territory 
This section analyses how the state sees and imagines the hydro-social territory. This 
analysis is necessary to understand how and why the state attempts to control and modify 
the waterscape (treated in the next two sections). 
Examining interviews with state officials, I reach the conclusion that the state perceives the 
hydro-social territory of the conurbation as disordered, a situation often worsened by lack of 
accurate information.  The state’s perspective of communitarian providers and of its own 
role is influenced by this vision. State officials, especially at the municipal level, see the 
construction of a universal water provider, and therefore of a more ordered waterscape, as 
the ideal hydro-social territory. Some seem to look at it as the result of the ‘natural’ evolution 
of the waterscape. Such a vision of an ideal waterscape is accompanied, especially at the 
municipal level, by the depiction of the municipal providers as legitimate, and of the 
cooperative as ‘private’ organizations. While not all levels of the state look at the 
cooperatives in the same way, the municipality has stronger physical control over the 
territory, and therefore a more direct influence on the cooperatives.  
The first sub-section considers the vision of state officials over the waterscape and 
communitarian organization. The second section looks at the ideal hydro-social territory of 
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state authorities, and at the effects this imagined territory has on how state officials see the 
cooperatives. 
5.1.1. A disordered waterscape  
As Chapter 2 underlines, in Cochabamba, the Bolivian state has never had complete control 
over peri-urban areas where a disordered process of urban development led to the auto-
construction of communitarian providers outside of state planning producing multiple 
waterscapes. This sub-section argues that the existence of multiple, overlapping waterscapes 
has influenced the state’s elaboration of hydro-social territories in the conurbation. 
State officials view the waterscape of the conurbation as disordered, due to a lack of 
centralized control and planning.  In interviews with state officials, the construction of a 
more ordered and fair waterscape was often associated with the growth of the control of the 
state. At the municipal level, this growth of control was often associated with a vision of an 
‘ideal’ hydro-social waterscape in which a universal municipal provider would directly 
provide the service. This view of the ideal hydro-social waterscape varied slightly at other 
levels of the state. At the departmental and national state levels officials also often looked at 
the waterscape as in need of order, intended as a more centralized control and uniformity in 
the service. However, this control was less strictly connected with the direct provision of the 
service by the municipality. 
In interviews with state officials, a lack of control over the waterscape was often associated 
with insufficient knowledge over water provision and infrastructures, specifically regarding 
peri-urban areas where communitarian providers operate. Interviewees in regional and 
municipal organisations often accumulated a good level of knowledge over communitarian 
providers, but accurate formal information was often incomplete or partially scattered among 
separate government agencies. For example, there is a lack of accurate maps depicting 
networks and sources of communitarian providers, and there are even doubts over the 
number of communitarian providers operating in the conurbation. An AAPS official related 
during an interview that they ignored how many providers in the conurbation are not 
registered. 
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Control and knowledge are then connected, so that state efforts to order and control the 
waterscape are often associated with attempts to make the waterscape ‘knowable’ (see 
Section 5.2.1). The necessity to collect accurate information before being able to carry out 
state infrastructural projects, and therefore strengthening the physical influence of the state 
over the waterscape, was often underlined by interviewees. The Metropolitan Masterplan, in 
particular, collected information from both state organizations and communitarian providers 
to create a depiction of the Cochabamba waterscape. The Metropolitan Masterplan, however, 
often underlines the lack of complete and accurate information, especially concerning 
communitarian providers, but at times even the infrastructures of municipal providers.   
The association between control and knowledge influences how state officials look at 
independent providers. Analysing my interviews with state officials, I argue that they often 
considered the presence of communitarian providers in the territory to be an element of 
disorder and of ‘illegibility’. This connection emerged particularly strongly in my interviews 
with municipal officials. 
My interview with the vice-mayor of District 2, where I performed my case study, offers a 
clear example of this tendency. In fact, the vice-mayor, who was newly appointed by the 
mayor during my fieldwork period, had requested the compilation of maps that depict the 
characteristics of each water network in the district. Water cooperatives carried out most of 
the water provision in the district. Such maps are based on the information that cooperatives 
provide, so a municipal official characterised them as incomplete or imprecise. The 
inaccessibility of official information was a problem for the municipality from a practical 
point of view; for instance, they needed information on the condition of pipes before they 
could pave a road. However, it also implicated a symbolic problem, as cooperatives were 
not considered to be legitimate entities that should deliver such information to the 
municipality. 
What is happening is that, since we are a municipal and autonomous government, the 
entity that should regulate the functioning and the provision of these [water] services 
should be EMAPAS [the municipal water provider of Sacaba]. It is not possible that, 
as a municipal government, we have to ask for the certification to pave a road. If I 
need certification [on the state of the pipes], some cooperative needs to give me this 
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service, when all the infrastructure should be centralised in EMAPAS, and EMAPAS 
should be able to give me that information. Even if this infrastructure is administered 
by a cooperative, it should be EMAPAS that give me a certificate. (Vice Mayor, 
District 2, Sacaba, 30/07/2014) 
This quote illustrates how the municipal company is ‘imagined’ as a universal provider even 
if it is actually not. As emphasized in the next quote, furthermore, the vice-mayor framed 
the presence of the cooperative as a problem of ‘duality’ of authority despite EMAPAS not 
legally being the operator in the whole district. This perspective further underlines the belief 
of municipalities that the lack of direct control is problematic.  He furthermore reasoned that 
the presence of cooperatives was a problem for municipal territorial planning. In other 
words, the cooperatives represented a source of disorder in the territory.  
So that, as I was telling you, with the presence of these cooperatives you understand 
that there is a duality of authorities or at least of organisations that provide the 
service. And the thing is that we have a problem in planning. On one side, the 
cooperatives do not have the technical capability to front the demands of the 
population. At this moment, for example, the population is growing. If before they 
had 1,000 members, now they have 2,000. This 1,000 more say, ‘we want water,’ but 
they say that they do not have the capability to support this demand. So, this, 
obviously, is a problem, because the population already does not ask the cooperative. 
In the Political Constitution of the state in Bolivia now, the service of potable water 
and basic sanitation is constitutionally protected. So that they obviously come to us 
with their demands, and we have to see what to do with them, and we are in a problem 
of overlapping competencies. (Vice Mayor, District 2, Sacaba, 30/07/2014) 
The developments in District 2 of Sacaba exemplify the attempt of the state to ‘order’ and 
‘make known’ the waterscape as well as its image of the presence of the cooperatives (and 
communitarian providers in general) as sources of disorder. Overall, municipal officials 
clearly viewed the municipality and its services as sources of order and fairness. For 
example, some remarked that there would be less variation in prices if they were the 
providers of the service. However, state officials at both the national state and at 
departmental levels occasionally criticised municipal providers themselves. Officials at the 
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national state levels criticised the inefficiency of SEMAPA. Departmental officials 
furthermore, suggested a need to order water governance at the conurbation level, and a 
contrast emerged between different levels of the state over who, how and which level should 
control the waterscape (see Chapter 6 for details). The consequences of these differences in 
visions on the relationships of different levels of the state with communitarian providers is 
considered in the next section.  
This subsection has considered the view of the waterscape as disordered and of the presence 
of communitarian organizations as a source of disorder. The second sub-section illustrates 
the consequence of this conception on the ideal hydro-social territory of state authorities, 
and of the role that communitarian organization take in such imaginaries.  
5.1.2. State’s vision of the role of the cooperatives in the hydro-social 
territory 
Interviews in the municipalities frequently depicted an ideal future hydro-social territory in 
which municipal providers – or a conurbation-wide one, if a municipal provider is not 
present – offer a universal service, and the municipality exerts stronger control over the 
territory. This vision is connected to how they conceive communitarian providers. In this 
sub-section, I analyse how the municipalities describe the cooperatives and underline how 
the discourse they employ tends to delegitimize the cooperatives and to reinforce the role of 
the state. I also underline, however, how not all levels of the state look at the cooperatives 
in the same way. While officials at most levels of the state looked at the cooperatives as 
fragile organizations that might disappear once state provision is strengthened, at the national 
state and at the departmental state levels officials did not often use delegitimizing discourses 
over the cooperatives. 
State authorities – especially at the municipal level – often look at communitarian providers 
in the conurbation as a stop-gap measure. To say, they tend to believe that communitarian 
providers would eventually be substituted by a municipal or conurbation-wide provider. This 
was looked at as a somehow natural development due to the weakness of communitarian 
providers, the growth of the population and the strengthening of communitarian provision.  
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Interviewees in the municipalities emphasised that they would not take over the networks of 
communitarian providers against their will, but they looked at a universal municipal provider 
as the best and fairest form of provision, as it would homogenize access to water.  The 
assertion of respect for communitarian providers could be a consequence of formal respect 
for the law, a political situation that precludes action against communitarian providers or a 
material situation that renders it impossible for municipal providers to provide a universal 
service. 
Such depiction of the role of communitarian providers by municipal authorities, was often 
coupled with an attempt to delegitimize them by defining them as ‘private’ and, in certain 
cases, searching for ‘profit27.’ I observed no evidence of a for-profit communitarian provider. 
These characterizations justify the lack of help from municipalities. In contrast, municipal 
providers are considered ‘public’ and, accordingly, more legitimate, although they often 
have little influence over a large area of the municipal territory.   
Confusing legislation has furthermore intensified tensions between municipalities and 
cooperatives. The Constitution affirms the duty of the state to provide basic water and 
sanitation services (State Constitution art. 20.2). The responsibility to deliver the service is 
materially assigned to the municipalities, who can delegate this function to public, 
communitarian, cooperative and mixed water providers (Law of Autonomies and 
Decentralization, art. 83.3). However, the article does not specify the relationship between 
the municipality and cooperatives or other communitarian providers. This law has then been 
interpreted by both cooperatives and municipalities as the confirmation of their respective 
role in water provision. The legislation, therefore, does not clearly support the vision of the 
municipal providers. 
It is important to note that not all levels of the state share the municipalities’ depiction of the 
cooperatives. Other levels of the state have usually had a more favourable view of 
communitarian providers compared to municipal institutions. At the national level, 
interviewees from the ministry for water and from national agencies often emphasised that 
                                                 
27 How the cooperative respond to this accusation is detailed in Chapter 6. As far as I was able to tell, 
cooperatives reinvest their profit (when such exists) to improve their infrastructures. Redistribution to share-
holders is practically non-existent, apart for a few cooperatives where the share-holders that are on time with 
their payment and/or went to all meeting receive a food gift basket from the administration.  
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cooperatives and communitarian providers are not private organisations, and they were keen 
to underline their non-profit nature. When asked about the municipalities’ opinion that 
cooperatives are private organisations, participants deemed it a ‘misconception’.  
There should be no problem for any kind of provider, except for private ones, that 
are profiting … A cooperative is not considered as a private organisation, which is 
profiting from water. It is forbidden to profit from water. If there are profits in a 
cooperative, these are reinvested. Before, in Bolivia, we had transnational companies 
– private companies that came from all over the world. We had from France in El 
Alto ‘Agua de Illimani,’ and in this case, all the resources that entered were not 
reinvested in El Alto, but the money was sent abroad. This is forbidden. For example, 
water should not be sold. What are we seeing now is that the water service – water, 
as a human right, it is not-for-profit. The private companies make a profit, the 
cooperative … If it does have money in excess, it reinvests it in the improvement of 
the services of potable water, and a transnational company does not do that. (Vice 
Minister for Potable Water and Sanitation, 19/08/2014) 
State authorities at the departmental level and state officials within the departmental offices 
of national state agencies, such as the Cochabamba branch of the AAPS, were also likely to 
have a positive vision of communitarian providers, despite frequently mentioning the need 
for communitarian providers to organise and improve their service to remain relevant.  
Therefore, while different levels of the state might consider communitarian providers as 
legitimate, they still see them as at risk to be subsumed within larger organizations. Such 
evaluations of communitarian providers focus on economic sustainability and quality of 
service. As already underlined in Chapter 4, cooperatives encounter economic sustainability 
problems that are well known by agencies in the conurbation, especially when considering 
renovations and network extensions. Problems regarding water quality were also referenced 
alongside those concerning wastewater treatment. These problems were cited as examples 
of the long-term unsustainability of communitarian organisations. Although the general 
opinion is that communitarian organisations should improve their sustainability and level of 
service, state support for such objectives is limited. 
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A key insight from some state officials, however, was that municipal providers themselves 
–  and SEMAPA in particular – are often not auto-sustainable. The major difference in the 
capability to expand their waterscape between cooperatives and the municipal providers 
derives from the ability of municipal providers to obtain state funding for expansions and 
major infrastructural projects. 
In the conurbation, cooperatives are often excluded from state funding due to the 
delegitimizing discourses of the municipalities. This exclusion has an influence on the 
weakening of the cooperatives and the parallel strengthening of municipal providers. These 
delegitimizing discourses reflect the municipalities’ perspective of the hydro-social territory 
of the conurbation, which in turn has a direct effect on funding choices. The hydro-social 
territory of the state, therefore, has a profound effect on communitarian providers. What 
these effects are, is analysed in more details the next section.  
 
5.2. State’s ‘ordering’ of the hydro-social territory and of the 
cooperatives  
The preceding section has analysed the state’s vision of the hydro-social territory as 
disordered and of an ideal hydro-social territory in which the service is brought by municipal 
or conurbation-wide providers. The state – and, more specifically, the municipalities – 
consider controlling the waterscape and providing the service to be its legitimate 
responsibility. Furthermore, municipalities often use delegitimising discourses towards 
communitarian providers, defining them as ‘private’ in contrast with the ‘public’, and 
therefore legitimate, municipal provider.  Such vision of the waterscape has consequences. 
This section analyses how different levels of the state create and modify the hydro-social 
territory through discourses and legislation to push it toward their ‘ideal’ vision. 
This section considers two policies specifically. The first is the registration of communitarian 
providers by the AAPS (the Bolivian water authority). The second is the way in which 
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municipal funding is used to reinforce the control of the municipality over the waterscape. 
These two policies are representative of the larger Bolivian water policy, which not only 
specifies the duty of the state to reinforce its service but also acknowledges communitarian 
providers. However, in the case of the Cochabamba conurbation, I argue that the currently 
dominant policy reinforces a governance model in which it is the role of the state to provide 
the water service. The hydro-social territory of the municipalities is, therefore, dominating 
state policy in the conurbation. 
5.2.1. Attempts to make the waterscape knowable 
The observation that the state views the waterscape as disordered, a conception often 
connected with lack of accurate information (see Section 5.1), is a suitable starting point to 
analyse the reorganisation of the sanitation sector under the Morales government.  This 
reorganisation passed through a series of legislative and institutional changes. 
The Bolivian legislation on water provision presents an apparent contradiction, as it both 
establishes the responsibility of the state to provide the service and officially acknowledges 
communitarian providers, customary rights and social participation in water management 
(Walnycki, 2013, p. 121). However, both processes can be interpreted as a way for the state 
to extend its control over the territory. Specifically, I argue that the drive to legally register 
and regulate communitarian providers is a way to make the waterscape more ‘knowable’ and 
controllable. 
This sub-section then explores the impact of the registration of providers on the capability 
of the state to ‘see’ the waterscape and on the independence of the cooperatives. Looking at 
what are the effects of such registration in the conurbation we can observe that the 
registration is only minimally strengthening communitarian providers. Furthermore, it is 
dividing them in ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ organizations and allowing the state to ‘map’ 
the waterscape. The official acknowledgement of communitarian providers, therefore, can 
be considered as a coherent part of a state policy aimed to reinforce its control over the 
waterscape. 
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The state is performing the formal registration of communitarian water providers through 
the concession of licences. Although social movements demanded the formalisation of 
communitarian water providers after the water war to allow for legal protection of the water 
providers’ territories and water sources, activists and some communitarian leaders now 
regard it with a certain weariness. There is a fear that the state would damage the autonomy 
of communitarian providers. Such reaction reduces the capability of the state to register 
water providers, thus limiting its knowledge of the waterscape.  
The formalisation efforts of the Bolivian state are currently within the domain of the AAPS, 
which was created in 2009. The AAPS regulates the sector and formally acknowledges and 
supervises communitarian, cooperative and municipal water providers. In addition, it acts as 
a user’s protection agency. The AAPS registers water providers as official Companies for 
the Provision of Potable Water and Sanitation (EPSAs). This registration legally protects the 
provider’s water rights and area of service. The AAPS is also theoretically charged with 
regulation of the water providers. However, the agency does not currently have the resources 
to monitor all providers. 
The registration procedure does offer legal protection to the cooperatives, although it also 
indirectly delegitimizes those that did not undergo this process. Interviews with officials who 
work for municipal providers suggest that the licence gives protection to the area of services 
and water sources of communitarian providers. The need for registration with the AAPS is 
rising, as some municipal officials considered as legitimate only AAPS-licensed 
organisations. This is accompanied by the delegitimizing of non-registered organizations. 
Such delegitimization occurred implicitly, usually by defining those with a licence as ‘real 
cooperatives’ or underlining their respect for the territory of those with a licence. 
Nevertheless, two interviewees who work for a municipal provider explicitly referred to non-
registered water organisations as ‘illegitimate’. Therefore, licences are also becoming a 
method through which the state is distinguishing between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ 
organizations, and is, therefore, modifying its hydro-social territory.  
Despite the legal protection from the regulatory agency, few concrete advantages of having 
an official licence have emerged. This might be one of the reason why several cooperatives 
have tended not to register with the AAPS. The AAPS managed to register around 200 
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communitarian providers in the Cochabamba department, but most providers remain 
unregistered, which is partly a consequence of funding limitations as well. At the time of my 
research, only five cooperatives in the Cochabamba conurbation had registered with the 
AAPS, which limits the state’s opportunity to improve its knowledge of the waterscape. 
The reasons for the failure of cooperatives to register are probably related to their mistrust 
in the state, and to their lack of knowledge of the process of registration itself. A general 
suspicion towards the state is apparent among certain leaders of water providers. One 
particular experience offered insight into why few cooperatives have registered: the 
president of one cooperative asked me to collect information about the registration process 
and specifically asked if there was a fee. 
Resistance to provide information also appeared during the registration process, which asks 
providers for extensive information, including of a financial, economic and technical nature. 
An official whom I interviewed in the Cochabamba departmental office of the AAPS 
explained that directors of communitarian providers were sometimes reluctant to provide 
information. She said that such information might be difficult to collate but also that 
representatives of communitarian providers might be suspicious that such information might 
be used to impose taxes.  
This is the biggest difficulty to get all this information because they think that we, as 
a government, are going to impose some kind of taxes, and it is not like that. All that 
we want is to identify them so that we can protect their water sources, and also so 
that we can organise a little. (AAPS Official, Cochabamba office, 28/10/2013) 
In principle, as mentioned, the AAPS not only registers water providers but also regulates 
them. However, at the time of my research, the AAPS did not have sufficient resources for 
systematic regulation. In Cochabamba, the AAPS was actively supervising only the three 
municipal water providers of the conurbation, which reflects another limitation of the state 
in controlling the waterscape. 
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Nevertheless, there is evidence that the state is trying to regulate cooperatives through the 
AAPS, albeit to a limited degree. For example, I observed that a few cooperatives had started 
to feel the effect of more intense control of the state over peri-urban areas and within the 
water sector. To my knowledge, the AAPS intervened directly in two cooperatives after users 
had presented a complaint after their water was cut. One of my respondents reported that 
they answered a letter from the AAPS by asserting that they never received support from the 
organisation or the state, so they did not have to obey.  In the other cooperative, the AAPS 
contested the practice of cutting water not only for the non-payment of bills but also for the 
non-payment of fines for non-participation. In the cooperatives, the payment of the bills and 
fines were unified so that the payment of water was not possible without paying for the fines 
too. In this case, the cooperative acknowledged the authority of the AAPS and separated 
water payments from the payment of fines. They were still able, however, to obtain the 
payment of fines – essentially by presenting them at the same time as the water payment – 
but the president of the cooperative expressed concern that this practice might damage 
member participation in the cooperatives, as fines for non-participation might become 
difficult to enforce. Overall, however, the capability of the AAPS to actually engender a 
change within the cooperatives was challenged either directly or indirectly.  
Therefore, the registration procedure hardly affects the cooperatives, though it does map the 
waterscape for the state. Considering the previous analysis, the process of registration has 
made the waterscape more knowable, but it has not effectively strengthened the 
cooperatives28. 
Scholars and activists have analysed the registration procedure as part of a wider attempt by 
the state to control communitarian organisations. From this point of view, there is no 
contradiction in the action by the state to register providers and strengthen its capability to 
directly deliver services. Crespo Flores (2017) has argued that this a contradiction in 
appearance only and that these state policies are a coherent way to incorporate autonomous 
organisations through a state-centric program. 
                                                 
28 This might also be due to the fact that the cooperatives were already legally registered entities. To say, they 
were legally recognized as cooperatives, even if not as water providers.  
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The official acknowledgement of communitarian water rights is then a way to reassert the 
state’s power over the water sector (Perreault, 2008, p. 849), while it had ambiguous results 
for communitarian organisations. Studies of the relationship between the state and 
communitarian or informal providers have often discussed the bid of the state to accumulate 
knowledge and render society knowable. For example, in their research on sanitation in Cape 
Town, McFarlane and Silver (2017) reference Scott’s (1998) well known concept of ‘seeing 
like a state’ in order to argue that the state’s power relates to its approach to ‘mak[ing] life 
legible, standardized, measurable, and amenable to intervention.’ The concept underlines the 
priority of the state to make the city understandable and countable. This process has been 
long running in Cochabamba (Hines Thompson, 2015, p. 186). It has recently intensified 
through these formalisation processes as well as projects such as the development of the 
Cochabamba Masterplan for water and sanitation, which included an evaluation of the 
conurbation waterscape.   
Some activists and academics have characterised registration as damaging to the autonomy 
of communitarian organisations. One academic shared a concern that future governments 
could use the information that is acquired through the registration process to expropriate the 
systems. Oscar Olivera, a leader of the water war, argued that mandating registration is an 
attempt to control and co-opt parts of the water sector (interview, 11.08.2014).  
Boelens et al. (2015) have proposed that attempts to register communitarian providers 
represent a form of governmentality, and it is certainly a way for the state to strengthen its 
control over an atomised waterscape. Communitarian organisations are encouraged to 
register in order to be considered ‘legitimate’ providers, which would signal the beginning 
of their self-regulation to adapt to an externally imposed paradigm. However, as underlined 
in Chapter 1, the concept of ‘governmentality’ as a totalising system should be only 
cautiously applied to the global south, as governmentality techniques are often 
‘contradictory and contested’ (Kooy and Bakker, 2008). In Cochabamba, the capability of 
state organisations to control cooperatives and other providers has seemingly increased, but 
it has encountered limits, and the collaboration of communitarian organisations in the 
‘disciplining’ process is far from ensured.  
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Finally, some activists and academics have identified the registering of water rights in AAPS 
as one cause of the heightened tension over water sources in the conurbation. For example, 
water sources which are shared between providers prompted conflicts once one provider 
acquired legal rights to it. Activists and academics viewed the bureaucratic nature of the 
AAPS as an obstacle to the communitarian providers’ capability of solving conflicts through 
traditional rules.  
What the people wanted was a legal defence, but even if it was a proposal of the 
people, we saw that there were many gaps. Because all it did was to give people 
property rights over the water sources, and from there many conflicts started. 
Because there were collective properties over water sources, reservoirs, wells, dams. 
Issuing registers and licences … the only thing that they were doing was to create a 
conflict between two water systems that before shared a water source … Who owns 
the sources? Because to obtain the register or the licence you have to demonstrate 
that you have water sources so that there were problems over the service area between 
providers. Due to the complexity of communitarian systems, there are 
neighbourhoods that surround other neighbourhoods. It was a little complex, and it 
generated many discussions concerning water sources, areas of service, regarding 
who manages what. (Cochabamba Water Activist, 26/03/2014) 
Therefore, the registration process provided little active benefit to cooperatives, although it 
did afford some legal protection. Furthermore, the registration and regulatory agency does 
not have sufficient resources to thoroughly monitor the cooperatives, and hardly any effects 
of its regulatory capabilities are apparent. These findings suggest that the most effective 
contribution of this procedure has been to map the waterscape from the perspective of the 
state, making it more ‘knowable’ and separating ‘legitimate’ from ‘illegitimate’ 
organizations.  
5.2.2. Lack of funding for the cooperatives     
This sub-section investigates the concrete consequences of the conception of municipal 
officials over the respective roles of communitarian organisations and municipal providers. 
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These discourses are accompanied by an active policy which excludes cooperatives, and 
other communitarian providers, from accessing state funding. However, not all the levels of 
the state share this vision. These differences emphasize the role of politics and power 
relations in the distribution of funding and in the relationship between cooperatives and the 
state more in general.  
The municipality is effectively a gatekeeper of public funding. While the vision of the 
cooperatives varies by state level, the capability of cooperatives to acquire funding from 
higher state levels has been limited. Furthermore, in larger municipalities, the municipal 
government must finance a substantial share of national state projects. Therefore, I dedicate 
particular attention to municipal funding in this section. 
The main source of funding for communitarian providers is a consequence of the Law of 
Popular Participation (LLP). The municipality yearly distributes funds for executing projects 
(e.g. paving a road or constructing a football field) to its OTBs (grassroots territorial 
organizations). The OTBs, which are officially recognised neighbourhood councils within 
the state apparatus, are in charge of requesting such projects for their neighbourhoods.  
In this sub-section, I discuss how six municipalities in the conurbation have administered 
LLP funding for water and sewage projects. Furthermore, I consider how the 
delegitimization of the cooperatives presented in the precedent section is instrumental to 
exclude them from receiving such funding. I argue that the municipalities use LLP funding 
to strengthen their control over the waterscape, either directly or indirectly. There are 
differences in the form such strengthening takes in municipalities that do have a municipal 
provider – which aim mainly at enlarging their municipal network – and those that do not 
have one. 
The latter, in fact, allows the usage of state funding to improve or build communitarian 
provider infrastructures through the OTBs. Interviewees in the municipalities without a 
municipal water provider noted that such infrastructures are owned by the OTB – not the 
communitarian provider – even when the OTB decides to allow an independent provider to 
manage them. The strengthening of the OTBs reinforces the control of the state in an indirect 
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way.  Although OTBs are inhabitant-elected neighbourhood councils, they are reportedly at 
risk of co-option by the municipality and often involved of party politics  (Driessen, 2008, 
p. 92) (Walnycki, 2013). 
Of the three municipalities that have a municipal provider, only Cochabamba allows the 
usage of LLP funding to improve the infrastructure of independent providers. The other two 
smaller municipalities have recently approved municipal regulations that exclude 
independent providers from receiving such funding or to administer networks that were built 
or repaired using such funding. If an OTB wishes to allot LLP funding to improve an 
independent network, the network must pass under the administration of the municipal 
provider. As a result, smaller networks, which are sometimes physically detached from the 
main municipal network, would pass under the administration of the municipal provider. In 
this way, such municipalities can strengthen their direct control over the waterscape. 
In all of these cases, LLP funding seems predominantly used to strengthen the control of the 
municipality over the waterscape. The remainder of this sub-section focuses on the 
justification for these decisions. I specifically address the influence of the municipality’s 
perspective on the respective roles of the state and communitarian organisations in service 
provision on the distribution of funding.  
First, I consider the case of the three municipalities that lack a municipal water provider – 
namely Colcapiruha, Tiquipaya and Vinto. In these municipalities, the Unit for Basic 
Sanitation only manages the sewage service. In the territory of these municipalities, LLP 
funding has been a primary means of state financial support for independent peri-urban 
providers. Respondents in the Tiquipaya municipal government relayed that OTBs receive 
the money for infrastructural projects, but they can decide to allow an independent provider 
to manage the finished infrastructure. Likewise, the municipality of Colcapiruha finances 
water-related projects that OTBs request, which they can then pass on to a communitarian 
provider. Both municipalities act as mediators for small-scale projects financed by national 
state programmes, such as MIAGUA I-II-III, which especially aim to build new 
infrastructures in areas that have no provider in place. 
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While these municipalities effectively facilitate the transfer of state financing to 
communitarian organisations, their mentality does not differ radically from those that forbid 
this practice. Respondents raised some doubts regarding the legality of this practice.  A 
respondent in Tiquipaya underlined that the problem is present because communitarian 
providers think that they own the infrastructure when it is in fact owned by the OTBs. In 
addition, a respondent in the municipality in Colcapiruha affirmed that they ‘must’ provide 
the project to the OTBs, but communitarian providers should be economically independent. 
The necessity for funding to be passed through the OTB further marginalises communitarian 
providers and possibly damages their independence, as municipal policy can influence the 
OTBs. 
Despite having SEMAPA as a municipal provider, Cochabamba exhibits some similarities 
with the cases that were described above. Single OTBs could decide to use their own funding 
to finance water and sanitation projects, that are then administered by a communitarian 
provider. Furthermore, the Cochabamba municipal provider aims to build a coherent 
network and has not expressed interest in including areas that are detached from their main 
network, unlike the case in Sacaba. 
However, the overall aim of the municipality is to reinforce the position of the Cochabamba 
municipal water provider as a universal provider, even if a certain respect for independent 
providers is present. Past projects within the Cochabamba municipality exemplify the will 
of SEMAPA to aim for an eventual universal provision. A project that the municipality 
carried out in 2014 in alliance with the United Nations Development Programme aimed to 
build new distribution networks in peri-urban neighbourhoods. However, alliances were 
established only with the OTBs, and the pipes that were used had to meet SEMAPA'S 
requirements to allow for their connection to the SEMAPA network if it were to ever arrive 
in the area (Marston, 2015, p. 252). This development indicates another attempt to secure 
future control over the territory, which state institutions strive to implement, in order to 
integrate communitarian systems with those of SEMAPA. Furthermore, Walnycki noted that 
LLP funding in Cochabamba is generally given directly to OTBs (Walnycki, 2013, p. 200), 
therefore strengthening indirect control through the OTBs. 
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Thus, the role of OTBs in some municipalities in the conurbation has been strengthened by 
state projects for basic sanitation while potentially weakening communitarian providers. In 
this way, power has transferred from independent organisations to the OTBs. Academics 
and water movements proponents have expressed concern over this development, as OTBs 
have long been considered subject to co-option by the state as well as being less independent 
compared to water committees and cooperatives (Walnicky, 2013). For example, Driessen 
(2008, p. 92) has noted that the municipal government has used service provision in 
Cochabamba as a way to obtain votes from OTB presidents. Thereby, state authorities have 
used water, and water services in particular, to exercise control over the population.  
Even in the absence of a municipal provider, state funding is only distributed within the state 
apparatus, which represents another way of indirectly reinforcing the power of the 
municipality over the territory. However, an attempt to control the waterscape more directly 
is apparent in the municipalities of Sacaba and Quillacollo.   
An even stronger centralisation of funding (or, in the case Quillacollo, an attempt to do so) 
took place in these two municipalities, both of which have a municipal provider. In fact, they 
both recently installed a municipal policy that prevents independent systems from receiving 
funding for basic sanitation through the OTB. Those that request renovations or general 
infrastructural work to their system must allow the municipal provider to take control of the 
new/renewed system. This process reflects a broader effort by both municipalities, which 
have started to strengthen, expand and reinforce municipal water and sewage systems in 
recent years. This practice would allow the municipal government to assume direct control 
over the territory rather than needing to exercise power through an OTB.  
The municipality of Quillacollo made the policy decision that infrastructure built with state 
funding should be administered by EMAPAQ. I was however told that this policy has not 
been consistently applied, as they did not wish to coerce the OTBs. In this case, the 
municipality did not have enough control to impose this policy. This could also be due to 
the fact that EMAPAQ was not, at the time, a sufficiently well-established provider, and was 
still in the process to receive the AAPS licence. The municipality of Sacaba has a larger and 
more firmly established provider and therefore has been successful in strictly enforcing this 
policy. Therefore, I further explore this case.   
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This policy was made enforceable by the municipality by assigning the Sacaba municipal 
provider (EMAPAS) the role of directly executing sanitation projects requested by the 
OTBs. For example, the vice mayor of District 2 relayed that funding for basic sanitation in 
the district should be directly given to EMAPAS. This policy allows EMAPAS to 
significantly extend its network. 
There are works ... any OTB that decides to use their allocated resources to build a 
basic sanitation system or a water system, very well, the condition is that they need 
to transfer it to EMAPAS; so that EMAPAS can administer it. In some cases, some 
committees passed to EMAPAS. Since they are state resources, we cannot do the 
work and then leave it to a private. We have to administer it. So, we are in this stage, 
and gradually they are being incorporated into the municipal administration by 
EMAPAS. (Vice Mayor, District 2, Sacaba, 30/07/2014) 
The decision to limit the use of LLP funding for independent providers was supported by 
the image of communitarian providers as ‘private’ entities as well as through legal 
argumentation. Furthermore, it was often emphasised that it should be the role of the 
municipalities to provide the service. The respective conceptions of the role of the 
municipality and cooperatives, therefore, had a substantial effect on the distribution of 
funding as well as the strengthening of state control over the waterscape.  
The decision to disallow the use of LLP funding for independent providers in the 
municipality of Sacaba was based on a municipal directive. However, interviewees 
frequently referenced a state law that forbids the use of state funding for ‘private’ 
organisations. A municipal official specified this law as the Ley SAFCO (Ley n.1178), 
which bans the donation of state resources to private entities. In the case of Sacaba and 
Quillacollo, the definition of a ‘private’ organisation was expanded to include providers 
administered directly by the OTBs, which are acknowledged as part of the state apparatus. 
Hence, ‘private’ encompasses all non-municipal providers.  
However, the legal argumentation for these policies is based on uncertain legislation. State 
officials in departmental and national state agencies noted that the interpretation of the law 
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to exclude communitarian providers from receiving funding is far from univocal. This 
variation also reflects differences between state levels in conceptions of communitarian 
providers and cooperatives in particular. Moreover, it underlines the influence of political 
decisions on such policies. As the level of the state that more directly bases its power on 
material control of the waterscape through service provision, the municipality also conflicts 
more often with cooperatives. 
Therefore, there are contradictions in the way that different state levels view communitarian 
providers. Such discrepancies emerge from differences in opinion regarding the right of 
communitarian providers to receive state funding. Contradictory beliefs are a consequence 
of a contradictory legislation as well as political choices. In fact, there is a regulatory 
problem concerning the capability of the cooperative to receive state-financed infrastructure. 
The vice minister for basic sanitation has reported ongoing efforts to clarify such legislation.  
Yes, the cooperatives send their projects so that we can finance the infrastructure. 
They send them, but when they start the management … But to start the work we 
must work with the municipal government (…), that is our weakness, the transference 
[of the completed infrastructure], but there is no problem if they give it to the 
cooperatives that use it. But, legally, it is not clear. There is a lack of regulation. We 
have a consultancy that is working. They just finished. They are going to tell us how 
we can transfer goods to private entities. (Vice Minister of Potable Water and 
Sanitation, 19/08/2014) 
Based on my observations, in the presence of a political will, this problem was somehow 
bypassed, usually by stating that the municipality or OTB is the owner of the infrastructure 
but that the cooperative can use it. Thus, in such cases, the decision to permit the cooperative 
to receive infrastructural projects was essentially of a political nature and usually controlled 
by the municipalities, although the central state could theoretically decide to bypass the 
municipality if deemed necessary (interview, Vice Minister of Potable Water and Sanitation, 
19/08/2014). 
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Moreover, some interviewees criticised the exclusion of communitarian providers from 
receiving state projects. Interviews with departmental and national state agencies officials 
revealed that OTBs and water committees were often considered legitimate recipients of 
projects. 
Of course, the OTB … what happens is that the municipality … first, the municipality 
has various resources. Some are direct resources that they manage. But others are 
resources that they must give to the base of the population – to the OTBs. And the 
OTBs are responsible to execute these projects and to generate, we can say, their 
basic needs. They can be water, sanitation, parks, a football field – I do not know, to 
cobble their streets or to remodel a square. Depending on their necessity, it can be 
put into the program. What I cannot understand is why they put conditions, I mean, 
‘if you want to invest in sanitation, you have to pass through EMAPAS,’ right? 
(Official Regional Government, Basic Sanitation Unit, 15/07/2014) 
The same official in the Unit for Basic Sanitation identified problems with financing the 
cooperatives specifically because they are theoretically for-profit organisations. However, 
he mentioned that this is a legal problem that should be solved by lawyers.  
Other interviews also illustrated the influence of power on this decision. An interview with 
an official from the Departmental Directorate for Cooperatives revealed that miner 
cooperatives received help from the state through national campaigns (interview, 
10/01/2014). The same interviewee noted the power of miners’ cooperatives and that water 
cooperatives should organise more effectively by following their example29.  
Further examples of the influence of political decisions on qualification to receive funding 
also emerged from a more in-depth examination of the powerful cooperatives of Santa Cruz 
de la Sierra. Interviewees from the Vice Ministry for Potable Water and Sanitation had a 
close relationship with the Santa Cruz cooperatives. The capability of the Santa Cruz 
                                                 
29
 Field notes, Cochabamba, 2014. 
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Federation of Water Cooperatives to obtain infrastructural projects from the state was 
apparent at all levels ranging from officials at the ministry to the Santa Cruz branch of the 
AAPS and members of the Santa Cruz federation. The absence of a municipal provider in 
Santa Cruz and the capability of cooperatives to create links with the central state have 
strengthened such organisations and improved their relationship with the state. 
Ah, that is normal with SAGUAPAC [the larger cooperative in Santa Cruz]. With 
FEDECAAS [Federation of Water Cooperatives of Santa Cruz Department], we have 
a totally good relationship. They ask for various projects. Their mayor is also very 
available. We have found funding for over US$15 million for them with the Germans 
(Vice Minister for Potable Water and Sanitation, 19/08/2014) 
Santa Cruz cooperatives have thus successfully presented themselves as a legitimate 
recipient of funding. Furthermore, they have been able to do so while remaining partially 
autonomous from party politics (interview with a consultant for sanitation project, 
06/12/2013). In fact, the cooperatives have established a good relationship with the often 
politically opposed national state authorities as well as the local authorities of the Santa Cruz 
department. The president of the Federation of Santa Cruz Water Cooperatives has indicated 
that their positive relationship with the state is a relatively recent development, and its 
improvement was due to their capability to organise in a federation (see Chapter 6). 
Therefore, the political power of the cooperatives and their relationship with the municipality 
is seemingly fundamental to their ability to receive projects.  
In sum, certain levels of the state attempt to delegitimise cooperatives by framing them as 
private institutions, but this perspective varies by state level. Additionally, state and local 
authorities often mediate the cooperatives’ ability to receive funding. The decision of state 
authorities to provide the service is mainly political in nature and dependent on their ability 
(or lack thereof) to directly control the waterscape and the service as well as the capability 
of communitarian organisations to exercise power. This issue raises the question of how 
cooperatives could contribute to the discourse at various state levels, which is the topic of 
the following chapter. 
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5.3. Direct modification of the material waterscape by the state 
The previous sections have explained the impact of the shape of the waterscape (i.e. the 
presence of different, fragmented waterscapes) on the action of state authorities and their 
conception of communitarian providers. Now, this section analyses the contribution of state 
actions to materially influencing the waterscape. I specifically argue that the state’s 
conception of the hydro-social territory influences the construction and modification of the 
waterscape. 
Consideration of the state’s infrastructural projects is fundamental to understanding its 
political aims. According to Webber (2016, p. 1866), infrastructural projects are critical for 
the Bolivian state and usually viewed in communitarian organisations as the main exchange 
between the community and state. Therefore, it is imperative to analyse the execution of 
projects in the water sector in order to determine the politics and aims of the Bolivian state 
as well as its influence over the conurbation.   
The state physically modifies the waterscape in the conurbation in two main ways. The first 
is through the construction of large-scale infrastructure, as the next subsection explains. The 
second is through the territorial expansion of the municipal water network, which is covered 
by the second subsection. Both contribute to making the waterscape more knowable and 
ordered as well as enhancing the control of the state. Large-scale projects, such as the 
Misicuni dam, which should become the main source of water in the conurbation, simplify 
control of the waterscape. Large providers, such as SEMAPA, can thus be less dependent on 
finding new sources, which requires lengthy negotiations with rural users and communities. 
The expansion of the municipal network also extends the control of the municipality and 
increases the uniformity of the waterscape. 
5.3.1. Large-scale projects 
The main method by which the national state can shape the physical waterscape of the 
conurbation is the construction of large-scale infrastructure. The effect of such projects on 
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smaller providers is often inadequately considered (see Chaper 6). Additionally, there is 
scarce attention to the sustainability of communitarian organisations in the Bolivian state 
water politics. These two facets of the national state water policy seem to favour an imagined 
‘ordered’ urban waterscape, which is improved through large-scale infrastructural projects.  
The Bolivian state currently controls water and sanitation projects through a centralisation 
of international funding, which is another configuration that imparts power to the state. 
Water-related projects are largely financed by international cooperation agencies and 
international financial institutions, such as the Inter-American Development Bank (BID). 
Foreign donors and financers coordinate with the Water and Environment Ministry through 
the Group of Cooperation in Water and Sanitation30 with the aim of maximising the results 
of investments. Projects are then usually executed through Bolivian state agencies (interview 
with an official from the Ministry for Water and the Environment, 21/01/2014). Outside of 
the Ministry for Water, the Ministry for Planning and Development is operating a large 
campaign for small-scale providers (MIAGUA). However, such projects have focused 
mainly on rural areas31. 
In urban areas, the focus of the ministry seems to be the construction of large-scale 
infrastructures. Such attention is reflected by the institutional transformation of the Ministry 
for Water. The Ministry for Water and the Environment has identified EMAGUA as the 
agency that is charged with carrying out water and sanitation projects. The agency has grown 
impressively since its foundation in 2009 and opened departmental branches, including one 
in Cochabamba. It concentrates on designing projects and building infrastructure.  
A focus on large-scale infrastructure is also obvious in Cochabamba, where discussions 
regarding the water sector have centred on the Misicuni dam, which is often cited as the 
solution for persistent water problems of the conurbation. The Misicuni project is intended 
to provide water, including for irrigation, to the entire conurbation. However, the means of 
                                                 
30
 http://www.aecid.bo/portal/2011/10/19/agua-el-grupo-de-cooperacion-de-agua-y-saneamiento-gras-se-
reunio-en-la-otc-de-bolivia/ (accessed in September 2016). 
31 A few projects have been carried out in peri-urban areas of the Cochabamba conurbation. These projects 
are mainly aimed to build new systems were none exist, and not to support existing water system.  
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water distribution and its cost have not yet been established. The emphasis on the building 
of infrastructures correspond to fewer resources for the support and improvement of the 
water providers who will ultimately administer them. In view of this, some academics who 
I interviewed had come to question the sustainability of such projects. In general, 
communitarian providers in peri-urban areas receive little attention and support.   
The politics of the state should be coupled with a process to help small committees, 
cooperatives. So that they could give (the service) because it was known that they 
could not provide it at the level that it was required, right? All the formalisation 
started with this logic. It was a logic of introducing the state as a guarantor of this 
quality through regulation. But to say the truth, I have not seen much progress in this 
area, right? (…) on the issue of the control over the quality of the service, and to 
strengthen their organisational, technical … what do I know … capacity to improve 
the quality of the service, right? But, really, up until now, there have been not many 
results in this area, right? (Rocio Bustamante, 27/11/2013)  
My respondent from the state agency SENASBA also confirmed the scarcity of attention to 
sustainability and the focus on infrastructure development32. As an agency of the Ministry 
for Water and the Environment, SENASBA is charged with improving the sustainability of 
water providers. During my time in Cochabamba, SENASBA was the only agency that had 
built a relationship with FECOAPAC in order to start a project to capacitate peri-urban 
cooperatives. Nevertheless, this project was an exception rather than the rule for 
Cochabamba’s cooperatives. My respondent in this agency stated that state projects – 
especially those financed through international loans – focus mostly on large infrastructural 
projects. A ‘community development’ element is commonly attached to such projects, 
although it is usually considered as a secondary issue. The relatively low priority of 
communitarian development in the water sector is also evident from the low budget reserved 
for SENASBA. 
                                                 
32
 Officials SENASBA, La Paz (second interview, 20.08.2014). 
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Furthermore, projects aimed to bring water to peri-urban areas, do not necessarily strengthen 
communitarian providers. An example is the EU-funded project Program for Water and 
Sanitation in Peri-urban areas (PASAP) aimed to improve water access in peri-urban areas. 
In Cochabamba, extensions of water and sanitation services seemed oriented towards the 
centralisation and municipalisation of water provisions (Walnycki, 2013) rather than 
strengthening communitarian providers. A focus on large-scale projects in urban areas in 
combination with scarce attention to sustainability and support for small-scale organisations, 
therefore, results in an overall neglect towards peri-urban organisations. Furthermore, the 
focus on large-scale projects reinforces the power of the state and of the municipalities over 
the waterscape (as it will be examined in more details in Chapter 6).  
5.3.2. Expansion of the municipal water provision network 
Municipalities have a central role in determining the relationship between peri-urban 
communities and the state. The municipality exercises considerable influence over water 
governance through its ability to control the state’s flux of resources and projects, control 
the waterscape and materially provide the water service.  
My interviews with state officials indicated that most municipalities sought to reinforce their 
ability to directly provide the service, influenced by an ideal hydro-social territory where 
provision is guaranteed by a universal provider. Section 5.2.2 discusses how the 
municipalities utilise LLP funding to strengthen their control over the waterscape. In the 
current sub-section, I focus specifically on the municipalities’ expansion of their control over 
the waterscape through the development of the municipal water and sewage network. I 
consider how the focus on network expansion could have implications for the relationship 
between communitarian providers and municipalities. I emphasize how the municipality 
does not exercise an uncontested control over the waterscape. The expansion of the network 
reinforces the state’s control over the waterscape but must be negotiated with communitarian 
providers. Furthermore, even when the municipality controls the network, it does not reserve 
complete control over the waterscape.  
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I interviewed representatives from the basic sanitation units of three municipalities that lack 
a municipal water provider. Respondents from all three units reported an intention to create 
a municipal provider and, therefore, to reinforce the direct control of the municipality over 
the waterscape. However, agreements with communitarian organisations that currently 
manage the water service would clearly be necessary in all three cases, underlining how the 
control over the waterscape and over the hydro-social territory is not absolute. Each 
municipality negotiated this necessity differently.  
Respondents from both Tiquipaya and Colcapirhua acknowledged the requirement to receive 
the consent of a communitarian organisation to include their networks in either a municipal 
or conurbation-wide provider. They considered negotiation with them to be a necessity. 
Respondents from Tiquipaya explained that there was an idea to build a municipal water 
company, which could perhaps be achieved by securing the agreement of communitarian 
providers in exchange for allowing them to retain part of their control. 
The respondent from Colcapirhua shared a proposal to build a municipal company for only 
the sewage service. He also discussed the possible construction of a conurbation-wide water 
company, the construction of which has been discussed in the conurbation with the aim of 
administering the water from Misicuni. My interviewee stated that if such a provider were 
to arrive in the municipality, communitarian providers could pass their networks to it in order 
to receive water from Misicuni. These answers reflect a vision of the future in which the 
state reinforces its presence in the waterscape. However, they also demonstrate that 
communitarian organisations exercise a certain amount of control over the shape of their 
waterscape, and over the capability of the municipality to modify it, and the need for their 
agreement and a possibility for refusal were taken into consideration.  
Meanwhile, my interviewee from the municipality of Vinto proposed another model for 
waterscape management whereby communities would retain a degree of control. Such a 
model would entail closer collaboration between the municipality and providers and lead to 
the sharing of power over the waterscape. This last example indicates that alternative models 
of governance are possible, albeit they are often hidden under legalistic discourses regarding 
the role of the state.  
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After a failed attempt to build a municipal water company, the municipality of Vinto sought 
to establish a collective social water company33, which would involve the participation of 
communitarian organisations. At the time of my research, the municipality was discussing 
this possibility with the OTBs and communitarian organisations. However, the process was 
still in an early phase, as the municipality managed only a few neighbourhoods in this way.   
While this project would strengthen the role and control of the municipality, it would 
theoretically leave space for communities to operate. Respondents in other municipalities 
did consider the possibility of collaboration with communitarian organisations, which would 
assign certain responsibilities to community organisations. However, my interviewee from 
the municipality of Vinto was the first to address it as a possible advantage. This indicated 
that the presence of communitarian organizations exercising some control over the 
waterscape was not considered as a compromise on the Vinto municipality’s ideal hydro-
social territory, but that their presence was included in such ideal. Vinto’s example, 
therefore, offers an alternative way in which the role of the state would be strengthened, 
while still leaving some space to communitarian organizations. 
Municipalities with a provider seemed to focus on expanding their networks and 
consolidating their control over their municipality waterscape. The growth of control in these 
cases was stronger and direct, and it introduced some tension with communitarian providers.   
Most respondents in SEMAPA looked at the unification of provision under one provider, 
and therefore the extension of direct municipal control over the physical waterscape, as the 
optimal solution. Although SEMAPA does not have the resources to provide water to the 
whole municipality, the arrival of water from the Misicuni dam could change the situation. 
According to a SEMAPA official, ministry policy specified the construction of a unified 
provider in the whole conurbation because water sources are owned by the state. Therefore, 
it was clearly considered the most legitimate solution. Nevertheless, interviewees were 
aware that such a solution might encounter social opposition. They emphasised that once 
water from Misicuni arrives, communitarian providers can decide to receive water wholesale 
and thus maintain their independence. Similar agreements are already in place in certain 
                                                 
33 In Spanish: empresa de agua social mancomunada. 
197 
 
  
areas where the SEMAPA network recently arrived. Still, not all interviewees from the 
municipality had a favourable view of such agreements. One respondent accused the 
communitarian providers of ‘profiting’ by reselling water at a higher price. However, 
another respondent admitted that the internal problems of SEMAPA are a factor in the 
refusal of committees to pass under SEMAPA’s administration. 
Officials from EMAPAQ, the municipal provider of Quillacollo, also considered the creation 
of a municipality-wide provider to be the most suitable solution. Employees viewed 
EMAPAQ as the legitimate water provider in the municipality, and one stated that there is a 
municipal ordinance which dictates that all cooperatives should pass under EMAPAQ. He 
attributed social resistance to this solution to the fact that communitarian providers are 
earning money. Another interviewee underlined that a law that imposes the passage of 
independent systems under the municipality does not exists. Still, this official said that it 
would be more ‘correct’ if all systems passed under a single administration. In this case, the 
control of the municipality, or of the state, over the waterscape, was equated with its control 
over the waterscape through direct provision of water. Therefore, the presence of the 
cooperative was represented as limiting the legitimate power of the state. This conception 
also underlines the problem of an unclear legislation over the relationship between 
municipalities and water providers.  
The municipal provider of Sacaba, EMAPAS, also demonstrated an aim to become a 
municipality-wide provider. An aim that have been supported through the equation of the 
municipal provider with the ‘the state,’ therefore preventing other providers from accessing 
state funding. As a well-established organisation, EMAPAS has grown exponentially. 
Officials from EMAPAS stated an objective of providing water and sewage services to the 
entire municipality. In practice, EMAPAS has neither sufficient resources nor water sources 
to achieve this aim. Nonetheless, it is evident that universal municipal provision is a strongly 
pursued goal.  However, this growth has engendered tensions with water cooperatives. 
In 1999, a municipal resolution officially transformed EMAPAS into a municipal company. 
It originally served the historical nucleus of SACABA and had approximately 1 000 water 
connections and 1 500 sewage ones. However, by 2013, it had grown by more than 10 times 
its size and provided water and sewage services to approximately 15 000 and 20 000 
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households, respectively (interview EMAPAS Manager, 30.01.2014). Through state 
financing from the municipality as well as projects from the national state, EMAPAS grew 
and improved its systems. This funding allowed EMAPAS to extend its network to unserved 
areas as well as add formerly independent providers to its network.  Crucial to this end was 
the aforementioned municipal policy that restricted LLP funding for sanitation to networks 
that are (or will be) administered by EMAPAS. Furthermore, the municipality intends to 
carry out a large-scale project (the PALCA project) to deliver water to the Sacaba 
municipality, which would yield a larger water supply for the municipal provider and might 
equip it to provide water to the whole municipality. This use of state funding thus 
strengthened the municipal provider’s control over the waterscape while weakening 
independent providers.  
Municipal officials underlined that they did not wish to take over independent systems, and 
they considered it their duty to give them technical assistance. However, the expansion of 
the network of EMAPAS caused tensions with the cooperative of District 2. At the time of 
my research, EMAPAS in fact provided potable water in District 2 in a highly limited 
fashion. Still, over the last 10 years, EMAPAS has strengthened its position in the district, 
especially in regard to sewage service provision. It built its sewage network in previously 
non-serviced areas and assumed management of seven small, independent sewage systems 
in the past seven years. One gated neighbourhood and one OTB also transferred their 
network from a cooperative to EMAPAS.  
The penetration of EMAPAS in the district incited some conflict. Various cooperatives 
complained that EMAPAS had broken their pipes during its works and mentioned an absence 
of communication during work in their area of service.   
Well EMAPAS, in many cases ... called by the inhabitants themselves … comes to 
install its networks, so that we enter in a conflict because we are the one in charge of 
giving the service, right? (…) They came with their machines and broke our pipes, 
and they do not do anything. We are the ones that must repair their imprudence. We 
are the ones that repair. We are the ones that cover the cost. They do not do it. They 
come directly. They install their pipes, and they go, and they do not care if there are 
ruptures. We had many problems with pipes, and the inhabitants told us that they 
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were the ones that did it. But in a certain way, we respect them because we want to 
have a good relationship with the institutions, and we do not want to have a problem 
if, in some cases, we cannot give the service. They give the service to the inhabitants 
(Interview, Administrator of Cooperative Chacacollo Oeste, 25.11.2013). 
 
These tensions indicate that the image of the municipal provider as the ‘legitimate’ provider 
is not consistent across the population. Thus, their ideal hydro-social territory is contested.  
Although their control over the territory is advancing as their network expands, the presence 
of cooperatives limits this expansion to some extent. My data, furthermore, suggest that 
inhabitants can influence the shape of the waterscape even when the municipal provider 
delivers the service. For example, EMAPAS was unable to exercise complete control over 
its territory without negotiating with its inhabitants. In one instance, EMAPAS users allowed 
a pilot project to install water meters in exchange for a renovation of the networks. 
Ultimately, both the negotiation and the project were a success. However, another large 
project of EMAPAS, namely a large-scale wastewater treatment plant that was funded by 
the Inter-American Development Bank (BID) and intended for construction in an area called 
Esmeralda, was blocked by the inhabitants (see Chapter 6 for further analysis of this theme). 
Therefore, network expansion can enhance the control of the municipality over the 
waterscape but does not make it absolute. 
 
Conclusion 
The material and discursive ways in which state institutions influence the waterscape are 
strictly connected. The representation of the waterscape as disordered and out of the state’s 
control correlates with the statement of the state’s role through legislation, which allows the 
state to make the waterscape more countable and knowable. Large-scale projects contribute 
to the objective of creating a more coherent waterscape, which is helped by the reinforcement 
and expansion of municipal water and sewage providers. The vision of a more coherent 
waterscape largely excludes cooperatives and other communitarian providers.  
Discourses regarding the cooperatives also implicate this vision of a future ideal hydro-social 
territory, as they often present cooperatives as a source of disorder that will ultimately be 
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subsumed by larger providers. These discourses have practical consequences for 
cooperatives, as they are often excluded from state funding, while the enlargement of 
municipal systems is dependent on their capability of receiving resources and projects from 
various state levels. 
This chapter has also highlighted differences between the vision of cooperatives at various 
state levels. Central state institutions are in fact more open to working with the cooperatives, 
but they focus on financing large-scale projects in the conurbation and engage in minimal 
direct contact with peri-urban communitarian providers, which justifies the need for 
cooperatives to establish links with central state agencies. The next chapter examines their 
efforts to this end. 
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6. Networks, scales and the construction of alternatives 
 
Introduction 
This chapter focuses on how cooperatives and the state interact within the water sector. The 
answer to this question, placed in the context described in the previous two chapters, allows 
me to understand how water governance in Cochabamba is influenced by communitarian 
providers. I argue that cooperatives can contest the dominant discourse of the state 
authorities over the future of the conurbation waterscape, both through networks which 
defend their legitimacy and with a discourse based on concrete examples that support the 
validity of small-scale solutions to the water and sanitation problems that the conurbation is 
facing. In this chapter, therefore, I develop my analysis with the help of the dimension of 
scale and of networks, and I connect them with the dimension of hydro-social territory and 
waterscape that were mainly used in the two preceding chapters.  
In the first section, I focus my analysis on the dimension of scale and its impacts on the 
power relations between the state and the cooperatives. I argued, in Chapter 5, that the 
construction of large-scale infrastructures is one of the main goals of the Bolivian 
government. In this chapter, I analyse how various levels of the state are pushing for ‘large-
scale’ solutions to the problem of water in the conurbations through the construction of large-
scale infrastructures. I expand on how these infrastructures influence, or are expected to 
influence, the cooperatives (and other communitarian providers), and how the cooperatives 
react to such projects. 
In the second section, I focus on the dimension of network. I first analyse how informal 
networks built within the cooperatives allow the latter to shape discourses that contest the 
municipality’s conception of the cooperatives as ‘private’ organizations, and how this shapes 
their relationship with the municipalities. Such networks are based on how the members of 
the cooperatives see their waterscape, to say on their capability to build a hydro-social 
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territory (as analysed in Chapter 4).  This allows me to underline how the construction of 
shared hydro-social territory in the cooperatives relates to their capability to contest 
discourses and governance models pushed by the municipalities. I further analyse the role of 
formal networks in propagating such discourses in front of the state. More specifically, I 
examine the Federation of Water Cooperatives of the Cochabamba Department 
(FECOAPAC) and its attempt to influence different levels of the state, by pushing for a 
political discourse that acknowledges the legitimacy of the cooperatives as a recipient of 
state funding and as a valuable part of the future waterscape of the conurbation, underlining 
the validity of small-scale solutions.   
In the third section, I analyse the case of the construction of a small-scale waste water 
treatment plant (WWTP) for a cooperative operating in Sacaba District 2. The difficulties 
encountered in this project allow me to underline how a cooperative was able to contest (both 
discursively and materially) the application of a large-scale paradigm that would have 
required relinquishing part of their autonomy to the municipality, with the help of national 
and international NGOs, and with the support of the departmental government. This example 
then incapsulates many of the themes of this chapter as it underlines the importance of scale, 
both discursively and materially, the importance of building networks at different scales, the 
necessity of looking at different levels of state as ‘different sovereigns’ with somewhat 
differing political objectives and the importance of the discursive and material control over 
the waterscape that a cooperative can exercise. 
6.1. Large-scale projects: discourses, material effects, and 
resistance 
This section focuses on the consequences of large-scale infrastructural work in water 
governance, and specifically on how they influence the relationship between communitarian 
providers and the state. 
The policy of the Bolivian state has been focused on the construction of large-scale 
infrastructures in the conurbation. The construction of such infrastructures is accompanied 
by the attempt from the part of the state to push water governance at a higher scale, through 
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discourses of scale (i.e. discourses over the scale at which water governance should be 
carried out). Attempts to modify water governance through large-scale infrastructures can 
be interpreted as an attempt to make the waterscape legible and ordered (as discussed in 
Chapter 5), as well as to expand the control and power of the state over the waterscape. 
However, different levels of the state have different visions on how governance should take 
place, and contrasts emerge due to the attempt of different levels of the state to exercise 
control over the waterscape.  
As a consequence of the construction of large-scale infrastructure, communitarian 
organizations are at risk of losing part of their independence. This is not only due to the 
physical modification of the waterscape brought by large-scale infrastructures, but also to 
the hydro-social territory pushed for by the state. Such hydro-social territory is marked by 
the idea that the growth of control of the state through a universal service provider is 
eventually or nearly inevitable. The effect of such infrastructures on the shape of water 
governance in the conurbation is therefore often presented as a techno-economic or 
legislative issue, hiding potential clashes as well as specific political aims. The cooperatives 
resist the attempt of the state to expand its territorial control in various ways. They were able 
to at least partially negotiate the results of such attempts through their material and discursive 
control over their waterscape. Such control was reinforced with the use of networks to relate 
to the state. 
In this section, I first look at the conurbation in general to examine what are the consequences 
of the dominance of large-scale water and sewage infrastructures on the model of water 
governance that is brought forward by the state. I analyse the case of the Misicuni project 
and the Metropolitan Masterplan for Water and Sanitation. This case study allows me to 
analyse how municipalities, the departmental government, and the cooperatives looked at 
the possible consequences of a project that will require building a more integrated water and 
sewage governance at the conurbation level. I then focus on the case of the construction of 
a large-scale waste water treatment plant (WWTP) in the municipality of Sacaba and 
specifically the consequences of such a project on the relationship between the state and 
communitarian water providers in the District 2 of Sacaba. This in-depth case study allows 
me to understand the reaction of the actors at various levels during a period in which the 
consequences of such project were defined, imagined, and negotiated. 
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These projects and the intervention of the state in the water and sanitation sector are 
important to the solution of the conurbation water and sewage problems. Especially for those 
cooperatives placed in arid areas where water is not readily available, receiving water from 
the Misicuni dam was long-awaited for, and the construction of the waste water treatment 
plant of Sacaba is necessary to prevent the progressive degradation of the conurbation 
environment. The discussion, however, lies in the way in which the agreements over access 
to these infrastructures take place, and on the consequences of these agreements. The issue, 
therefore, touches on the question of democracy in water governance, as it pertains the 
question of who, how, and in which ways makes decision over the waterscape. 
6.1.1. Large-scale projects and hydro-social territories in the 
conurbation 
I argue in Chapter 5 that large-scale infrastructural projects are central to the Bolivian state 
policy on water and sanitation provisions in urban areas. The most prominent project in the 
conurbation is the building of the Miscuni dam and related infrastructural works. Its 
consequences on the conurbation’s hydro-social territory and waterscape are examined in 
this sub-section.  
The Misicuni dam has long been looked at as the solution to water scarcity in the 
Cochabamba Valley. The arrival of water from the dam will strongly affect the material 
waterscape of the conurbation. This change of the material waterscape also engendered 
changes in the hydro-social territories. Specifically, it produced discourses of scale, as it 
reinforced discourses over the need for potable service provision to be delivered through 
large-scale water providers. This created tensions both between different levels of the state, 
and between the state and communitarian organizations. Furthermore, discourses of scale 
were often associated to discourses that see the waterscape as ‘disordered’ (as examined in 
Chapter 5). The attempt to move institutional governance at a higher scale, in fact, is often 
accompanied by the idea that this would make the waterscape more ordered and fair, which 
emerged in the interviews with state officials. Such discourses lead to the vision that 
cooperatives would tend to disappear, after the large-scale projects are done. 
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The Metropolitan Masterplan of Cochabamba (PMMC, 2013) is an example of this attempt 
to order the waterscape and to organize water management at a higher territorial scale, and 
of the connection of such attempt with the construction of large-scale infrastructures. The 
report that accompanied the masterplan offered a detailed diagnostic of water and sewage 
provision, services, and production in the conurbation. Its analysis and proposals for the 
future of water provision in Cochabamba hinged on the Misicuni dam, which, it estimated, 
would provide 71% of water in the conurbation (PMMC, 2013, Resumen Ejecutivo, p. 41). 
The PMMC explicitly underlined that such a large-scale infrastructure would alter the 
geographical scale at which water governance needs to be carried out, making it necessary 
to create organizations able to work at the conurbation level. 
A paradigmatic change that the Metropolitan Masterplan proposes through the 
Misicuni project, is precisely a metropolitan vision of water and sanitation services, 
with a mission of service that cover the seven municipalities of the valley, and that 
will benefit all the population without any distinction of place, zone, or municipality. 
Misicuni, therefore, becomes the driving force for the improvement of the quality of 
life and the development of the region, creating space of dialogue and integral 
understanding amongst all the actors of the region (PMMC, 2013, Resumen 
Ejecutivo, p. 99)34 
The Metropolitan Masterplan suggests the need to establish a Metropolitan Water Company 
operating at the conurbation level to distribute water from Misicuni (PMMC, 2013, Resumen 
Ejecutivo). However, how such a company would work and what competencies it would 
have is not clear, and it has been the subject of debate between levels of the state.  Such 
debates are connected with the strengthening of the control of different levels of the state 
over the waterscape.  This indicates that there are differences in the vision of the hydro-
social territory at different levels of the state, and that questions of scale create tensions not 
only between the state and the cooperatives, but also between different levels of the state.  
The consolidation of a Metropolitan Water Company has been considered particularly 
important by departmental government officials, which deem it fundamental for the solution 
                                                 
34 Translation mine. 
206 
 
  
of water issues, conflicts, and contamination in the conurbation. This indicates the existence 
of a link between discourses of scale and the vision of the waterscape as disordered.  
Departmental officers in general stressed the importance of creating a more coordinated 
water and sanitation governance at the conurbation level, involving both communitarian 
organizations and municipal water providers.  An official of the Unit for Basic Sanitation 
related that the ideal solution would be the planification and integrated management of water 
and advanced the idea of transferring management (or at least to coordinate the management) 
of all water sources (not only Misicuni) at a metropolitan scale, arguing that a centralized 
management would bring equality of provision and prices in the conurbation, as well as 
reducing water conflicts.  Such centralized management would then concentrate the material 
control over the waterscape at a higher territorial level, and it was described by a 
departmental official as an occasion to build a just waterscape.  
For this reason, we believe that, when an authority is established that control water 
sources, as it could be Misicuni, such authority should, in the future, start assuming 
control over all the water sources, and should administer all water sources. Because 
these sources are not of the cooperative and are not of the water committees. They 
are of the state, and the state should give this service (Interview, official Unit for 
Basic Sanitation, 15.07.2014) 
Such a project, however, would mean weakening the control that territorial organizations, 
municipalities and communitarian organizations alike, hold over the waterscape. 
Departmental officials therefore underlined the difficulties of such endeavours. 
Questions over who would control the material waterscape of the conurbation and, in 
particular, who would control water coming from Misicuni, was a source of contrast between 
different levels of the state. After I left the field, specifically, disputes over who should be 
in charge of such Metropolitan water provider occurred between the municipal provider of 
Cochabamba (SEMAPA) and the departmental government. The municipality of 
Cochabamba considered, in fact, that SEMAPA could be transformed into a conurbation-
wide provider, while the departmental government encouraged the formation of a new 
provider. Such a new provider would be shaped by the Metropolitan Council, formed by the 
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seven municipalities of the conurbation and the Departmental Government (Los Tiempos, 
2017b). 
The construction of the Misicuni dam, therefore, strongly changed the material waterscape 
of the conurbation and created tensions over the hydro-social territory that would emerge as 
dominant.  Such tensions and uncertainty also influenced the relationship of the cooperatives 
with the state. At the time of my research, it was not clear how water from Misicuni was to 
be distributed specifically to communitarian organizations, and what the effects of receiving 
this water would be on their capability to maintain independent systems.  The Metropolitan 
Masterplan indicated that communitarian providers could receive Misicuni water through a 
municipal provider (or the municipality35) (PMMC, 2013, Resumen Ejecutivo, p. 100-106), 
however, how that would take place was not clear.  
At the time of my research the more advanced planning concerned the need to bring water 
to the arid South Zone, leaving open the decision to the communitarian providers to either 
pass to SEMAPA or to receive water wholesale.   The head of the cooperative Primero de 
Mayo (South Zone, District 9) relayed that they hoped to receive water from Misicuni, but 
he was doubtful that any would arrive before 5-7 years. He strongly underlined that they 
wished to remain independent (interview, 21.11.2013). However, in other areas of the 
conurbation the effects of the arrival of the Misicuni water on the cooperatives was not as 
clear.  A respondent of a cooperative placed in the north side of Cochabamba affirmed that 
they had been told that they could receive water but seemed in doubt over what the 
consequence of accepting water from Misicuni would be, to say he thought that accepting 
the water might mean that they needed to pass their administration to SEMAPA.  
While state interviewees often remarked that they did not wish to force the cooperatives to 
cede their networks, they often saw the arrival of Misicuni as a probable cause of the end of 
the cooperatives. The construction of large-scale water infrastructures is then seen as having 
effects on the scale at which water provision should be carried out, to say: it produces 
discourses of scale. Such an effect was often described by state interviewees as a natural 
                                                 
35 In Tiquipaya, where a municipal water provider is not present, the unit of basic sanitation intended to treat 
water through a municipal potabilization plant, and then distribute it to some providers (Official Unit for 
Basic Sanitation, Municipality of Tiquipaya, 26.05.2014). 
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consequence of the arrival of Misicuni, and not as a political choice. They underlined that 
the cooperatives could maintain a separate administration, if they wished to, but seemed 
convinced that it was probable that they would be absorbed by a larger entity. They often 
underlined the need of communitarian organizations to organize and to improve their service. 
However, cooperation and resources that the communitarian organizations would need to 
carry out such improvement were not provided by the state.  In the imagined hydro-social 
territory of many state respondents, therefore, the cooperatives were a stepping stone 
towards the aim to provide a universal water service, as well as inherently weak 
organizations. The consequences of the arrival of Misicuni on communitarian providers, 
therefore, were often considered in technical and economic terms, and not as something that 
needed to be subjected to political discussion. 
Large-scale projects can then produce negative consequences for communitarian providers, 
not necessarily through their exclusion from connection with the infrastructure per se, but 
through neglect and exclusion from state resources.  For communitarian providers, in fact, a 
discourse based on the necessity for ‘large scale’ infrastructures, could lead to the idea that 
the existence of the cooperatives themselves is not useful, and that their disappearance is 
inevitable. The question is, then, the capability of the cooperatives, and other communitarian 
providers, to be accepted as a legitimate part of a future landscape, that should be nurtured, 
and not allowed to simply waste away. 
How the cooperatives negotiated and partially resisted the effects of such large-scale 
infrastructures is investigated in the next sub-section, as I analyse the case study of the 
construction of a large-scale waste water treatment plant in the Sacaba Municipality.    
6.1.2. Case study on the effect of large-scale projects on the 
cooperatives: Municipal Waste Water Treatment Plant District 2 
This sub-section explores how cooperatives were able to partially resist the expansion of the 
municipal control over the waterscape caused by the project to build a large-scale waste 
water treatment plant (WWTP) in the municipality of Sacaba. This resistance was made 
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possible by the material control that the cooperatives exercise on their waterscape and by the 
use of a network organization (FECOAPAC).  
The construction of this WWTP is part of a general growth in attention over waste water 
treatment both at the conurbation and at state level. In the conurbation, attention has been 
paid specifically to the contaminated River Rocha, which was declared an environmental 
disaster in 2012. This growth in attention was accompanied by an attempt from the state to 
increase its control over the waste water which passed through the construction of large-
scale infrastructures and to an attempt to regulate much more strictly the organizations that 
discharge waste water. Waste water, then, is involved in the growing expansion of the state 
control over the waterscape, through large scale infrastructures and stricter regulations.  
The problem of waste water has grown during the years due to lack of state-provided sewage 
systems in peri-urban areas as well as lack of adequate waste water treatment. As with water 
provision, the state never had a complete control over wastewater production, channelling, 
and discharge. At the time of my research, the only functioning large-scale WWTP was Alba 
Rancho, managed by SEMAPA, infamous in the conurbation for the bad smell it produces. 
The plant was built in the 1980s and had not been properly maintained for years, as was 
considered by SEMAPA as a secondary problem, indicating the process by which the state 
lost control over the conurbation waterscape. In the last years, maintenance has greatly 
improved, but the fundamental problem remains that the plant has not kept up with the 
expansion of the city, thus receiving more water than it can treat (SEMAPA official, field 
notes, 11.06.2014).  
The solution offered by state officials for the pollution problem was based on large-scale 
infrastructural work and the strengthening of the state control over the waterscape. The 
Metropolitan Masterplan points to the construction of large-scale waste water treatment plant 
(WWTP), under the management of the municipalities, as the solution for the contamination 
problem. A project to enlarge the Alba Rancho plant, financed by the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF), was slated to start soon.  Various municipalities elaborated projects to 
build their own plants, but the municipality of Sacaba was the only one that had a financed 
project ready to start at the time of my fieldwork. 
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Building WWTPs in the conurbation is a serious challenge. The difficulties encountered 
emphasize how state authorities do not have a complete control over the waterscape, and 
often need the consent of communitarian organizations to be able to carry out infrastructural 
projects. Interviewees in the municipalities underlined the difficulty in finding adequate 
space to build a plant, due to the uncontrolled growth of the city, the high cost of land, land 
speculations and the opposition of the inhabitants. Most interviewees underlined that 
inhabitant opposition was due to the example of Alba Rancho.  
These difficulties emerged also in Sacaba. The municipality received financing from the 
state for the construction of the two large-scale WWTPs, called El Abra and Esmeralda. The 
project of the Esmeralda plant dates from 2008 but had been stopped due to prolonged social 
conflicts with the inhabitants of the area (Los Tiempos, 2013). This represents a clear 
example of the fact that the municipality does not have complete control of the waterscape 
and needs to negotiate with the inhabitants to carry out infrastructural works.  
The situation was different for the plant of El Abra, that would purify the wastewater coming 
from the District 2 and 6 of Sacaba. The construction of the Plant of El Abra had just started 
at the time of my research and the project was looked at positively in District 2 where most 
interviewees acknowledged the necessity of a plant. While, however, the building of the 
plant per se has not been opposed, the tensions between the cooperatives of District 2 and 
EMAPAS; as well as between different actors in the district, made it so that it was unclear 
how waste water would be canalized to the plant at the time when works where due to start.  
In fact, various cooperatives in the district feared that they would be pressured to pass their 
sewage system to the municipal provider. Therefore, tensions regarding the construction of 
the WWTP are in fact tensions caused by the growing control of the municipality in the 
waterscape, and the resistance of the cooperatives to such growth. The construction of a 
large-scale infrastructure, therefore, changes power relations in the waterscape, and, in this 
case, was perceived as a risk for the control of the cooperatives over their sewage network.  
District 2 is provided with its sewage service not only by EMAPAS but also by the 
cooperatives. Tensions over the control over the waterscape were already present before this 
project started, especially concerning the construction of a municipal sewage service. Some 
cooperatives complained that EMAPAS did not respect and often damaged their networks, 
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causing EMAPAS to be seen as an arrogant entity, that aimed to take over their networks. 
The progressive entrance of EMAPAS in the district, helped by the municipal decision to 
cut cooperatives and OTBs from municipal funding (see Chapter 5), was often seen by 
communitarian providers as an attempt of the municipality to take over.  
Furthermore, the cooperatives had been subjected to growing legal pressure, concerning their 
wastewater discharge, a symptom of the stricter control of the state over wastewater 
discharge in the conurbation waterscape. Most wastewater in District 2 is discharged with 
little treatment in the River Rocha. Most cooperatives use Imhoff tanks, which provide very 
basic treatment and are often malfunctioning. The Departmental Environmental Agency (the 
main environmental authority in the conurbation) started to supervise polluters and started 
administrative processes that could lead to sanctions. Cooperatives were left scrambling to 
improve their waste water treatments. These legal procedures exasperated certain 
respondents, that saw it as an unnecessary pressure from the state. Some of my interviewees 
believed this pressure was aimed to force them to pass their sewage network to the municipal 
providers, or at least to force them to connect to the EMAPAS plant. They saw these inquiries 
as unfair, as they alleged that the municipality was currently polluting the river Rocha more 
than they were. The situation further worsened when letters notifying various cooperatives 
that a separate inquiry had been opened over them by the Fiscalia del Estado (office of the 
public prosecutor), due to their wastewater discharge in the Rocha River.  
Such persistent pressure led to a response of the cooperatives. In this case, they organized to 
mediate with the state through a network. The cooperatives quickly allied with each other 
and contacted the FECOAPAC to try to solve the problem. However, it was also remarked 
that they were capable to defend their waterscape materially if needed. The president of one 
cooperative was particularly frustrated and asserted that it was ‘all politics’ and a way to 
force the cooperatives to pass to EMAPAS. He also argued that if the state kept pushing this 
way they would risk the members of the cooperative taking the streets (field work notes). 
FECOAPAC was able to ask the Departmental Environmental Agency, as well as the Unit 
for Basic Sanitation of the departmental government to mediate this conflict. Different levels 
of the state, in fact, might have different visions of the waterscape. The departmental 
government officials, while pushing for a more ordered water governance in the conurbation, 
212 
 
  
often expressed a more positive vision of the role that communitarian providers could play 
in such governance compared with municipal officials. While it was clear that departmental 
officials saw very positively the project of EMAPAS, they underlined that they did not wish 
to damage the cooperatives. 
We are trying to reach a solution that will be beneficial also for these seven 
cooperatives that have a problem with the public prosecutor office (…) We do not 
want to, it is not our intention, that the cooperatives disappear. On the contrary, we 
know that they are good for society. We do not want to take away from them the 
management of the sewage system (…) Our objective is to solve the problem of the 
Rocha River. If for that to happen, they need a more healthy and close relationship 
with the municipal provider, then is what needs to be done, right?  (Interview Official 
Environmental Unit, 11.08.2018) 
In order to solve the legal problems, a meeting was organized between the cooperatives 
involved, the Environmental Agency, FECOAPAC, and EMAPAS. FECOAPAC obtained 
consensus that all cooperatives would connect to the treatment plant. However, FECOAPAC 
obtained an agreement that state financing for the construction of waste water collectors and 
macro-meters necessary to pass the waste water to the municipal plant were to be found 
(interview president FECOAPAC, 12.08.2014). Relating with the state through a network, 
therefore, was at least a partially successful strategy. However, even after the meeting what 
would happen was not completely clarified. When I concluded my fieldwork, the 
cooperatives and EMAPAS had still not reached a clear agreement, and there were still some 
fears that the municipality might push to take control of the cooperatives’ sewage networks. 
Respondents remarked that the sewage was owned by the them, and that they would not be 
willing to pass it to the municipality, underlining the sense of ownership of the cooperatives 
over their waterscape.  
It is clear that the cooperative … we cannot give them, to say, we cannot pass to 
EMAPAS. The cooperatives, all that we have installed it came from our sacrifices, 
there can be an agreement only for the treatment of water but nothing more (…) This 
[agreement] is under study (…) We did not sign it, we are waiting for it (…) For the 
moment we will not do anything, because right now we cannot talk about anything 
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yet, because we do not know very well. They did not start building the plant yet, 
when it will be finished then afterwards we are going to see these points, and how to 
measure, and what would the agreement be (...) (President Coop. Quintanilla, 
10.09.2014) 
While in this case, the presence of FECOAPAC, as well as the mediation of Departmental 
authorities allowed the cooperatives to obtain some protection for their systems, along with 
some concessions, the imagined hydro-social territory of the municipality was able to impose 
itself, acknowledging large scale municipality-controlled infrastructure as the solution to the 
pollution problem. However, the existence of the cooperatives limited the control that the 
municipality was able to exercise on the territory. This example underlines how discourses 
on scale (in this case, discourses on the appropriate scale at which waste water governance 
should be administered) have real consequences on how the waterscape is built. It also 
emphasizes, however, how the cooperatives can at least partially modify these discourses 
and plans. Furthermore, at least one cooperative disassociated from the agreement between 
FECOAPAC and the municipality. The decision of this cooperative to create their own waste 
water treatment plant constituted a small but noticeable break in the municipal vision of the 
scale at which waste water governance should be carried out (this example is examined in 
Section 6.3). 
6.2. Contesting state discourses: the role of networks  
Section 6.1 underlines the cooperatives’ need to employ discourses that resist stronger state 
discourse. State discourses are not homogeneous, but they tend to present a universal water 
and sewage system as the ideal model of provision. This section examines in more detail 
how discourses and resistance are produced and employed. To this end, I focus on the 
‘dimension’ of networks. I focus on understanding how networks, built at different levels 
(e.g. community level, departmental level), develop discourses that influence or contest the 
state’s hydro-social territories, and therefore the constructions of the waterscape. 
The capability of the cooperatives to elaborate alternative discourses starts from their 
relationship with their members, to then attempt to influence governance at higher scale. 
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They can therefore be interpreted as a way to democratize water governance. The importance 
of a democratic participation or the democratic nature of the cooperatives was barely 
mentioned by state officials. They, in fact, considered the rights of inhabitants mostly in the 
context of access to service and not in the right to shape the service. Overall, they did not 
address the benefits of user participation in water governance and primarily situated the 
voices of inhabitants in relation to resistance to state projects. In this case, they identified 
the necessity for discussion but not the need for continuous participation. Therefore, 
legitimate questions arise on the democratic nature of governance in Cochabamba, pointing 
to the importance of communitarian organizations for the capability of the inhabitants to 
exercise their rights to the city. 
I start by analysing the reasons of the cooperatives’ resistance to become part of the 
municipal network, and how they represent their role in relation to the state. To do this, I 
need to look at the informal networks which are formed within the cooperatives through 
shared history, and how these networks allow the cooperatives to form defensive discourses 
to oppose the way in which cooperatives are represented by the municipalities. I then look 
at more formal networks that are used by the cooperatives to enhance their capacity to shape 
discourses on water governance, and, more generally, their capability to interact with the 
state. To this end, I focus on FECOAPAC and on how this organization have been able to 
influence state policy at different levels. Looking at the operation of both FECOAPAC and 
the Santa Cruz federation, I underline how the objective of the cooperative’s network is to 
obtain the collaboration of the state in providing the water and sewage service. The 
cooperatives, then, need to present themselves as legitimate recipients of state funding and 
support and, more generally, as a legitimate part of the urban waterscape. To this end, the 
cooperatives interact with different state levels, taking advantage of the fact that state 
discourses on the cooperatives are not the same in different levels of the state. 
6.2.1. Contesting discourses: creation of the cooperatives discourse  
Before focusing on the relationship between cooperatives and state, it is important to 
understand the discourse that the cooperatives use to contest the state, and to defend their 
autonomy. This is necessary to understand the connection between the lived history of the 
cooperatives, their shared hydro-social territory and the way in which they relate to the state. 
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In short, I am going to underline how the shared hydro-social territory of the cooperatives, 
formed through informal networks of inhabitants of their neighbourhoods and their 
communal experiences (analysed in Chapter 4) influence the way in which they relate to the 
state and how they see their future.  
Further, I focus on the relationship between cooperatives and municipalities, and how their 
continuous interaction during the history of the cooperatives also contributes to shaping the 
way in which cooperatives represent themselves and the municipalities, and, therefore, the 
way in which they see and imagine their hydro-social territories.  
Municipalities often define the cooperatives as ‘private’ and even ‘for-profit’ organizations, 
as well as criticizing the sustainability and quality of service (as examined in Chapter 5). 
Many state interviewees look at communitarian water providers as fragile organizations that 
will disappear to leave space for a universal municipal provision. As underlined in Chapter 
4, some of these criticisms are justified as these fragilities are real, however they are 
compounded by the refusal of the state to collaborate.  
The cooperatives’ resistance to the state is based on their shared hydro-social territory built 
through their lived history. Through the informal networks that developed though the history 
of cooperatives, the members of the cooperatives were then able to contest the hydro-social 
territory of the municipalities. Cooperatives’ resistance to discourses that posit them as 
‘stepping stones’ to a universal municipal service, can be explained by the fact that the 
cooperatives are owned and controlled by their community, since they were built through 
the ‘sacrifice’ of the inhabitants. This engendered a feeling of ownership over the 
waterscape.  Furthermore, the cooperatives contest the discourse of the municipalities, which 
essentially posits that a universal service provider would deliver a better and more fair 
service, by pointing out that the service could worsen under a municipal provider. 
Cooperatives respondents underlined that joining the municipal service will result in a loss 
of independence in decision-making (especially concerning prices). As a result, respondents 
feared that the service would become more expensive under the municipality. Some 
respondents also feared that ‘their’ water would be used for a larger waterscape, diminishing 
supply. The strong connection between the cooperatives, community, and space was also 
used to criticise municipal providers. Differently from the cooperatives, in fact, municipal 
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providers are often seen as ‘absent’ from the waterscape. The fact that EMAPAS workers 
came, installed the sewage service, and then disappeared was underlined by one 
interviewees, that explained that cooperatives were sometimes called to solve problems of 
the municipal sewage pipes. 
Some respondents associated with the cooperatives turned the municipalities’ criticisms on 
their head by questioning the economic sustainability and quality of service offered by the 
municipalities, therefore contesting the discourses used by the municipality to support their 
vision of an ideal hydro-social territory. Those cooperatives that offer a continuous service 
usually asserted that their service is better than SEMAPA, while many underlined how their 
prices are lower. Not surprisingly, therefore, when asked, if they think they would pass to 
the public provider, most respondents rejected the idea outright, while a few asserted that it 
would be the decision of the members to do so, but that they would probably refuse the offer. 
This rejection does not only concern those cooperatives that provide a good quality service. 
The representative of Primero de Mayo, that, placed in the arid South Zone, does not have 
access to sufficient amounts of water, underlined how they would not pass under SEMAPA, 
as they considered it an inefficient organization. While they do hope to receive water 
wholesale from SEMAPA in the future, they wish to maintain internal control (Interview 
with President Cooperative Primero de Mayo, 21.11.2013).  
Furthermore, respondents from cooperatives contested the discourses that paint them as non-
legitimate recipient of state funding. This contributes to both contest the way in which 
cooperatives are depicted by municipal discourses and their ideal hydro-social territory, 
which are often focused on producing a universal sanitation provider. The municipal hydro-
social territory, as analysed in Chapter 5, is in fact often supported by the delegitimization 
of the cooperatives. The cooperatives contest state discourses by underlining the fact that 
they provided the service at a time in which the state was not fulfilling its duty.  The 
cooperatives in Cochabamba did not develop a fully coherent discourse against their 
definition as private (most respondents do occasionally refer to their organization as 
‘private’), like the cooperatives in Santa Cruz were able to do. However, most of them did 
remonstrate against the decision of the municipality to not offer support, either through the 
form of infrastructural projects, or the lending of machineries. There was a general sense of 
frustration with the lack of help from the state, as respondents underlined that they built a 
service that should have been the duty of the municipality to provide. Some interviewees 
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were keen to underline that municipal providers themselves are not sustainable, since they 
depended on state support, as well as LLP funding to execute their projects (see Chapter 5). 
In practice, an interviewee argued, it is the municipality that uses community money to 
extend their networks. 
There are many people that ask for an improvement of basic sanitation, and 
EMAPAS tell them “sure, we are going to do it, but you have to pass under the 
administration of EMAPAS” and I think this is blackmail, right? Because the 
resources of the municipality, the resources of the state, they are our own money. We 
pay taxes, and here they are. The fact that we are a cooperative does not mean that 
we do not pay taxes, we pay them all the same (President Water and Sewage 
Cooperative Arocagua-Puntiti, 11.08.2014) 
Considering these issues, it is not surprising that the relationship between cooperatives and 
municipalities is rife with tensions in Cochabamba (especially where a municipal provider 
exists). These contrasts can take different forms, but they are often related to fundamental 
questions over who has the right to shape water governance, the municipal waterscape, and 
to control the cooperatives' territory and waterscape, even if they are often ‘rendered 
technical’ (Li, 2007), namely, framed in legislative and technical terms. Some of the most 
common conflicts relate to the growing control that the municipality is exercising on the 
waterscape, and the consequent stricter implementation of municipal rules and regulations. 
As underlined in Chapter 4, in fact, most cooperatives now operate in well-established 
neighbourhoods, where municipal service and municipal control, are growing. As a 
consequence, tensions over who has the right to control and modify the waterscape are 
growing. 
The growth of municipal networks often resulted in complaints from cooperatives that 
expressed frustration over the lack of communication and a certain lack of respect to their 
territory and infrastructures. Communitarian providers found it difficult to get repayment for 
pipes broken by the municipality, and in certain cases seemed irritated by the fact that they 
had received no communication over works executed over their area of service.  
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Another kind of conflict regarded the rights of the cooperative to use the neighbourhoods 
‘green areas’ (areas destined for communal uses such as streets, parks, etc.) to build their 
infrastructures. As most of the cooperatives’ neighbourhoods were built outside state 
planning, often communal spaces were administered and used by the community, for 
example to build wells or water towers.  However, in a few recent cases the municipalities 
questioned the right of the cooperatives to execute works on these lands, as they were 
considered owned by the state.   
However, the municipality is far from asserting complete control over the waterscape, 
especially where a community refuses certain projects (e.g. the construction of WWTP). The 
municipality’s hydro-social territory is, therefore, not unchallenged, especially when there 
is a good relationship between OTBs and cooperatives. The ownership of the land by the 
municipality is in fact often connected with ownership by the OTB, and, therefore, of the 
inhabitants.  
Yes, because if I am not wrong, the land where we asked for the authorization … 
because these lands are owned by the OTB, right? And thanks to the authorization of 
the OTB we could dig the wells, so that as I told you, the cooperative and the OTB 
walk hand in hand. There is mutual aid (Manager Cooperative Chacacollo Oeste, 
25.11.2013)  
Furthermore, the cooperatives are also organising in networks that allow them to defend their 
right to modify the waterscape. An interesting example is the conflict that emerged in the 
cooperative Sausalito (whose president is also the president of FECOAPAC), where the 
municipality intervened because the cooperative used part of a green area to build their 
potable water treatment plant. In this case, the FECOAPAC intervened to mediate, and to 
create a legal agreement that should be a model for the relationship between the municipality 
and the cooperatives. In this case, in exchange for the usage of the area, the cooperative 
provided water at a low cost to the local school. 
Due to the construction of the plant, the municipality raised some criticism on the 
usage of the land in the park, for all the modifications … So, we discussed the issue 
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and we reached an agreement. We now have this agreement between the cooperative 
and the municipality. We are going to give 43 cubic meters of water for free to the 
school, and we are only going to charge for usage beyond that (President of the 
cooperative Sausalito 25.07.2014) 
The intervention of the FECOAPAC in the Sausalito case is a relatively new tactic for the 
cooperatives. The strengthening of the federation and how this organization now acts as a 
representative of the cooperative in front of the state will be analysed in more detail in the 
next sub-section. 
6.2.2. Propagation of hydro-social territories at different scales  
In this section, I analyse the way in which FECOAPAC was able to connect the cooperatives 
with different sovereigns (municipal authorities, departmental authorities, and national 
agencies) and how they are attempting to change the discourse on the role of communitarian 
providers that dominate state policies. Therefore, FECOAPAC has been attempting to 
propagate its hydro-social territory at different scales, to contrast the hydro-social territory 
of the municipalities, and specifically how the municipalities depict the role of the 
cooperatives in the water sector.  
FECOAPAC has a fundamental role as an intermediary between the cooperatives and the 
state, defending the cooperatives in conflicts with the state and working at improving their 
relationship with it. A particular important endeavour of the federation has been to focus 
specifically over the rights of the water cooperatives to receive state funding. This attempt 
is fundamental to create a different imaginary over the hydro-social territory from the one 
promoted by the conurbation municipalities. This is because it does not represent the 
fragmentation of the service as an issue to be eliminated in the long term. More explicitly: 
the imagined ‘ideal’ waterscape proposed by the cooperatives is one where different kinds 
of providers co-exist and co-create the service with the support of the state. After looking at 
how FECOAPAC operates, I will then consider the case of FEDECAAS (the federation 
representing the powerful water cooperatives of Santa Cruz de la Sierra), to underline how 
the success of such vision is based more on power relations than on legalistic or technical 
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arguments, and therefore the need to consider the question of democracy in water 
governance. 
State control over the waterscape grew stricter in the last few years. From this point of view, 
the cooperatives need the help of FECOAPAC to mediate their relationship with the state 
especially concerning legal issues. FECOAPAC was first funded in 2003 but it effectively 
stopped working in 2005 (Interview, founder of FECOAPAC, 17.06.2014). It was then 
reactivated in 2009 and, at the time of my fieldwork, it had rapidly expanded to include 30 
cooperatives. During my fieldwork, the federation assumed a growing role as an 
intermediary with the state, especially concerning obtaining documents, licences, and in 
general bureaucratic procedures. Respondents from cooperatives underlined the advantages 
of this arrangement, as when submitting their documents through FECOAPAC they received 
a response quickly, a fact that they argued was due to the higher ‘respect’ that FECOAPAC 
was given, whereas single cooperatives were often neglected. FECOAPAC directors also 
helped during cooperative’s elections, as it had been recently established that water 
cooperatives elections were to be supervised by the state, requiring a precise application of 
the rules. FECOAPAC was also keen to encourage the cooperatives to register with the 
AAPS (the Bolivian Water Authority) and hired consultants to help the cooperatives obtain 
their environmental licence.  
The role of FECOAPAC was also strengthened by a change in legislation. The role of the 
FECOAPAC underwent an officialization through the new General Law of Cooperatives, 
which reinforced the role of federations in conflict resolutions. Due to the new law, some 
respondents in the cooperatives were told by state officials that it was mandatory to be 
members of the federations. While it is not clear what the consequences, if any, would be 
for not joining the federation, these instances underlined the growing legitimacy of this 
organization in front of the state. While help from FECOAPAC is positive, these changes 
indicate the progressive bureaucratization of both cooperatives and FECOAPAC, and more 
stringent regulation from the state. FECOAPAC has accepted certain aspects of the hydro-
social territory of the state, by helping with the ‘ordering’ of the waterscape. However, this 
does not mean that the federation has not contested certain other aspects of the state’s hydro-
social territory, especially at the municipal level.  
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The relationship between the federation and the state is somewhat ambiguous. The 
FECOAPAC aims to collaborate with the state, but also depicts itself as a ‘defender’ of the 
cooperatives in front of the state. Such ambiguity is reinforced by the fact that different levels 
of the state have different visions of the cooperatives. Therefore, the role of this network is 
alternatively to reinforce the hydro-social waterscape of the cooperatives through legal 
discourses, to achieve collaboration with state authorities to help the cooperatives reinforce 
their waterscape, but also to defend the cooperatives against attempt of the state to penetrate 
in their waterscape. Therefore, while the FECOAPAC president asserted that they were 
building a relationship based on collaboration and respect with the authorities and that they 
have worked to improve their relationship with the municipalities, FECOAPAC 
representatives also often need to represent the cooperatives when conflict arises with state 
authorities (usually the municipalities). Furthermore, the FECOAPAC had been able to 
create connection with national agencies, such as SENASBA, from which they had been 
able to obtain one project. They had also started to research the possibility to obtain funding 
from the international cooperation and, more in general, were trying to create links with 
national agencies so to be able to obtain projects to support the cooperatives.   
FECOAPAC then worked to elaborate on discourses to defend the cooperatives, strengthen 
their legitimacy, and try to establish them as legitimate recipients of state funding. To this 
end, FECOAPAC mainly used legal discourses. The legal consultant of the FECOAPAC, 
argued that the cooperatives can receive funding from the state, since they are acknowledged 
as legitimate providers in the Constitution. Likewise, members of FECOAPAC often 
referenced to the State Constitutions, and to the Law of Autonomies, to argue that the 
municipality has a duty to assist the cooperatives (while municipal officers sometimes 
referred to this law to underline that it is the duty of the municipality to provide the service, 
see Chapter 5). Criticising the competence of municipal officials, leaders of the FECOAPAC 
often stated that municipal officials ‘do not know’ the legislation concerning the 
cooperatives. 
They [municipal officials] continue with this idea that if the municipality invests, 
then, it is the municipality that have to manage, because public goods, from public 
investment, cannot be transferred to privates, and that is not true. As I told you, there 
is a superior good which is the service, and administrative mechanisms are secondary 
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or they must adapt to this superior purpose that is to give the service (Interview, legal 
consultant of FECOAPAC, 07.06.2014) 
The president of the federation relayed the fact that they were trying to reach an agreement 
with the municipalities, with the assistance of the AAPS. This agreement would result in the 
acknowledgement that the cooperatives can receive funding. However, this was still under 
consideration during my fieldwork, so that I could not determine nor confirm its 
consequences. 
The AAPS is also going to be part of these agreements so they will have to be 
respected. As you can see, with what we have defined in these agreements we will 
work together so that the basic service issues are solved perfectly. This would be 
ideal. Now, in any case, this project for an agreement is going to be elaborated in the 
municipalities, and the federation has sent a project proposal that basically asks to 
follow the legislation (…) and the spirit of this agreement is that the state can invest 
in the renovation of infrastructures through the cooperative. (Interview, president of 
FECOAPAC, 12.08.2014) 
The federation furthermore elaborated a vision of the ideal hydro-social territory of the 
conurbation and the role of the cooperatives in it. The ideal hydro-social territory that 
FECOAPAC is striving for could be considered as a co-production model. In this model, the 
cooperatives would progressively adapt to new state regulations that impose stronger state 
control, but they would also be considered as a legitimate recipient of state funding and 
support. However, this is a difficult endeavour, whose effects were just becoming visible at 
the time of my fieldwork. 
The federation’s president was optimistic about the future of the cooperatives and for their 
capability to last in time, even if he acknowledged that there were problems. Various 
members of FECOAPAC board of directors affirmed that there are certain institutions that 
might desire the disappearance of the cooperatives and spoke about the difficulties with the 
municipalities. The president of FECOAPAC himself complained that there is still a 
territorial idea that lead mayors to think of themselves as the owners of the municipalities.  
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He, however, argued that the municipalities do not have the capability to provide the water 
service to everyone, and that even the Metropolitan Masterplan acknowledges this reality. 
Hence, it established that water from Misicuni can be given wholesale to those that need it. 
FECOAPAC is then trying to challenge the discourse of the municipality, and to open state 
resources to the cooperatives.  
At the time of my research, therefore, the relationship of the cooperatives with the state 
seemed to be skewed, as cooperatives were asked to adhere to progressively more stringent 
regulations but were not obtaining resources. In fact, the only project that the federation (in 
collaboration with ASICASUDD) had received was a SENASBA project for the 
development of technical and management capacity for 10 cooperatives and 10 
ASICASUDD members. However, the president of the federation was optimistic of their 
capability to develop an argument that could be accepted by state authorities and underlined 
how the FECOAPAC had been consulted with for the elaboration of the Metropolitan 
Masterplan and had been able to participate in the consultation of the General Law of 
Cooperatives as part of the FENCOPAS (the National Federation of Water Cooperatives). 
The FECOAPAC has then been able to reach some objectives, but they are far from making 
their discourse widely accepted, especially at the municipal level. To offer a comparison, I 
focus briefly on the case of the FEDECAAS (Departmental Federation of Water and 
Sanitation Cooperative of Santa Cruz).  The powerful Santa Cruz cooperatives, were in fact, 
able to build a stable relationship with the state, establish their legitimacy, and receive state 
funding in a way that the FECOAPAC had not yet managed. This comparison is useful in 
order to understand that the hydro-social territory which dominates state policies in 
Cochabamba depends on the relative political power of the actors pushing for it. The 
relationship between state and cooperatives is often shaped in legalistic and technical terms 
but it is also strongly influenced by the political strength that the cooperatives can exercise. 
This underlines once again that arguments that exclude the cooperatives from state funding 
or foresee their disappearance, while based on legal normative, and/or techno-economic 
analysis, are also political arguments and they should be treated as such. This emphasizes 
the need for these arguments to be publicly discussed, stressing the need for democratization 
and more transparency in the making of Cochabamba water governance.  
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The relationship between FEDECAAS and the Santa Cruz municipality is different from the 
one in Cochabamba. The cooperatives can access state resources and exercise more control 
over the municipal waterscape. This is due to the material differences in the waterscape 
between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, but also illustrates how different models of relations 
between municipalities and cooperatives can be established, and the usefulness of networks 
in negotiating relationships between communitarian organizations and the state.  
In the department of Santa Cruz de La Sierra water cooperatives are prominent, with the 
departmental federation counting, in 2014, 135 members (interview, President FEDECAAS, 
07.02.2014). The city of Santa Cruz does not have a municipal provider of water and 
sanitation. The water cooperative SAGUAPAC supplies its water to the city centre. 
SAGUAPAC is the largest water cooperative in the world that offers water service to 70% 
of the population and  sewage service to 44% (Vousvouras, 2013, p. 48). Due to the inability 
of SAGUAPAC to provide the service to the whole city, other cooperatives were founded. 
An example is the cooperative COOPLAN, founded in the peri-urban Plan 3000, and that 
now provide water to 26 500 households (interview, manager COOPLAN, 06.02.2014). 
Cooperatives in Santa Cruz are on average much larger than the one in Cochabamba. The 
president of the FEDECAAS estimated that an average cooperative had around 5 000 
connections (interview, 01.09.2014). 
The cooperatives of Santa Cruz, therefore, do not need to compete with the municipality for 
the control of the waterscape. They have strong control over water governance, including 
over the use of state resources for water and sanitation. Currently, as the president of 
FEDECAAS explained, they were able to obtain municipal funding for water and sanitation, 
and they were pushing for a percentage of municipal funding to be reserved for basic 
sanitation. They were also able to access funding through state projects, financed by the 
Inter-American Development Bank (BID) and the German agency for cooperation and 
development. The FEDECAAS was also at the head of the advisory committee for the Santa 
Cruz Metropolitan Masterplan for Water and Sanitation (interview, president FEDECAAS, 
07.02.2014; interview, president FEDECAAS, 01.09.2014) 
However, the situation in Santa Cruz had not always been so positive. The president of 
FEDECAAS affirmed that they also used to think that the state was going to take over, but 
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now they work together with all levels of the state (interview, president FEDECAAS, 
01.09.2014). He underlined that lack of understanding with the local government is one of 
the main problems of the cooperatives, but in Santa Cruz even the municipality realized that 
the cooperatives can provide a better service than the municipality (interview, president 
FEDECAAS 07.02.2014). In this case, the hydro-social territory elaborated through the 
cooperative’s network and propagated at various level of the state managed to strongly 
influence state policy. 
The president of the federation underlined how it is fundamental for the cooperatives to 
receive state funding in order to control and maintain their physical waterscape. In Santa-
Cruz, the service can be considered as effectively co-produced, with funding for large-scale 
works provided by the state, and the everyday service provided by the cooperatives.  The 
president of FEDECAAS stated that the cooperatives were not born to front large projects, 
extensions, and problems connected with waste water, but that they are able to cover the 
maintenance and the normal operations of their cooperatives. The manager of COOPLAN 
similarly affirmed that the cooperatives are mostly autonomous, but they need the support 
of the state, for large projects. The capability of the cooperatives to establish working 
relationships with different levels of the state is then fundamental for their continued 
capability to maintain their physical waterscape.  
The new favourable situation was due to the efforts of the federations and the legislative 
changes brought by the Morales government. New legislations acknowledge the 
cooperatives and underlined the duty of the government to provide the service.  FEDECAAS 
was founded in 2007, specifically to assist with presenting projects to the state. After the 
federation was established, the cooperatives were able to receive the help of professionals 
and technicians to elaborate on the projects, and the state started to listen to them, so that 
‘the life of the cooperatives changed’ (interview, manager of COOPLAN, 06.02.2014).  
To support their right to receive help from the state, the cooperatives of Santa Cruz created 
discourses over their role and the role of the state that are more coherent, and complete, than 
the ones employed by the Cochabamba cooperatives. The president of FEDECAAS 
underlined how the cooperatives are non-profit. However, differently from Cochabamba 
cooperatives representatives, he stated that they are public organizations. 
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Yes, I tell you that the Pluri-national Constitution of the Bolivian State established 
that the cooperatives are water and sanitation providers, and that the municipal 
government must guarantee this liquid element that it is water, as a fundamental 
human right. The cooperatives only have to do maintenance and day-to-day 
management and that is what the water provider covers, and the Bolivian state in its 
three levels has to help, and for this we are differentiating the theme of the water 
cooperatives that are public-public (president of FEDECAAS, 01.09.2014) 
The cooperatives of Santa Cruz have then been able to carve a more positive and productive 
relationship with the state, which reinforced their capability to control the waterscape. 
However, these relationships require the continuous attention of the Federation to be 
maintained and cultivated. Furthermore, respondents in Santa Cruz seemed aware of risk of 
co-option. Two interviewees underlined the need to maintain independence from political 
parties. 
This section, therefore, underlines the importance of networks for the capability of the 
cooperatives to both create and propagate their hydro-social territory, starting from the 
relationship between the cooperatives and their members and going to the relationship 
between the federation and various levels of the state. Furthermore, it emphasizes how the 
capability of the cooperatives to be accepted as legitimate part of the hydro-social territory 
is fundamental if they are to maintain their physical waterscape.  
6.3. Scale, Networks, hydro-social territories, and waterscape: 
an example of alternative governance 
I finish this chapter by analysing the project of the construction of a small-scale WWTP in 
the cooperatives San Pedro Magisterio. The construction of such a plant emphasize how 
cooperatives are capable to present alternatives to the hydro-social territory elaborated by 
state authorities, which present large-scale WWTP as the only solution to the pollution 
problem of the conurbation.  This case study presents an opportunity to look at how water 
cooperatives use different discourses to resist the state and also to examine how this 
resistance is made possible by their control over their territory and by their shared hydro-
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social territory. Furthermore, this case study also emphasizes how different levels of the state 
have different visions over the territory, as different state authorities alternatively supported 
and opposed the project. The importance of networks to support such alternative discourses 
and the material transformation of the waterscape is also emphasized in this case study. San 
Pedro Magisterio small-scale WWTP plant was financed by an Italian NGO and supported 
by a local Bolivian NGO.   
Finally, this case presents an opportunity to look at how cooperative members exercise their 
right to the city, to say their right to participate in decision-making over the shape the city 
should take. This right is mainly exercised on small scale, within the waterscape of their 
cooperatives. However, this case study exemplifies the capability of the cooperative to 
present alternatives to the state hydro-social territory, and therefore to influence discourses 
on governance at a higher scale. By offering alternative solutions to the dominant paradigm 
in the conurbation, the construction of small-scale WWTP underlines that presenting a large-
scale plant as the only solution to the pollution problem of the conurbation is a political 
choice and not a technical necessity.  
This is not to say that large-scale solutions supported by the state are not a necessity in 
Cochabamba: the construction of WWTP from the municipalities particularly are a necessity 
in an increasingly polluted conurbation. However, they can be accompanied by alternatives. 
The opposition, or the choice not to support, such alternatives should then be considered as 
a political choice that has not been discussed at the conurbation level, raising questions of 
democracy in the conurbation water governance.  
The construction of the WWTP for the cooperatives San Pedro Magisterio followed quite a 
tormented path, mainly due to the contrasts between communitarian organizations as well as 
the municipality over the control of the waterscape. The project was initially designed for a 
different cooperative acting in District 2. However, it encountered a series of obstacles that 
forced its move to the cooperative San Pedro Magisterio. NGO workers, and leaders in the 
cooperatives argued that these difficulties were at least partly due to the hostility of the 
municipality to the project.  
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Opposition to the project was then seen as a symptom of the general attitude of the state 
towards communitarian providers, as well as the focus of the state on large-scale 
infrastructures. Large scale projects, in fact, reinforce the power of the state on the territory, 
and are often supported through technical-juridical discourses which posit large-scale 
projects as the only solution in the conurbation. These discourses were sometimes associated 
with ones which doubted the technical competency of the cooperatives. This is also 
compounded by their so-called ‘private’ nature, which excludes them from the state funding 
that is necessary to carry out such projects. This small-scale WWTP project was then an 
attempt to propose a different narrative and to support the role of communitarian 
organization.   
However, while the difficulties encountered by the project could be seen as part of a largest 
trend, they also had specific characteristics, and were connected to local actors. This 
emphasizes the importance of local networks of power, of the control that local organizations 
can exercise over their waterscape and of the need to pay close attention to alliances between 
municipal politics, local power holders, and territorial organizations. Control over the 
waterscape is fundamental for the capability of the cooperatives to exercise power. The main 
point that made this project vulnerable was the fact that that plant needed to be built at the 
border of the river, outside the area of service of the cooperative for which it had been 
designed. Furthermore, there were some problems concerning the legal ownership of the 
land where the plant was supposed to be placed.  Finally, the cooperative encountered the 
opposition to the construction from the OTB in which areas the cooperatives’ waste water 
plant was supposed to be placed.  This underlined again how the control of the waterscape 
in the conurbation is determined by an overlapping set of state rules, regulations, and 
communitarian control.  
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Figure 17 The (approximate) area of service of the cooperative for which the plant was designed (red) position project 
WWTP (yellow), base map: municipality of Sacaba. 
The OTB in which area the WWTP was to be built discussed and opposed the construction 
of the plant during a public meeting. A general fear of waste water treatment plants was first 
posited as the reason for this resistance, but, as the situation developed, NGO representatives, 
leaders of the cooperative, and the consultants involved started to argue that the opposition 
was also due to the involvement and the opposition of the municipality. This opposition was 
attributed to the fact that the construction of a small-scale plant would have taken away users 
for their large-scale plant, whose building was scheduled to start soon (see Section 6.1.2). 
There were many elements, one of the main ones was that the cooperative did not 
have a consolidated piece of land, it did not have a piece of land in reality. The second 
was a sabotage from EMAPAS on this plant, because it would have taken away 2000 
families of users from the municipal system, and then the wife of the president of the 
cooperative was a member of the opposition in the municipal council (Oscar Olivera, 
Fundaciòn Abril, 11.08.2014) 
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Trying to grow support for the project, the president of the cooperative organised a meeting 
with representative of various OTBs of the district, as well as asking to participate in a public 
meeting of the OTB in which the plant was to be built. Both meetings went quite well. 
However, the president of the OTB underlined that they could not simply revoke their 
previous decision, and, in the end, it was decided that a commission would be formed in the 
OTB to analyse the plant project. While waiting for an answer the cooperative called another 
meeting to explain the project to the inhabitants of the area surrounding the plant. In this 
meeting, after an initial hostility, the overwhelming majority of the people present approved 
the project. 
These meetings revealed great awareness of the problems caused by the river pollution, and 
that people were keen to find a solution. The oratory capability of the president of the 
cooperative, the fact that he was a long-time prominent figure in the district with deep 
knowledge of its problems and inhabitants (it was not rare to see him address people by name 
at various meetings), as well as the technical explanations given in an accessible manner by 
the designers of the projects, made it so that the inhabitants seemed ready to accept the plant. 
However, a letter from the municipal provider EMAPAS that criticised the plant on technical 
grounds put the project into question again.  
Adding a further layer of complication to the situation was the fact that the president of the 
OTB opposing the plant was also the president of the association of OTBs of the district, and 
therefore a prominent figure in the District 2. General tensions in the district, therefore, were 
interpreted by my respondents as having an effect in the construction of the plant. Some of 
my respondents in the district asserted that this organization was quite enmeshed in the 
municipal politics, as well as rife with internal tensions. The president of the district, for his 
part, asserted that he was just trying to improve the district, and conflicts in the association 
of OTBs derived from the fact that to do so, he had broken certain established structures of 
power in the district; for example, clashing with some cooperatives. He also argued that his 
OTB was the legitimate authority over the territory and therefore the one that should have a 
final say over the construction of the plant. He strongly criticized the project and the way in 
which it was carried out. While it was not possible to clearly understand how all these 
tensions effectively influenced the construction of the plant, it is important to underline that 
relationships of power and tensions between different communitarian organizations 
231 
 
  
emphasize once again how the control over the waterscape is fragmented and not exercised 
by one single entity.  
As a consequence of these complications, it was finally decided that the plant could not 
possibly be built within a reasonable timeframe in the chosen cooperative and was moved to 
the cooperative San Pedro Magisterio.  The president of the cooperative of San Pedro (which 
was also the president of the OTB) had in fact previously expressed interest in the project 
and had a space available within the OTB. These characteristics made carrying out the 
project simpler. The cooperatives and OTB had, in fact, quite strong links, and the project 
was to be executed in the territory of the community served by the cooperative. The project 
in San Pedro, therefore, went on in quite a smooth manner, even if a series of formalities 
needed to be addressed, and additional funding (obtained through an international funding 
campaign) were necessary to improve the sewage system.  
The control of the community over the waterscape then made the project possible. 
Furthermore, the population of the neighbourhood supported the plant as the project was 
conceived as benefiting them directly. One of the cooperative users I interviewed, lauded the 
project at the same time as she criticized the building of a waste water collector (which would 
receive waste water from outside the OTB) to canalize waste water to the municipality’s 
WWTP36. She underlined how the inhabitants’ sense of belonging to their neighbourhood 
makes it easier for a local initiative to be accepted, when an ‘external’ one, even supported 
by the state, might be rejected. The plant is now finished and working.  
 
                                                 
36 I could not find further details of such as project, but I report this exchange to exemplify the attitude of the 
inhabitants on the subject.   
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Figure 18 Area of Service Cooperative San Pedro Magisterio (red), and position of WWTP (yellow), Base map: 
Municiipality of Sacaba. 
This example allowed me to illuminate and connect many of the themes of my thesis, starting 
to underline how the themes that emerged from the fourth and fifth chapter contribute to 
develop urban water governance. Firstly, this case study underlines the significance of the 
capability of a cooperative or an OTB to control its space, but also how OTBs are connected 
with wider structures of power. In District 2, in fact, local structures of power influenced the 
development of project, and the municipality also played a role. The problems that made the 
construction of the WWTP difficult were partly connected to pre-existing tensions over the 
control of the waterscape (which, at the very least, fuelled distrust between certain 
organizations). 
Secondly, this case study illustrates the need for the cooperatives to build networks of 
relationships to obtain funding and support. The cooperative San Pedro, in fact, was able to 
obtain this project by linking itself with actors at a national and the international level (in 
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this specific case, the Fundación Abril and the Italian NGO Cevi) and was also capable to 
receive support from the regional government.  
Thirdly, this case study illuminates the existence of differences in vision of the hydro-social 
territory of different levels of the state. The departmental government stance is a particularly 
interesting case, as it supported the construction of the Sacaba municipality plant, but also 
the Cevi project. The regional government had supported the project from the beginning, 
however, they had no wish to participate directly before a place for the construction of the 
plant was firmly secured. Nevertheless, when the project received the support of the 
inhabitants of San Pedro they were ready to offer more substantial support. The project then 
received support by various department offices (in particular, in the Departmental Unit for 
Basic Sanitation) while the governor publicly showed his support by participating in a press 
conference when the plant construction was announced, as well as the ceremony for the 
opening of the plant. This support might indicate that officials in the departmental 
government are more open than the Sacaba Municipal Authorities to alternative solutions to 
Cochabamba water and sanitation problem (even if large-scale projects are still seen as the 
main solution). 
Sometimes there are mediocrities of the … not of the population, but of EMAPAS 
itself (…) We have explained to EMAPAS the they [the cooperative] have all the 
right to build a plant, if they want to treat their water. What the municipality must do 
is simply supervise that the plant is working (…) through its environmental unit, the 
one of the municipality. They can control, take water samples, to see if the water is 
treated or not, right? Therefore, I believe that the cooperative can do it here. Yes, if 
they have the possibility to build a plant they can do it (…) But I believe, in my 
opinion, that as a municipality they should not try to stop others from building more 
plants. This is not good, in my opinion (…) In the end no one is going to force [the 
cooperative] to discharge in this [EMAPAS’s] plant, right? This is their decision. 
This is what we trying to explain to EMAPAS. That they cannot act as a policeman 
and say, “you have to connect or else”, right? (Official Unit for Basic Sanitation, 
Departmental Government, 15.07.2014) 
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Fourthly, this case study underlines the difficulties in the relationship between the 
cooperatives and the municipality, and the efforts of the municipality to expand its control 
over the territory. Such contrasts are based on competition over the control of the waterscape 
and are supported through different representation of the hydro-social territory. Part of this 
vision, is how the municipality sees the cooperatives in the district, often looked as 
organizations that do not have the technical and organizational expertise to front the growth 
of the population. These issues were already discussed in Chapter 5, and in Section 6.2, but 
the assumption over the incompetency of the cooperatives also emerged implicitly from the 
way in which the municipality criticised the technology proposed in the design of the original 
plant and expressed worries on the capability of the cooperatives in general to appropriately 
manage a WWTP.  
While, in fact, EMAPAS interviewees frequently underlined that they did not wish to take 
away the networks of the cooperatives, and that the cooperatives were free to implement 
their WWTP, they, however, expressed some worry over the capability of the cooperatives 
to carry out and take care of such a project. Specifically, on the original WWTP project, they 
expressed reservation about the technology employed. There were some other observations, 
mainly concerning the need of additional documentation, information, and formalities, but 
those, argued the designer of the project, were solvable (and in fact they were obtained before 
starting the construction of the WWTP in San Pedro). The bigger obstacle was the overall 
criticism of the technology that the cooperative wished to employ. 
We received the project of the treatment plant so that we could revise it. As technicians 
we gave our opinion (…) It had a lot of problems, to say the truth, the project. It seemed 
simply an Imhoff tank and it did not have any more treatment. I would suggest that they 
revise the technology that they think to apply, and also to revise the population and the 
flow, because there were voids in the project (engineers, EMAPAS. 08.05.2014) 
The designer of the project answered the criticism of the technology employed by 
underlining that the technical personnel of EMAPAS did not have experience with the 
technology proposed (Upflow Anaerobic Sludge Blanked), that had been selected as the 
most appropriate for the space and budget available.  He argued that the problem was that 
the municipality engineers are used to think only about large-scale plants, but that the 
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technology that they proposed has been largely employed in South America. In a sense, these 
interviews flipped over the discourse of the municipality, criticizing EMAPAS’ competence. 
Furthermore, this exchange of criticisms underlines how technical discourses often conceal 
political reasoning.  
But fundamentally they commented that these kinds of plants are not useful, because 
they did not give results. So, I repeat again, how can they speak about something that 
they do not know, how can they criticize something of which they have no experience 
(...). But, behind everything, there are the issues of which we spoke before: that there 
is an interest to criticise the technology (interview, designers project Cevi, 
11.04.2014) 
Finally, this case offers an example of how alternative visions of the hydro-social landscape 
can be constructed. The capability of the cooperatives, and of the water movements allied 
with them, to develop discourses that are discordant with that of the municipality is a sign 
of their capability to resist state power. This shows that the state does not have complete 
control either over the waterscapes, or over hydro-social imaginaries. The capability of those 
involved in the project to criticise EMAPAS competency, then, could be read as a capability 
to resist the discourse of the municipality that posits its role as the sole actor for the resolution 
of the Sacaba wastewater issues. These criticisms furthermore, contribute to modify a 
discourse that posit communitarian providers as simple artisanal system, incapable of coping 
with the progress of the conurbation, and therefore as ‘stepping stones’ useful only before 
the arrival of a municipal system. 
Furthermore, the construction of small-scale plants also implicitly criticizes the discourse 
which posits large-scale infrastructural work as the sole possible solution of the waste water 
pollution crisis in the conurbation. Both in the municipality and in the departmental 
government office, large scale plants have always been seen as the main solution. While the 
departmental government did support the plant of San Pedro, it did not seem that this was 
part of a political vision that included small-scale plants (in urban areas) as the solution for 
sanitation problems. Social problems, and the problem of obtaining land were in fact 
mentioned by most state interviewees, but the possibility for smaller plants to be part of a 
solution seemed to not have been seriously considered. Small-scale plants administered by 
236 
 
  
communities have been built in the Cochabamba department, but usually in rural areas. One 
plant has been built in an isolated neighbourhood in Cochabamba and it was considered to 
be a solution at the level of neighbourhood, where the municipal system had not arrived.  
It is important to underline that these discourses do not necessarily criticize large scale 
solutions or downgrade the importance of the state in finding a solution to this problem. 
However, the presence of small scale waste water plants could be considered as an advantage 
instead of a difficulty. While EMAPAS projects are indubitably a necessity, and the 
municipality of Sacaba had been admirably active in improving its water and sewage 
services, these improvements do not necessary exclude complementary projects and 
organizations.  The Fundacción Abril NGO (which assisted on the construction of the waste 
water treatment plant of San Pedro) members in particular considered the communitarian 
character of the San Pedro plant as an advantage, as it guarantees more transparency, and 
the possibility for the plant to be followed more closely by the whole community.  
Some respondents working in the project also mentioned that large-scale structures could 
not solve the problem on their own, and it would be interesting to have a mixture of small 
and large-scale plants. The social difficulty of building a plant, the expense of using large 
stretches of land, as well as the continuous growth of the conurbation were mentioned. This 
solution was also mentioned by an ex-official of the departmental government environmental 
office. She relayed that she had wanted to push for small treatment plants, but she did not 
get the political support for it. She argued that the best solution would be the combination of 
small and large plants, as due to the growth of the population building only big ones is not 
sustainable. Interest in building small-scale treatment plants and the difficulties in building 
large infrastructures due to the changing structure of the conurbation was also underlined by 
a SEMAPA officials. However, these opinions seem to still be a minority. 
Mixed, big and small, right? Because water cooperatives are already established, 
right? So, we have to understand the reason why these associations exist. We are 
growing chaotically, so that we must find long-term solutions. And, for me, long 
terms solutions are these mixed associations. Not saying “the small ones are useless,” 
right? They need to be done, because the big ones are not going to be enough, and in 
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20 years they are going to be another Alba Rancho (ex-officer Departmental 
Environmental Unit, 03.07.2014) 
Conclusion 
This chapter underlines how water governance, in Cochabamba, is a complicated and 
contradictory affair, influenced by different actors, acting at different scales. Governance is 
built and changed through the material construction of the waterscape as well as through 
discourses and the way in which the two influence each other. Governance is a deeply 
political discourse, but it is often posed in technical and legal terms. Acknowledging the 
underlying discussion over the role of the communitarian providers is then necessary to 
create a more democratic water governance.  
To understand the influence of communitarian providers in the creation of the conurbation 
governance, it is necessary to look both the way in which they build their physical waterscape 
and the way in which they imagine it, to say their imagined hydro-social territories, both 
built though the lived history and the day-to-day interaction of the cooperatives’ users. This 
chapter underlined how these interactions created discourses that aim to defend the 
cooperatives' autonomy, while long-term interaction with the state created a certain level of 
distrust towards the municipal authorities. Therefore, as the municipal control over the 
territory increased clashes both at the discursive and at the material level emerged.  
The construction of large-scale infrastructures by the state, in particular, are supported by a 
desire to control and order the waterscape, as well as the vision for a universal service 
provider, either at the municipal or at the conurbation level. The capability of the 
cooperatives to resist this vision takes different forms: through the construction of formal 
networks capable to shift the discourse and open the use of state resources to the 
cooperatives, through the construction of alternative solutions which challenge the dominant 
discourse on large-scale infrastructures; and through resistance brought by their shared 
hydro-social territory and their sense of ownership over their territory. The governance 
model of the municipalities and of the state then, often need to be re-ordered around the 
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cooperatives. However, the cooperatives do not only passively resist the state but have been 
creating networks capable of modifying the dominant state discourse. 
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Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
As attention towards communitarian providers in cities has increased, the literature has posed 
questions regarding their ability to exercise agency. The answers to such questions have 
significant consequences for analytical approaches to democratic governance in cities as well 
as how urban communities can exercise their right to the city. This dissertation focuses on 
the capability of communitarian organization to influence urban water governance. 
My research contributes to this body of literature by presenting a framework of analysis that 
underlines the importance of connecting the ways in which urban communitarian providers 
physically and discursively control space, to the influence of that control over relationships 
of power at different scales. More specifically, I emphasise the need to consider material and 
discursive control of limited spaces in relation to wider governance. The framework of 
analysis that I propose and apply in this thesis links different scales and spaces of analysis 
by connecting the concepts of scale, waterscape, hydro-social territory and networks through 
an enhanced version of the TPSN framework of Jessop et al. (2008).  
The first section of this chapter briefly summarises my research aim. It then illustrates how 
I reached such aim through an analysis of the Cochabamba water cooperatives. The second 
section describes my analytical and empirical contributions to knowledge. Finally, the third 
section explores limitations of this study as well as avenues for future research.  
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Research aim and main insights 
This section briefly reviews the main objective of this dissertation and the corresponding 
research questions. It then explores the main findings and their contributions to 
accomplishing the research aim.  
The overall aim of this dissertation is to determine how communitarian providers influence 
patterns of urban governance on the basis of the case of water cooperatives that operate in 
the Cochabamba conurbation. The case of Cochabamba is useful for my analysis for two 
main reasons. First, the heterogeneous waterscape of the Cochabamba conurbation allowed 
me to study the interactions of various state authorities and communitarian organisations that 
influence water governance at different scales. Second, the strengthening of state 
intervention revealed tensions concerning control of the waterscape. Both of these elements 
offered insight into the impact of actors who operate in diverse spaces and at a variety of 
scales. 
Rather than conceptualising governance as a coherent set of actors and institutions, my 
analysis assumes a definition of governance as a process that is created by divergent and 
occasionally clashing interests. Governance is an inherently political process through which 
multiple visions of the waterscape interact. Therefore, to analyse urban water governance, it 
is necessary to examine how communitarian and state actors at various scales use formal and 
informal processes and institutions to influence the control, channelling and distribution of 
water.  
To understand water governance in the Cochabamba conurbation, I first explored how both 
the state and the cooperatives have affirmed and strengthened their respective roles. I then 
analysed the ways in which they have influenced, limited and conflicted with each other 
directly or through networks. On the basis of these three elements, I investigated the 
production of governance through numerous actors and visions in a variety of scales and 
places.  
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I achieve my research aim by answering the following questions: 
• How do cooperatives protect and further their role as a water provider? 
• How do state institutions affirm their role in the water sector? 
• How do the state and the cooperatives interact in the water sector? 
The answers to these research questions illuminate the relationship between the state and the 
cooperatives at multiple scales and reveal how these relationships shape water governance.  
The overall conclusion of this dissertation is that cooperatives can influence water 
governance on a variety of scales and in multiple ways through the control of their 
waterscape and capability of elaborating imagined hydro-social territories. Such territories 
are propagated in scale through networks. Moreover, the ability of the cooperatives to control 
the waterscape and create hydro-social territories derives from their history and relationship 
with their members, which cultivates feelings of belonging to the territory. Furthermore, I 
argue that the ability of both the state and the cooperatives to control their waterscape and 
hydro-social territory are correlated and mutually influential. Specifically, the hydro-social 
territory affects the protection of the waterscape, and the modification of the waterscape 
impacts the hydro-social territory. Therefore, material and discursive controls over the 
waterscape co-produce and influence each other.  
In this section, I first underline the importance of the ability of cooperatives to materially 
and discursively control their waterscape. I propose that the capability of creating a shared 
hydro-social territory is the method by which the cooperative can exercise discursive power. 
Such shared vision is cultivated through the history of the cooperatives and, specifically, the 
sacrifices of inhabitants to create the waterscape. The establishment of a shared hydro-social 
territory is fundamental to the relationship between the cooperatives and their members, 
which is essential for their ability to physically control and maintain the waterscape. 
Examining how the cooperatives establish discursive and physical control over their 
waterscape clarified their ability to influence water governance at the conurbation scale.   
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The physical presence of the cooperatives and their means of impacting the waterscape limit 
the ability of the state to control and order the territory. Additionally, a shared hydro-social 
territory is vital for the ability of the cooperatives to present alternatives to the strong 
‘imagined’ hydro-social territory of the state and, in particular, of the municipalities. In fact, 
cooperatives question the discourse that represents them as a ‘stepping stone,’ inefficient 
organisations or even ‘private’ organisations that are ‘searching for profits.’ To combat this 
discourse, they have proposed another narrative which presents them as organisations that 
serve a community, are more present on the territory compared to the municipal company 
and, therefore, are more capable of following the wishes of their inhabitants. Through these 
discourses, cooperatives have carved their own space in the conurbation and challenge the 
dominant discourse of municipal authorities. Finally, the formation of networks propagates 
and reinforces such discursive and material control. These networks reinforce the vision of 
the cooperatives as legitimate providers and create links between them and the state at 
multiple scales. The interaction at these scales is particularly relevant, given that the state 
perspective varies by level.  
Despite the ability of the cooperatives to influence water governance, they are not the 
primary actor with this capability. The state can exert control that is strong, though not 
unchallenged, over the waterscape of the conurbation through institutional, legislative and 
material changes. In the case of Cochabamba, I interpret the attempts of the state to ‘order’ 
the waterscape through state legislation and large-scale infrastructure as an effort to make 
the waterscape more legible and, therefore, more controllable. I argue that such intervention 
depends on their vision of the hydro-social territory – and specifically those parts under the 
control of communitarian providers – as disordered and, thus, difficult to understand and 
control.  
Attempts to make the waterscape more ordered and controllable are associated, especially at 
the municipal scale, with a vision of an ‘ideal’ hydro-social territory, wherein the state 
provides the service through a universal service provider at either the municipal or 
conurbation level. While this ideal configuration is difficult to achieve, it can influence the 
action and projects of the state. Therefore, it can have real effects on their view and 
modification of the waterscape as well as their vision of the role of communitarian providers.  
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While most state officials have viewed peri-urban communitarian organisations as weak and 
at risk of disappearing, the state’s vision of cooperatives does change with the level of the 
state. Municipal officials often use delegitimising discourse in regard to the cooperatives, 
such as by defining them as ‘private’ and asserting their own role as ‘legitimate service 
providers.’ Such discourses are often used to justify excluding the cooperatives from state 
funding. Other levels of the state are more likely to accept communitarian organisations as 
legitimate providers. Cooperatives therefore attempt to create connections with various 
levels of state through a network to receive support and resources.  
From this perspective, cooperatives are not independent but in fact subject to changes about 
which they have limited input. State-induced changes in water governance strongly influence 
the cooperatives. In the conurbation, legislation such as rural reforms – and, more recently, 
the formalisation of communitarian water providers – has and continues to influence 
cooperatives. Alterations to the material waterscape through large-scale infrastructure have 
the potential to weaken communitarian organisations, but they might also present an answer 
to the need of certain cooperatives to access quality water sources and to purify waste water. 
Furthermore, cooperatives reside within a wider waterscape whose evolution, which resulted 
from migration, population growth and large-scale infrastructure construction, heavily 
impacts cooperatives.  
Considering the influence of the state and cooperatives over both water governance and each 
other, it is apparent that the state exerts a stronger impact on the shape of the waterscape and 
it is therefore capable of designing and imposing a more dominant vision of the hydro-social 
territory. However, this control is not unchallenged. Communitarian organisations and 
providers with whom the state must negotiate are vital for the ability of the state to physically 
modify different spaces. Furthermore, the state’s vision of the future of water governance in 
Cochabamba is contested by communitarian providers, whose presence offers an alternative 
model of governance. Thus, cooperatives are able to negotiate with the state at various levels 
and occasionally use the state’s internal contradictions to resist its attempts to strengthen 
direct control over the territory and reinforce the state’s presence and rights over the territory. 
Through both their independent efforts and their networks, cooperatives can exercise a 
certain amount of agency. A crucial conclusion of this thesis is that all means by which 
cooperatives and the state influence each other must be considered in combination in order 
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to understand the participation of these various actors in the development of water 
governance.  
Contribution to knowledge: the ‘enhanced’ TPSN framework, the role 
of urban communitarian providers and democratic water governance 
This section details the contribution of this thesis to the knowledge of the field. I argue that 
this thesis contributes to knowledge in three main ways. Firstly, I broadly contribute to the 
literature on multi-stakeholder water governance in urban areas by exploring how 
communitarian organizations influence water governance. This is a facet of urban 
governance that has been little explored in the literature. I argue that communitarian 
organizations’ capability to exercise discursive and material power at the local level is the 
basis for their capability to influence wider urban water governance. This brings me to my 
second contribution to knowledge: the modified TPSN framework.  This framework allows 
me to look at how power, exercised in different ways, at different scales, in different spaces, 
and through networks, influences water governance in an urban space. Through this 
framework, furthermore, I make my third contribution, specifically to the literature on 
democratic water governance. I argue that the capability of local communitarian water 
providers to exercise their right to the city (seen here as the right to decide how the city 
should be shaped in relations to water provision) in limited spaces contributes to the 
democratization of water governance at a higher scale. Communitarian organizations can, in 
fact, limit the power of the state both by materially controlling their local waterscape and 
through their capability to create discourses on how the overall urban waterscape should be 
shaped. The existence of alternative discourses contributes, in an admittedly limited way, to 
democratize governance in the city, especially by contesting the supposedly neutral 
decisions taken by the state apparatus. Adding to these three main contributions, this 
dissertation also contributes to empirical knowledge of communitarian sewage and 
wastewater management in cities. The rest of this sub-section expands on these 
contributions.  
How communitarian organizations contribute to water governance is a facet of multi-
stakeholder urban water governance that has been little addressed by the literature, but which 
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has important implications. The capability of communitarian providers to exercise agency is 
a point of debate in the literature, but the discussion often only focuses on the capability of 
communitarian organization to resist state control. My dissertation offers a contribution to 
this literature as it does not only consider the capability of local organizations to resist state 
control but also looks at how such organizations influence the overall shape of urban water 
governance. Exploring the capability of communitarian organizations to exercise power to 
influence governance, I argued that such capability is based on their control over their local 
waterscape. Such control, I contend, allows communitarian organizations to interact with 
and limit the power of the state at different scales, therefore influencing urban water 
governance as a whole. 
Debates over the role of small-scale providers emerged due to a shift in policies concerning 
water provision in the Global South. After privatisation policies failed to deliver water to the 
‘poor’ interest in communitarian providers rose among both proponents and opponents of 
privatisation (Bakker, 2008, p.236). This heightened interest was accompanied by a shift 
towards multi-stakeholder governance models, which include attention to ‘civil society’ 
participation. From this context, a debate over the role of communitarian providers emerged, 
especially over the capability of communitarian organizations to exercise agency. Parties 
have expressed fear that the state or elites would co-opt communitarian organisations or that 
‘community participation’ could be used to justify abandoning or underserving part of the 
population (Finewood and Holifield, 2015, p. 89) (Bakker, 2013a, p. 257). The capability of 
communitarian organizations to resist the control of the state is therefore put into doubt. 
Authors argue that the participation of civil society to service provision can be interpreted 
as governmentality, to say as a technique of governance aimed at disciplining the population 
(Swyngedouw, 2005b, p. 2003). Such a concept is often applied in the literature when 
looking at the capability of the state to control urban and environmental governance. 
However, such a vision is also contested: Kooy and Bakker (2008), for example, argue that 
‘governmentality’ is not a totalizing system, especially in a post-colonial context. Appadurai 
(2001, p. 35) offers examples of urban communities’ networks capability to exercise 
‘governmentality from below’. 
Perreault (2008, p. 839) has therefore argued that more attention should be directed to ‘social 
movements, resource users’ groups, or other civil society organizations’ in natural resource 
governance. Studies have  investigated the ability of rural organisations to influence water 
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governance (Boelens et al., 2015; Bridge and Perreault, 2009, p. 487; Hoogesteger, 2012) as 
well as the interaction between ‘informal’ providers and the ‘formal’ state providers (e.g. 
Ahlers et al., 2014; Bakker, 2008; Cheng, 2014; Marston, 2014; McMillan et al., 2014; 
Schwartz et al., 2015). However, research has only marginally examined the ability of 
‘informal’ providers to influence governance at a higher scale and in an urban context. The 
few exceptions especially concern the case of the Technical Water Committees in Caracas 
and their relationship with the public utility. Studies on this subject have argued that 
communitarian organisations were able to exercise a form of social control over the water 
utility and, therefore, to engender change in water governance (Allen et al., 2006, p. 348; 
McMillan et al., 2014, p. 203). 
However, the last two studies do not focus on the material and social relationship between 
urban communitarian organisations and their physical waterscape. My thesis underlines that 
this relationship is fundamental for their capability of influencing water governance. 
Through a detailed, empirical exploration of communitarian water providers in 
Cochabamba, I demonstrate that an analysis of water governance should take into 
consideration the relationship between communitarian providers, their physical waterscape 
and their vision of it (i.e. their hydro-social territory). Previous research has assessed the 
importance of a community’s conception of its territory to influence large-scale water 
governance but is limited to a rural context. Romano (2016) has asserted that Nicaraguan 
rural water providers use networks to propagate their ‘hydro-social’ territories in front of the 
state in order to protect their autonomy and enhance democratic governance  (see also 
Hoogesteger et al., 2006). Nevertheless, no research has examined the relationship between 
communitarian water providers and their territory, and the effect of this relationship on water 
governance in an urban waterscape at multiple scale.  
Authors have underlined the importance of seeking resistance at multiple scales (Perreault, 
2008) and encouraged attention to ‘the power of self-governance’ as well as the ‘micro-
politics of subject formations’ (Gabriel, 2014, pp. 41–42). I address both these calls by 
stressing the significance of small-scale territorial control and shared history in determining 
the ability of grassroot actors to resist state power at both a local and at a higher scale. 
Additionally, I highlight the criticality of the geographical limits of territorial control that 
the state can exercise within cities. Authors have argued that the state’s capability of 
controlling processes of informality (Ahlers et al., 2014, pp. 4–5) and exercising 
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‘governmentality’ (Gabriel, 2014; Kooy and Bakker, 2008) is limited. However, I propose 
that this limitation should also be viewed in relation to the ability of the state to exercise 
territorial control, as the control that the communitarian organizations exercise on their local 
waterscape limits the material control of the state. Therefore, I argue that a true 
understanding of the formation of water governance in the Global South requires 
examination of the contributions of communitarian providers at multiple scales and in 
different ways. 
This conclusion lead to my second contribution to knowledge: the enhanced TPSN 
framework. In my dissertation, I argue that to analyse the ability of communitarian providers 
to influence urban water governance, one needs to take into consideration the existence of 
physically overlapping waterscapes and hydro-social territories that are produced and 
controlled by both communitarian organisations and the state at different scales. The 
capability of communitarian organizations to exercise power should be then considered at 
different scales, both as single organisations and through the use of networks.  
To examine how all these facets of water governance overlap, I elaborated an ‘enhanced’ 
TPSN framework that supports a detailed analysis of the role of communitarian providers in 
an urban context. It allows for connecting analyses of waterscapes and hydro-social 
territories that were carried out in separate spaces and geographical scales to understand how 
they influence the overall urban water governance. It also facilitates an analysis of the 
interaction between actors at different scales while grounding them in their relationship with 
their waterscape. Furthermore, it clarifies how the discourse regarding the waterscape 
informs material control over it. Finally, it permits an examination of the effect of networks 
at different scales on governance. This framework, thus, contributes to the literature on urban 
water governance by encouraging the integration of separate concepts, such as scale, hydro-
social territory and waterscape, as well as through its suitability for multi-scale and multi-
site analysis.  
The analysis that followed this framework also allowed me to make a contribution to the 
literature on democratic water governance. I argue that waterscape modification and 
participation in water governance by communitarian providers are means by which urban 
communities can exercise their right to the city. Chapter 1 has asserted that democratic water 
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governance should include the right to modify and participate in governance arrangements 
and in the evolving shape of the city on both material and discursive levels. The concept of 
democratic water governance can then be reconfigured as the right of inhabitants to exercise 
their right to the city (Perreault, 2014, p. 243). In Cochabamba, cooperative members 
effectively participate in the production of their waterscape and its associated imaginaries 
(i.e. hydro-social territories). In this way, they are exercising their right to the city on a small 
scale. However, the state has also produced a discourse concerning the role of cooperatives 
and its own role that often presents contradictory effects. These visions are decisive in 
configuring the conurbation water governance, though often without an open political 
debate. For cooperative members and Cochabamba inhabitants in general to fully exercise 
their right to the city, an open debate on the optimal approach to water governance is crucial. 
Therefore, I argue for the need to observe how the right to the city is exercised at different 
scales as well as how discourses regarding the ideal hydro-social territory are produced and 
contested and which facets of it are open to discussion.  
Finally, this thesis contributes empirically to knowledge of communitarian organisations in 
cities and to the area of community-managed waste water treatment in particular. The 
literature has rarely considered this aspect of communitarian management (for literature on 
communitarian sewage treatment, see Das, 2015). The state has advocated for large-scale 
solutions, and only a few state interviewees believed that waste water treatment on a smaller 
scale could be useful. However, because of the difficulty of procuring large tracts of land as 
well as the social opposition to the construction of large-scale treatment plants, 
communitarian management could support improvements to waste water pollution in the 
conurbation. My dissertation suggests that the population might be more receptive to a plant 
that treats the community’s own waste water and is controlled by an organisation with which 
they have a close relationship. While the one case I observed does not yield enough data in 
this sense, it does imply that alternative solutions are feasible for waste water treatment in 
cities in the Global South.  
Limitations and recommendations for future research 
Time and access restraints imposed limitations on my fieldwork. This section explores such 
limitations and subsequently recommends areas for future research. Certain decisions that I 
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have made during my fieldwork yielded beneficial results and excluded avenues for inquiry. 
However, an in-depth study of cooperatives in different municipalities may clarify 
discrepancies between the water policies of municipalities. Conducting research in a 
municipality without a municipal water provider could have more clearly underlined how 
water governance at the local level is influenced by the presence of a municipal provider. 
More generally, it may reveal how a stronger or weaker ability of the municipality to provide 
the service influences the ability of communitarian organisations to shape water governance. 
Furthermore, water governance involves other actors, such as private organisations, 
irrigators (considered only marginally here) and mountain communities. Although these 
inquiries were beyond the scope of this dissertation, a study that encompasses these 
organisations could provide a more precise understanding of the creation of water 
governance in the conurbation.  
My fieldwork has also imposed a limited time period to explore operations. When I finished 
my fieldwork, certain projects were on the brink of beginning or finishing, including the 
Misicuni project, the WWTP (waste water treatment plant) of Sacaba and the WWTP of the 
cooperatives of San Pedro Magisterio. A study of the effective consequences of these 
projects is a fundamental area of inquiry for a future research. In fact, the construction of 
such infrastructure will heavily impact the physical waterscape. More specifically, large-
scale infrastructure might strengthen the control of the state over the waterscape and over 
water governance in general. A study on the functioning of the WWTP of San Pedro 
Magisterio might yield a useful analysis of small solutions for large-scale issues in an urban 
context.  
My research has focused on why and how communitarian providers influence water 
governance. Through interviews with state officials, I explored the state’s motivation and 
ability to shape water governance in a certain way. However, a more in-depth study of 
decision making and discourse cultivation within state institutions is necessary to clarify the 
motivations of various state levels as well as how they develop and apply their vision of 
water governance. Ethnographic studies within state institutions are inherently difficult but 
could indubitably provide an interesting context to investigate differences in discourses at 
various state levels as well as the elements that inform political decisions. It could also be 
useful to obtain a deeper explanation of party politics and the influence of certain elements, 
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such as elections or differences between the parties in power at each state level, over water 
governance.  
A final line of inquiry for future research could be a case study of Santa Cruz cooperatives 
and their creation of a constructive relationship with the state. Such research might introduce 
a comparative element to my study of Cochabamba water cooperatives and reveal how 
power impacts the ability of cooperatives to influence water governance.  
Conclusion 
This dissertation has connected the ways in which communitarian providers and the state 
have clashed, co-operated and influenced each other to create water governance at different 
scales. It has underlined how urban organisations can develop a shared vision of their 
waterscape, which informs their decision-making and capability of influencing water 
governance. I have argued that such organisations can contest state discourses and control 
by exerting their ability to defend their material waterscape and propagate their hydro-social 
territories through networks and examples of alternative governance.  
This analysis was guided by the ‘enhanced’ TPSN framework, which integrates the concepts 
of waterscape, hydro-social territory, scale and network. Thereby, the framework offers 
insight into the creation of water governance through visions and material control that 
interact at various scales and are connected through networks. 
Finally, this dissertation has demonstrated the value of considering how actors exercise 
democratic control of resources in different spaces in the city on the basis of shared 
experiences and history. Thus, it has revealed that such control can have democratising 
effects on governance at a larger scale. 
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Glossary  
• AAPS: Autoridad de Fiscalización Y Control Social de Medio Ambiente y Agua – 
Authority for the Regulation and Social Control of Water and the Environment. 
• Aguatuya: Cochabamba-based NGO that works in the water sector. 
• ASICASUDD-EPSA: Asociación de Sistemas Comunitarios de Agua de Sud 
Departamental y Entidades Prestadoras de Servicio de Agua y Saneamiento de 
Cochabamba. Departmental association of communitarian water providers of the 
South and of water and sewage providers of Cochabamba. 
• BID: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo- Inter-American Development Bank. 
• CAF: Corporacion Andina de Fomento: Andean Development Corporation. 
• CLOCSAS: Confederación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones Comunitarias de 
Servicios de Agua y Saneamiento – Latin-American Confederation of 
communitarian water and sanitation providers. 
• Directors: dirigentes - elected officials of a cooperative, federation, OTB. 
• EMAGUA: Entidad Ejecutora de Medio Ambiente y Agua – Executing Agency for 
Water and the Environment. 
• EMAPAS: Sacaba Municipal Water Provider. 
• EMAPAQ: Quillacollo Municipal Water Provider. 
• FECOAPAC: Federación de Cooperativas de Agua y Alcantarillado de 
Cochabamba - Departmental Federation of Water and Sanitation Cooperatives of 
Cochabamba. 
• FENCOPAAS: Federación Nacional de Cooperativas de Agua y Saneamiento -
National Federation of Water and Sanitation Cooperatives. 
• FEDECAAS: Federación departamental de agua potable y alcantarillado de 
Santa Cruz - Departmental Federation of Cooperatives of Water and Sanitation of 
Santa Cruz. 
• FPS: Fondo de Inversión Productiva y Social – Fund for Productive and Social 
Investment. 
• Fundación Abril: Cochabamba-based NGOs active in the water sector and chaired 
by Oscar Olivera, one of the leaders of Cochabamba's Water War of 2000.  
• OTB: Organizaciones Territoriales de Base – Grassroot Territorial Organizations, 
legally recognized neighbourhood associations. 
• PMMC: Plan Maestro Metropolitano Cochabamba - Metropolitan Masterplan of 
Cochabamba. 
• SEMAPA: Cochabamba municipal water provider. 
• SENASBA: Servicio Nacional para la Sostenibilidad de Servicios en Saneamiento 
Básico – National Service for the Sustainability of Basic Sanitation Services. 
• Member of a cooperatives: Share-holder of a cooperative.  
• UMSS: Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba public university.  
• WWTP: Waste water treatment plant. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: FECOAPAC questionnaire  
 
 
 
 INFRASTRUCTURE 
 Water Sources 
 Water sources Kind of water sources:                                 
n.    
 Do you have water regularly?  
 Location of water sources  
 Property of water sources Shared:    yes/no                        
 Quantity of water 
 
 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
Name interviewee 
 
. 
Foundation year   
Territory 
 
Municipality:    
OTB:     
Locality:    
Borders:  
 
Juridical personhood Administrative decision n.:                  
Date:                                               
Register (cooperative)  N.                                                            
Licence AAPS  
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 Pumps   
 Water tank 
  
Size  
 
 How many   
 Network 
 Water Yes/no 
 Sewage Yes/no 
 Condition of the network  
 Water Quality 
 
 Depuration 
 
 
 Analysis 
 
Date of most recent:  
 
Results:  
 
How many times per year:  
 
 Waste Water 
 Waste Water treatment plant Yes/no: 
 
What kind: 
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 Where do you discharge the waste water?  
 
Water distribution  
How many hours do you have water? 
 
 
Water per member (household)   
Is it sufficient?  Yes/no 
 
Cooperative’s members  
Number of members   
Number of users   
Members that are not persons Public institutions:  
 
Industries: 
 
Water Prices 
 
Social   
Domestic   
Industrial/Commercial  
 
 
Employees  
Number   
Roles   
 
 
 
Projects 
Did you/do you have any project?   
Timeframe  
  
Collaborations for the project  
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Appendix 2: Interview guide for the representative of a cooperative  
 
The questions underlined in bold were asked directly and the others were asked in case the 
person did not incorporate the desired information in their answers. This interview took place 
after the FECOAPAC questionnaire. 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
• What is your name? What is your role in the cooperative? 
• Since when have you been involved in the cooperative? Why did you decide to 
get involved in the cooperative? 
HISTORY 
• Could you tell me about the history of the neighbourhoods/OTBs where the 
cooperative operates?  
◦ When was the neighbourhood founded? What is its composition (are there 
immigrants, and in this case, from where)? 
• What is the history of the cooperative? 
o When was the cooperative created? 
o Why was the cooperative created? 
o Was there another entity (such as an informal committee) before the cooperative 
was legally established? 
o How was the infrastructure built? Did people contribute with communitarian 
works? In which other ways the community contributed to the construction? 
• Why did you decide to establish a cooperative and not, for example, a water 
committee? 
o How did you legally establish the cooperative? Was it difficult? Did you have 
265 
 
  
any help with it? 
MANAGEMENT 
• Could you tell me about the water and sewage management in your cooperative 
in general?  
o Did you have any conflicts for the water sources? Did you share it with anyone? 
How did you obtain them? Who is the owner of the water sources?  
o Who are the owners of the cooperative? Who are the owners of the infrastructure? 
o Is the cooperative the only entity that provides water and sewage in this territory? 
(if not, who else? The municipality? Other cooperatives?) 
o Could you tell me about the water quality? How could it be improved if needed? 
 
ECONOMY 
• Do you think water prices are appropriate? How did you establish them? Did 
you have any problem with it? 
o What are the main expenses of the cooperative? 
o Is the cooperative able to cover all the expenses? Do you have money for 
projects? 
ENVIRONMENT 
• Do you have any environmental problems (for example, contamination of the 
river or the water sources)? 
COOPERATIVES MEMBERS 
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• Do you give water to all the families that live in your territory? 
• Are all users also members of the cooperative?  
• How does someone become a member of the cooperative?  
o Who can be a member? What is the advantage in being a member? 
• How do users consume water? 
o Are users careful in the usage of water? Are there any fines to encourage a careful 
usage of water? 
DECISION-MAKING 
• Can you tell me about the decision-making process of the cooperative?  
• Can you tell me about how the members participate in the cooperative? 
o Could you tell me about the general assembly? Do members participate in the 
general assembly? What kind of decisions the general assembly take? 
o Are you satisfied with the level of participation of the members? 
o In what other way do the members participate in the cooperative? Do you carry 
out communitarian works?  
o Are there fines for not participating? 
o How do you communicate the annual financial review to the members? 
o What kind of decisions do the boards of directors take?  
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE 
• What kind of relationship do you have with state organizations (national 
agencies, departmental authorities, municipality)? 
o Do you have any relationship with the water ministry and its agencies (AAPS, 
EMAGUA, SENASBA)? 
o What kind of relationship do you have with the municipal provider/ the 
municipality basic sanitation unit? 
• Do you think that the authorities do enough for the cooperative? Why? 
o What kind of role should state authorities have in your opinion? 
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FECOAPAC 
• When did the cooperative become a member of FECOAPAC? 
• Why are you part of FECOAPAC?  
• In what way do you participate in FECOAPAC? 
NGO/INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL MEETINGS 
• Do you have any relationship with NGOs or foreign cooperation agencies? 
• Did you ever participate in workshops, meetings, debates on water? 
◦ If yes, could you tell me about this? 
 
Appendix 3: Additional questions for the interview of cooperative 
representatives 
 
Supplementary questions for interviews and re-interviews with heads of cooperatives 
carried out from May onward.   
ECONOMY 
• Could you tell me how much the members pay to connect to the cooperative’s 
network? How did you decide this price?  
• How do you use this money? 
• Did you have many new members this year? Is the number of new members going 
down? 
• What is the main source of income of the cooperative? 
• Do you have savings for large projects (for example, to renovate the network)? 
SEWAGE  
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• Does the municipality manage the sewage?  
o If yes: why? 
o If not: 
▪ How did you build the sewage network? 
▪ In what condition is the network? Is it difficult to look after it? 
▪ Do you have a waste water treatment plant? How does it work? 
MEMBERS 
• Are all the members acknowledged by the state? Did you have a problem with the 
official acknowledgement? Did FECOAPAC help you with this? 
• How long does it take for the cooperative to make a new connection? Do you 
have problems to connect new members?  
• Are there people/industries in your service areas that have their own well? 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE 
• What is your relationship with the municipality? 
• Do you think that the state is under the obligation to help the cooperative? In 
which ways?  
• If the state finances a project in your territory, who is going to own the 
infrastructure? What do you think of this?  
• What do you think of the future of the cooperative? Is it going to be controlled 
by the state? Why?  
EMPLOYEES 
• You/the president of the cooperative: what role do/does you/he have in the 
cooperative? What is the role of the employees?   
ENVIRONMENT 
• Do you have an environmental licence?  
AAPS 
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• Do you have the AAPS licence? Why? 
 
Appendix 4: Interview guide for water users of the cooperatives San Pedro 
Magisterio and Quintanilla 
 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 
• Could you tell me your name, age and occupation? 
• Is a member of your family a member of the cooperative? 
o If no:  What kind of agreement do you have with the owner of the house (e.g. 
are you a renter, a relative...)? Does the owner live in the neighbourhood? Is 
the owner a member of the cooperative? 
• Can you tell me how many people there are in your house? 
o Family composition 
o Profession 
o Level of education 
• Where does your family come from? 
• Can you tell me when and why you came to live in this neighbourhood? 
o How did you obtain the land/house? 
• Could you tell me what water system did you had in the place you lived before 
coming here? 
o What kind of water/sewage connection/system? 
o How was it administered (e.g. municipal system)? 
• Do other families live with you? What relationship do have with them (e.g. 
renters, relatives) 
o Can you describe me this family (number of people, professions, how long 
did they live there)? 
OFFICIAL MEMBER 
 
• Who, in your family is the official member of the cooperative? Why? 
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• Can you describe to me how and why your family became a member of the 
cooperative?  
• Can you tell me about the history of the cooperative (if they are long-time users)? 
• Has the cooperative changed (since it started/ in last years) in your opinion? In what 
way? How did the service change? 
COOPERATIVES SERVICES 
• Do you obtain both the water and the sewage service from the cooperative? Do 
you also have the service from other sources? Why? 
• How do you utilize the water? 
 
OPINION ON THE COOPERATIVE 
• What do you think of the service of the cooperative? 
o What do you think of the water service (water quality, continuity of the 
service, meters, breakage, service interruption)? 
o What do you think of the sewage service (blockages, breakages)? 
• What do you think are the main problems? And what do you think are the 
strong points? 
• Do you think that the water and sewage service has improved in the last 5 years? 
Why and how? 
• What do you think of the management of the cooperative? 
o What do you think of the work of the directors and of the employees? 
• Is there are a social control over the directors? In what ways is this carried out? 
• Do you think that the management of the cooperative has improved in the last 
5 years? Why and how? 
PRICES/FINES 
• What do you think of the prices of the cooperative? 
o What do you think of the water and sewage prices? 
o What do you think of the connection fee? 
o What do you think of the fines for non-participation? 
o What do you think of the late fines? 
o Were there extra payments for projects? 
• Do you that the price could raise of the cooperatives needs it? What would you 
think of this? 
• Is the cost of the service a problem for your family’s economy?  
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• Do you have a problem at times to pay the cooperative? Could you give me an 
example? 
• What do you think of water cuts? 
PARTICIPATION 
• Can you describe how do you participate in the activities of the cooperatives? 
o For example, in what activities have you taken part in the last year? 
o What do you think of these activities? 
• In your family who does participate in these activities?  
o What do you think of this? In what ways those of your family that are not 
members participate in the cooperative? 
• If you have renters/if you are a renter how do they/you participate in the 
cooperative? What do you think of this? 
• Do you think that the participation of the members is important? In what way 
would you like to participate? 
• Do you feel that your opinion is taken into consideration?  
o Is the opinion of the users taken into consideration? Why? 
• Does the cooperative give you enough information on its activities?  
o Would you like more information? 
• Do you know where the water of the cooperative come from? 
• Do you know if the cooperative is carrying out any project? 
• Do you know what happens to the waste water? What do you think of this? 
• What do you think of the river Rocha pollution? In your opinion how is this 
problem going to be solved? 
• (Only in San Pedro Magisterio) Have you been informed over the project of the 
waste water treatment plant? What do you think of it? 
• (For long-time users) Do you think that the way in which people participate in 
the cooperative has changed? How? 
• (For long-time users) What have been the most significant events in the life of 
the cooperative? 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
• Have you ever been part of the board of directors? 
o Why yes/no? 
• Would you like to participate in the board?  
o Why? 
FUTURE 
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• How do you see the future of the cooperative? Do you think it will stay 
independent? 
 
Appendix 5: Interview guide for state officials 
These are the themes that were treated in each interview. Probing questions were tailored to 
each interviewee.   
• What is the role of your agency/unit? 
• What is the main aim of your agency/unit? 
• How this agency/unit influence water governance in Cochabamba and/or at the 
Bolivian level? 
• What projects does this agency/unit carry out in Cochabamba and/or at the Bolivian 
level? 
• What relationship does this agency/unity has with communitarian providers in 
Cochabamba and/or at the Bolivian level? 
• What do you think of communitarian providers? 
• What are the main issues connected with water/sewage provision in Cochabamba 
and/or at the Bolivian level? 
• What changes have there been in the last years in water/sewage provision in 
Cochabamba and/or in Bolivia? 
 
 
Appendix 6: List of interviews for the head/representative of cooperatives  
 
COCHABAMBA  
Virgen de Guadalupe, North Zone (2) 
29.11.2013 (interrupted and continued the 02.12.2013) – 26.06.2014   
Interviews with two different presidents (change due to elections) 
Nuevo Amanecer, South Zone (1) 
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05.12.2013  
Interview with Administrator 
Primero De Mayo, South Zone (1) 
21.11. 2013  
Interview with President 
Candelaria, North Zone (2) 
30.11.2013- 28.08.2013  
Interview and re-interview with the President 
Coña Coña, West Zone (1) 
08.04.2014 Interview with the administrator  
SACABA 
Quintanilla (1) 
11.11. 2013  
Interview with the president, for re-interviews, see Case Study 
San Pedro Magisterio (1) 
26.11. 2013  
1 interview with the president, for re-interview, see Case Study 
Arocagua-Puntiti (1) 
11.08.2014  
Interview with the President 
Puntiti (1) 
08.06.2014  
Interview with the President and two members of the Board of Directors 
Los Huertos (2) 
22.11. 2013– 14.05.2014  
Interview and re-interview with the administrator 
Chacacollo Oeste (2)  
25.11. 2013– 14.05. 2013  
1 interview with the administrator, 1 with the accountant 
San Jose De Koripila (1)  
13.12.2013  
Interview with the administrator 
Chacacollo Grande (1)  
29.03. 2014  
1 interview with the president together with the vice-president 
Nueva Betania (1) 
31.03.2013  
1 interview with the president together with the vice-president 
COLCAPIRHUA 
San Lorenzo (1) 
11.12. 2013  
1 interview with the president together with the vice-president 
Sausalito (2)  
26.10.2013– 25.07.2014  
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1 interview with the administrator and 1 interview with the president  
(the president of the cooperative is also the president of FECOAPAC, other interviews 
carried out with him on the subject of FECOAPAC are included in the FECOAPAC 
interview list)  
13 Noviembre (2) 
09.12.2013 – 16.06.2014  
Interview and re-interview with the president 
QUILLACOLLO 
Villa Urkupiña (2)  
20.11. 2013– 09.06. 2014  
Interview and re-interview, both time most of the board of directors was present 
Quechisla (2) 
03.12. 2013– 05.06.2014 
 Interview and re-interview with the president of the cooperative 
(the president is also one of the officials of FECOAPAC so that the re-interview is also 
included in the FECOAPAC interview list)  
Llauquinquiri (1) 
13.04.2014  
Interview with the President 
VINTO 
El Porvenir  
27.03. 2014  
Interview with the president  
OTHER 
(Interview with cooperative that are part of FECOAPAC, but are not based in 
Cochabamba Metropolitan Area)  
 
Capinota  
02.12. 2013  
Interview with administrator 
Arani  
28.11. 2013  
Interview with the administrator and the president of the cooperative 
 
COOPERATIVES SANTA CRUZ  
 
SAGUAPAC (1), 06.02.2013, Interview with the responsible for public relation 
COOPLAN (1), 06.02.2013.  Interview with the administrator 
COPASIR (1), 07.02.2014.  Interviewed the administrator  
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COOPERATIVES LA PAZ 
 
 
President Federation of Water cooperatives of La Paz and of the Cooperative Las 
Nieves (1), 07.03.2013 Interview with the president 
Water cooperative Cotahuma (1), 06.03.2014 Interview with the president  
 
Appendix 7: List of interviews for the federation of cooperatives  
 
FEDERATIONS OF COOPERATIVES  
FECOAPAC (Departmental Federation of cooperatives for potable water and 
Sanitation Cochabamba) 
President: 26.10.2013 – 13.11.2013 - 12.08.2014 
Director 1: 15.12.2013 - 26.08.2014  
Director 2: 05.06.2014 
First president of the Federation: 17.06.2014  
Legal Consultant:  07.06.2014 
 
FEDECAAS/ FENCOPAS (Departmental Federation of Potable water and Sanitation 
Santa Cruz /National Federation of Cooperatives and Providers of Water and 
Sanitation Services)  
07.02.2014 – 01.09.2014. 
Interview and re-interview of the president of FEDECAAS, that is also the president of the 
FENCOPAS 
FEDECOAP (Departmental Federation of Water Cooperatives of La Paz) 
06.03.2014.  
President of the Federation. 
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Appendix 8: List of interviews with consultants, NGO officials, academics  
 
NGOs 
Fundación Abril, Bolivian NGO 26.03.2014 – 11.08.2014 – 28.12.2013  
3 different NGOs officials, one of those is Oscar Olivera 
Aguatuya, Bolivian NGO 25.11.2014 
Agua Sustentable, Bolivian NGO 24.02.2014 
Fundación Avina, South American NGO, 07.01.2014 
Red Habitat. Bolivian NGO, 07.03.2014 
Cevi, Italian NGO 09.05.2014 
ASICASUDD-EPSA, Umbrella Association of Cochabamba Communitarian 
Providers, 07.04.2014  
ACADEMICS 
Carlos Crespo, UMSS37 – CESU 25.02.2014  
Rocio Bustamante, UMSS – Centro Agua 27.11.2013  
Torres Scarlett, CEDIB 29.11.2013 
Carmen Ledo, UMSS – CEPLAG 17.12.2013 
Jenny Rojas, UMSS – Chemistry Department 09.05.2013 
Raul Ampuero – UMSS - Centro Agua 05.08.2014 – 11.04.2014 
CONSULTANTS 
Ex-director of SEMAPA, 18.03.2014 
Water services consultant 06.12.2013 
Engineer, technical designer of the waste water treatment plant of San Pedro 
Magisterio 11.04.2014 
                                                 
37 Universidad Mayor de San Simon, Cochabamba Public University 
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Appendix 9: List of interviews with state officials  
Interviews with officials of Central State Agencies 
LA PAZ  
AAPS, 23.01.2014 –23.01.2014 – 23.01.2014  
EMAGUA, 24.01.2014   
SENASBA, 23.01.2014 – 20.08.2014  
Interview and re-interview with the same official 
Vice-ministry for Potable Water and Basic Sanitation, 21.01.2014 –19.08.2014  
General Directorate for Cooperatives, 10.01.2014 
COCHABAMBA (Departmental offices of Central State Agencies) 
AAPS, 28.10.2013 – 04.11.2013,  
I did two rounds of interviews, interviewing the same two people two times 
EMAGUA, 12.03.2014 – 24.04.2014,  
interview and re-interview with the same official 
FPS, 14.13.2014 
General Directorate for Cooperatives, 20.01.2014  
SANTA CRUZ (regional offices of the Central State Agencies) 
AAPS 07.02.2014 
Interview with a Bolivian senator, 03.02.2014 
Interviews with Agencies of the Cochabamba Departmental Government  
COCHABAMBA (Agencies of the Regional Government) 
Basic Sanitation Unit, 15.07.2014 – 16.012014 
Interview and re-interview 
Unit for the planification and integrated management of water 28.01.2014 (interrupted 
and continued the 24.02.2014)  
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Unit for the environment, 12.03.2014 -11.08.2014-30.01.2014  
four people interviewed, two on the first date and another on the second  
Ex-official unit for the environment 03.07.2014  
Interview with officials of Municipal Governments  
COCHABAMBA  
SEMAPA (Cochabamba Municipal water and sewage service) 
• Sewage planning unit 19.04.2014, (two people interviewed) – 07.07.2014 (re-
interview) 
• Potable water planning unit, 07.01.2014  
• Environmental unit, 07.07.2014  
• Legal unit, 10.06.2014 
• Official working in the waste water treatment plant of Alba Rancho, 
20.06.2014 
SACABA 
EMAPAS (Sacaba Municipal Water and Sewage Service) 
• Manager 30.10.2014  
• Sewage planning Unit 19.05.2014 – 08.05.2014 (re-interview) 
• Potable Water Planning Unit 19.05.2014   
• Legal Unit 17.07.2014 
• Administrative Unit 19.05.2014-19.05.2014 
 
Unit for Urban Development 03.07.2014 
QUILLACOLLO 
EMAPAQ (Quillacollo Municipal Water and Sewage Service) 
• Administrative unit 29.01.2014 
• Legal Unit 29.01.2014  
• Technical Unit 22.08.2014 
COLCAPIRHUA 
Basic Sanitation Unit of Colcapirhua 
• Director 23.03.2014 
VINTO 
Basic Sanitation Unit of Vinto 
• Director 27.03.2014  
TIQUIPAYA 
Basic Sanitation Unit of Tiquipaya 
• Legal Unit 26.05.2014  
• Director 26.05.2014 
• Technical Unit 26.05.2014 
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NOTE: Interviews with state officials of District 2 are included in Appendix 10. 
Appendix 10: List of interviews for the case study in the District 2 of Sacaba 
 
This is a list describing the different actors I interviewed in District 2 of Sacaba. It was 
difficult, however, to separate different kinds of actors, as the same respondent might have 
multiple roles. For example, in some case, the OTB would also act as a water provider, and 
therefore the president of the OTB is also the president of the water provider. In this case, I 
usually prepared two sets of questions for the interviewees, aiming to understand the role of 
both the OTB and the water provider and the way the two interact. In some other cases, the 
OTB and the water provider are separate entities but the president of the OTB might also act 
as a director of the water provider. In the case that an interview is also mentioned elsewhere 
I will make it clear.  
WATER PROVIDERS DISTRICT 2 
 
 
I have collected data on the water providers of District 2. During my first and second trips 
to the district, I tried to pinpoint their existence and location (signed on a map) and, when 
possible, I collected basic information in a survey. In some cases, I carried out in-depth 
interviews. In this list, I included also the cooperatives. However, detailed information on 
the interviews carried out therein can be found in the list of interviews carried out with the 
cooperatives.  
 
 
NAME  DATA COLLECTED 
WATER COOPERATIVES 
Water and Sewage Cooperative Quintanilla 
Ltda.* 
Case study (see Case Study Quintanilla) 
Water and Sewage Cooperatives San Pedro 
Magisterio Ltda.* 
Case study (see Case Study San Pedro 
Magisterio Ltda) 
Potable Water Cooperatives San Jose Koripila 
Ltda.* 
1) Map 
2) Survey 
3) Two interviews with the administrators 
Potable Water Cooperative Arocagua Puntiti 
Ltda.* 
1) Map 
2) Interview with the President  
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Potable Water Cooperative Chacaollo Oeste 
Ltda.* 
1) Map 
2) Survey 
3) Interviews with: administrator, 
accountant and secretary  
Water and Sewage Cooperative Chacollo 
Grande Ltda. * 
1) Interviews with the president (2 times)  
2) Survey  
3) Map  
Potable Water Cooperative Puntiti Ltda.* 1) Interview with president 
2) Survey  
3) Map 
OTBs THAT PROVIDE THE WATER SERVICE38 
OTB 27 de Mayo  1) Map  
2) Survey  
3) Interview with president 28.07.2014 
 
OTB Bolivia39  1) Map 
2) Interview with president 23.07.2014  
OTB Colaypato  1) Map 
2) Interview with presidents 07.07.2014  
OTB Quintanilla Sud40 1) Map 
2) Interview with president 27.07.2014 
WATER ASSOCIATION/COMMITTEES  
Water Association Oriental- Edén  1) Map 
2) Survey 
Water Association Amancayas  1) Map  
2) Survey  
Water Committees of the North  1) Map 
Water Committees Huayllani  1) Map  
2) Partial Survey  
Water Committees Puntiti Norte  1) Interview with the President 07.04.2014  
GATED NEIGHBOURHOOD 
SIDUMMS SUD (also an OTB) ** 1) Map 
2)Survey  
3) Interview with the Administrator  
26.06.2014  
SIDUMMS NORTE PLAN A (also an OTB) 1) Map 
3) Interview with the administrator 
16.07.2014   
SIDUMMS NORTE PLAN B (also an OTB) 1) Map 
3) Interview with the administrator 
17.07.2014 
URBANIZACION MAGNOLIA 1) Map 
2) Interview with administrator 27.06.2014 
                                                 
38 In this list, I have not inserted gated neighbourhoods that are also legally recognized as OTBs, preferring to 
list them separately as enclosed neighbourhoods, as I believe that to be their primary characteristic. 
39 The OTB Bolivia receives the sewage service from the Cooperative Quintanilla, so the interview with the 
president is also present in that list. 
40 The Quintanilla Sud territory has two water networks, the other one is from the Cooperative Quintanilla, so 
that the interview with the president of the OTB is also listed in the interviews done for the case study of the 
cooperative. 
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URBANIZATION EL VERGEL (also an OTB) 
** 
1) Map 
2) Interview with the administrator 
3) Interview with the president 10.07.2014 
URBANIZACION LOS PINOS (also an OTB) 
** 
1) Map 
2) Survey  
3) Interview with the Administrator 
26.06.2014 
URBANIZACION LAREDO ** 1) Map 
2) Survey 
3) Interview with the administrator 
06.06.2014 
URBANIZACION EL CASTILLO (also an 
OTB) 
1) Map 
2) Interview with the president 27.06.2014  
URBANIZACION SANTA MARIA  1) Map 
 
* These Cooperatives are also mentioned in the list of Water Cooperatives interviewed in 
Cochabamba Metropolitan Area. 
** These neighbourhoods do (or, in one case, did) receive the sewage service from the 
cooperative Quintanilla, so they have been interviewed also on their relationship with the 
cooperative.  
OTHER ACTORS OF DISTRICT 2  
NAME DATA COLLECTED 
Vice-Mayor 30.07.2014  
Vice-Mayor and ex-president of the OTB 
San Pedro Magisterio 
12.05.2014 – 06.08.2014 (Interview and 
re-interview) 
President of the Association of OTBs (also 
President OTB San Jose de Koripila) 
13.05.2014 -29.07.2014 (Interview and re-
interview) 
President Association of Irrigators of 
District 2 (also a director of the OTB 
Arocagua Chiljchi) 
19.07.2014 
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Appendix 11: List of interviews for the case study of the Quintanilla 
cooperative 
 
Here, I provide an overview of the different actors interviewed. I underline, as in the case of 
District 2 actors, that in some cases, actors might overlap, or the same actor might have more 
than one role.  
PRESIDENTS OF OTBS IN THE TERRITORY OF THE COOPERATIVE 
 
OTB Quintanilla Este Interview president (also president of the 
Cooperative Quintanilla, see case study) 
OTB Quintanilla Central Interview with the president (also an 
elected officer of the cooperative 
Quintanilla), 24.07.2014 
OTB Quintanilla Oeste   Interview president, 29.07.2014 
OTB Paraiso Interview Vice-President, 26.07.2014  
OTB Quintanilla Sud The OTB is partially served by the 
cooperatives but it also has an independent 
water provider, this interview was then 
already listed in the list of water providers 
of District 2 
 
WATER USER 
I interviewed 48 water and/or sewage users. I also interviewed 1 non-user that was waiting 
to receive the service.  
DIRECTORS/EMPLOYEES 
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Board of Directors 
President of the cooperative 10.09.2013 
Vice president  04.07.2014 
Treasurer 22.05.2014 – 02.08.2014 
Secretary of Minutes 21.05.2014 
President of the supervision council  24.07.2014 
Vice-president supervision council 20.07.2014 
Spokesperson supervision council 24.06.2014 
Ex-president Cooperative 15.08.2014 
First President of the Cooperative 04.09.2014 
EMPLOYEES 
Secretary 21.05.2014- 07.08.2014 
Meters reader 20.05.2014 
Accountant 21.05.2014 
Plumber 19.07.2014 
 
Appendix 12: List of interviews for the case study of the San Pedro 
Magisterio cooperative 
 
WATER/ SEWAGE USERS  
• 42 water and/or sewage users of the Cooperative San Pedro. 
• 4 people that live in the territory of the OTB San Pedro Magisterio but receive water 
from EMAPAS 
 
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
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President of the cooperative 09.08.2014  
Vice president Administration Council 23.05.2014 
Legal Counsellor 30.05.2014 
Vice-president Supervision Council 28.05.2014 
Member Supervision Council 28.05.2014 
Member Administration Council 14.06.2014 – 27.06.2014 
Member Supervision Council 29.05.2014 
First President of the Cooperative 24.07.2014 
EMPLOYEES 
Secretary 08.08.2014 
Administrator 24.08.2014 
Plumber 20.05.2014- 17.07.2014 
OTB 
Vice President 11.06.2014-06.08.2014 
Ex-President 6.08.2014 (plus 1 previous interview as 
Vice-mayor of the district) 
OTB 
OTB San Pedro Magisterio 1) Interview president (also president of 
the Cooperative San Pedro Magisterio) 
2) Interview vice-president 23.05.2014 – 
06.08.2014  
 
